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ABSTRACT
This research focuses on elective changes which are introduced to improve
productivity. The "quality movement" of the last decade has resulted in a significant
increase in both the pace and scope of change throughout the ship design and construction
cycle. Recent attention has been given to Production Engineering, Concurrent
Engineering, Standardization, and Build Strategy development as means to reduce the
amount of downstream engineering rework associated with design changes. These are
elements of a "Design for Competitiveness" approach which must also include Change
Management Through an industry survey it is shown that shipbuilders recognize Change
Management to be a strategically important capability, but that their perfonnance in this
area is relatively \veak.
A framework is developed to facilitate the identification and introduction of
elective changes. The framework begins with strategic planning based upon responses to
the competitive environment. A decision analysis Inodel is developed and tested for the
evaluation and prioritization of improvement proposals within the context of a strategic
plan. After a review of alternative evaluation methods including traditional Engineering
Economy, 'Utility Theory, Fonnal Decision Analysis, and the Analytic Hierarchy Process
(AHP), the AHP is selected as the decision theory best suited to this application. The
output of the model, priority vectors with respect to benefit, cost and risk as well as
overall preference, is used to suggest an appropriate implelnentation strategy for
altel11ative proposals.
An effective Change Management plan can enable a shipyard to implenlent
innovative, productivity-motivated, design solutions faster and nlore effectively. A
successful £1.pproach to Change Management is required to avoid paying the price of lost
opportunity. It is also equally necessary to avoid paying the price of delays and
disruption associated \vith improperly introduced, or ill-conceived, design changes.
Thesis Super,'isor: Prof. I-Ienry S. Marcus
NAVSEA Professor of Ship Acquisition
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1.,0 INTRODUCTION
This research examines the management of improvement activities within the
context of competitive strategic objectives. A particular emphasis is given to those
improvements involving the interface between product and process, as it will be shown
that improvements in one necessarily involve the other. Improvement represents change,
and this research explores Change Management within the context of the design process.
Machiavelli warned that ".. .it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than
to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." [Lamb, 1986] 'This work
seeks to contribute to a greater understanding of why this is so, and some means for
mitigating these difficulties. The research is focused on the shipbuilding industry, but the
conclusions drawn could be easily applicable in a more general context. While design
change is emphasized throughout this research, the procedural context and decision
analysis model developed are applicable to a broad range of improvement proposals.
The research questions which are its focus include:
• Is Change Management a strategically important capability relative to other
competitive capabilities?
• How strong is industry's understanding and skill with respect to Change Management
relative to other capabilities?
• What facets of the Change Management process are most critical for success?
• What facets of the Change Management process require the most improvement?
• Can a decision analysis model be developed to significantly improve the process?
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION
Shipbuilders will create and sustain a true competitive advantage only if they rely
on improvements rather than temporary subsidy. "The rate at which individuals and
organizations learn may become the only sustainable competitive advantage." [Stata,
1989, p.64] A high rate of learning implies continuous and substantial change.
Shipbuilders require an understanding of how to identify and implenlent the changes that
are required to compete. In general, these changes can be associated with the
shipbuilding processes and facility, the shipyard organization, and the ship designs
themselves. As will be shown in chapter 2.0, changes in anyone area typically require
associated changes in the others. This research is unique in its attention to the interface
between product, process, and organization. Elective '~Design Change"" ~s considered to
occur at that interface. Management of change in the context of the design process i~ a
specific concern of this research. The solution of the problem is developed through the
15
integration of management SCience, organizational theory, decision theory~ and
engineering practice.
Webster's dictionary defines the word "change" as follo\vs:
I) To cause to turn or pass from one state to another; to alter or make
different; to vary in external form or in essence
2) To substitute another thing or things for
In other words, to change is to MODIFY or to SlIBSTITUTE. Change Management in
the context of design is then defined as the coordination, organization, and leadership of
the processes associated with modifying and silbstituting design elements.
Shipbuilders recognize the need for change. The problem they face is that "...over
half of all major change initiatives prove to be disappointm~nts or outright failures."
[Pritchett, 1996, p.1 ] In this research, the reasons why that statement is true are explored
along with the means for l:ffectively managing design improvement.
An effective Change Management plan can enable a shipyard to inlplement
innovative, cost-saving solutions faster and more effectively. A successful approach to
Change Management is required to avoid payin,3 the price of lost opportunity. It is also
equally necessary to avoid paying the price of delays and disruption associated with
improperly introduced or ill-conceived design changes.
Change that takes longer than expected can cause an organization to miss a
window of opportunity, wiping out the need for the change in the first
place. Higher than anticipated costs because of the additional time and
attention required compound that failure. Finally, a sense of failure
frequently penneates an organization ineffectively implernenting change,
resulting in low morale and, e\'en more damaging, change-shy managers
who now believe themselves incapable of implementing change. These
are the costs of not managing change - the high costs that many
organizations arc unnecessarily paying. [Carr, Hard, Trahant, p.162]
The purpose of this research is to explore the ways in which continuous
productivity improvement can be supported throughout the ship design cycle through the
effective management of design change. Issues related to the introduction of design
irnprovements, and revised or new design standards, which are introduced to reduce
construction costs and cycle time will be studied. This research exanlines the nl0tivations
for introducing design changes, the means available for evaluating the proposals, and the
implementation of these proposals. Contributing factors for both success and failure will
be identified through the use of an industry survey. This research develops a
descriptive/cognitive model of the successful Change Managenlent process as it relates to
design. The National Science Foundation defines Cognitive/Descriptive ITIodels as
models of the design process based on, and informed by, close observation of hUI11all
design activity. [NSF, 1996, p.9]
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This research concentrates on elective design changes which are in contrast to
mandatory design changes. Elective changes are those changes which are desired due to
th~ir perceived benefits, but which are not required for function, to meet a specification,
or for production to proceed. Mandatory design changes are those changes which must
be made in order to ensure proper function, to meet the specifications, or to allow
production to proceed.
ELECTIVE CHANGE
MANDATORY CHANGE
Lessons Learned
During Construction
Lessons Learned Competitive
During Design 0ppoltunity
MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE
FIGURE 1.0 - ELECTIVE VS. MANDATORY CHANGES
This research draws from supporting theories and procedural contexts for
managing change in order to develop a framework and model for the successful
introduction of design improvements and lessons learned throughout the design cycle.
The conclusions drawn are reinforced through a survey of industry attitudes and practices.
Changes can be implemented using a variety of approaches, ranging from forced,
or coercive, to entirely collaborative efforts. The speed with which the changes are
identified and implemented can vary, depending on the approach used. Initiatives which
are not implemented immediately may represent a lost opportunity. Alternatively, a
rushed and poorly managed implementation may do more damage than it is worth. The
literature regarding organizational change, which will be shown to offer a foundation
upon which Design Change Management can be developed, illustrates the fact that
varied approaches have their place. One leading consultant wrote "the caution here is
patience. It takes people a long time and a great deal of discussion, independent thought,
formulation, trial, reformulation, and retrial to assimilate a significant organizational
change...There is little that can be done to leapfrog the step by step process of change, or
the assimilation time that people require." [Heifetz, 1993, p.32] Not all of those who have
written about organizational change would agree that it is doomed to be a lengthy
process. Pritchett wrote, "Gradual change may look like the safest route, but appearances
are deceptive. Going slow is usually a big gamble...The third and least promising \vay to
begin is with the middle of the road approach. It's the most common, but the least
effective. Basically it amounts to muddling along - being neither subtle, nor bold and
d~amatic. It offers none of the benefits of the other two strategies. The enelnies of
change find it the easiest to resist. They see what's cooling, and the sight of that mainly
serves to mobilize their counter-~ttack." [Pritchett, 1996, p.7] While it is agreed that
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there is a step by step process of change, it is clear that some organizations are better at
introducing changes than others. The keys to their success are explored.
The tools, methods, and conclusions presented in this research are developed
through extensive benclunarking of a variety of finns, the author's experiences with
firsthand implementation of design changes in a major U.S. shipyard, and a review of the
existing literature and research pertaining to Change Management, product improvement,
design for manufacture and assembly, value engineering and design/production
integration.
1.2 BACKGROUND AND I~IPORTANCEOF THIS RESEARCH
The greatest motivation to change is pain and discomfort. A second motivation is
observed opportunity. u.s. ~iipbuilders must take advantage of opportunities to reduce
costs and cycle time rather than focus only on required design changes resulting from the
pain of errors and omissions. If it is true that ".. .the people who change the best and
fastest are the ones who have no choice" [Frey, 1993], then U.S. shipbuilders should
rapidly become superior managers of change. It is clear that U.S. yards find it difficult or
impossible to compete at market prices for international commercial orders at this time.
"A comparison of the manhours required to build similar ships in a U.S. shipyard and a
Japanese shipyard [in 1987] indicated the Japanese shipyard required 39% of the effort of
the U.S. yard. Presently, the gap although significant is not as great as estimated in
1987." [Rack, 1995, p.27-3] Data collected as part of the industry sllrvey conducted in
the course of this research demonstartes that cycle times and total employement are
dramatically lower in internationally competitive shipyards than in the U.S today.
Significant changes to the business processes, production processes, design processes and
organizational structure will be required to succeed internationally. Shipyards must
embark on a design improvement process concurrently with the routine design effort in
support of a Design for Competitiveness philosophy. An effective Change Management
plan will allow the shipyard to quickly and effectively utilize the improvements
identified. Without effective Change Management, the shipyard's efforts to reduce costs
through design will be unguided at best, and will often fail.
u.s. shipbuilders are aware that they must change, and are more willing than ever
to make changes to compete in a global market. Shipyards throughout the United States
have invested great sums of money into training regarding the philosophy of Total
Quality Management (TQM), or Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI). Training
regarding the philosophies of Deming, Juran, Crosby and other TQM gurus has
successfully created an awareness regarding the need to change. Unfortunately, this
willingness to change has been poorly translated into the ability to implement change
effectively. Figure 1.1 illustrates the chain of events leading from the pain of nlarket
realities to the development of an effective Change lvlanagement plan. Shipyard feedback
and an extensive literature survey will be shown to support this chail1 of events in
chapters 2.0 and 4.0. This research is important in that it may enable shipyards to
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introduce lessons learned, new and revised design standards, and design improvements
effectively without suffering the significant false starts, delay and disruption, and
frustration that is associated with improperly managed change. This research is also
important in that it may provide guidance for those shipyards that are presently, or have
in the past, suffered through a disruptive and frustrating ilnprovement program and are
wary of trying again.
PAIN
FALSE STARTS,
DISRUPTiON
TQM & FRUSTRATION AB1LITY TO
INVESTMENT COORDINAT7 CHANGE
& TRAINING /' EFFECTIVELY
CHANGE
MANAGEMENT
PLAN
FIGURE ].1 - CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO CIIANGE TvtANAGEMENT
Successful Change Management in the context of "design improvement" as
opposed to "design repair" must clearly understand and assess the current "as-is" state,
identify opportunities to improve, identify desirable future states, and facilitate the rapid
transformation from tt~e current state to the desired state. As the industry survey will
show, the key is for resources to be expended on the most beneficial changes, for these
changes to be both rapid and lasting, and for these changes to work together consistently
towards an overall strategy for success. A contribution of this research will be a decision
analysis model for use in evaluating, prioritizing, decisionmaking and planning which
links proposals to such a strategy.
Feedback to repeat the cycle
FIGURE 1.2 - CYCLE OF CHANGE
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This work will complement other research in this area. It recognizes that there
will always be opportunities to improve the design throughout the design cycle. In this
way, it will complement research regarding Concurrent Engineering and Build Strategy
development. This research focuses on reducing costs and improving efficiency by
effectively managing design change rather than by focusing entirely on streamlining
organizational structure or downsizing. Organizational structure will be examined, but
only in the context of managing design change.
There is a clear need for research in this area, which is supported by the results of
the industry sun'ey discussed in chapter 4.0. A recent Marine Board study, "Shipbuilding
Technology and Education", found that U.S. shipyards lag behind the international
competition in four Inajor areas:
• Business-Process technologies
• System Technologies
• Shipyard Production Process Technology
• New Materials and Product technologies
The study noted that the shipyards appeared to be furthest behind in business-
process and new product and material technologies. This research supports
ilnprovements in these areas.
An April 1996 National Science Foundation (NSF) report, II Research
Opportunities in Engineering Design lt also cites the need for further research in this area.
The report indicates that competitive factors are forcing drastic reductions in cycle time.
This competition is forcing designers to "design on the edge" more and more, demanding
improved decision making capabilities under conditions of uncertainty and risk. The
decision analysis model developed in this research directly addresses this problem.
Engineering Change Management continues to be cited by companies as a major problem
and detriment to timely production. [NSF, 1996] Changes in design practice are needed
to deal with the amount of information generated for a product and process, and the speed
with which that product or process changes.
Change is overwhelming in today's U.S. shipyard. The organization itself is
changing, with restructuring occurring so rapidly and so often that one often wonders if it
is necessary to add "or currenl occupant" to each memo. The way the shipbuilding
industry does business is changing. Cycle times are being reduced, forcing every
department to do more in less time, ,~.'ith fewer resources. Engineering offices are
transitioning to Concurrent Engineering. Concurrent Engineering is, as the Ilanle
suggests, a design approach in which all the players and participants (including customers
and suppliers) work together and in parallel towards the development of a product or
service. It serves to reduce design cycle time, and if properly implemented can reduce the
number of downstream design changes which are required. This transition period often
involves departments "'orking in parallel with imperfect communication.
In today's design offices, a greater empllasis and discipline nlust be placed upon
Change Management and configuration control. In the past, sequential engineering
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would dictate that one group would typically lead the other. For example, development
of detailed composite drawings for distributive systems, equipmen~ foundatioI1~~, and
other miscellaneous outfitting would be preceded by detailed developnlent of the ship
structure. This would permit the Composite Group to avoid interferences and provide a
stable list of changes required of the ship structure. In today's design offices, the
schedule for most drawings and engineering disciplines overlap and are not necessari~y in
a rational sequence from the perspective of a systems based designer. In fact, the
traditional drawing has been replaced by product models which pennit production
infonnation to be delivered as late as possible. Schedules are now based upon setbacks to
block erection dates. The Build Strategy dictates the schedule. Working in parallel
introduces change in and of itself as each group is forced to react to the iterative design
process of the other. In this period of transition, and even in a company which has a
greater level of "concurrence" in its Concurrent Engineering efforts, changes due to the
iterative nature of design are frequent and must be anticipated. Design groups are finding
thelnselves working very hard to deal with these "iterative" design changes. In such an,
environment of frequent mandatory changes manifested as an intense and iterative design
development period, it is difficult to implement additional "desired" design changes.
Change Management skills are more important than ever. The costs of a better end
product (one which may have lower overall costs) are incurred in Engineering. In IJ.S.
shipyards, the engineering costs associated with any given contract are already several
times that of a world-class shipbuilder. It is difficult to introduce design changes
intended to reduce production costs which require additional engineering resources in an
environment in which all costs, incluejing engineering costs, must be drastically reduced.
Those who desire design change often hear, "if only we could concentrate on the
design at hand and save this new approach or new standard. for the next ship or next
contract." There appears to be an expectation that while we are busy and overwhelmed
toda)', there will be a lull between contracts which will permit a smoother, less stressful
introduction at a later date. Unfortunately, postponing changes may not only represent
lost opportunities at present, but may also guarantee that the changes will never be made.
As the Detail Design division winds down their design effort, the Systems Engineering
division is already working on conceptual and preliminary designs for potential future
contracts. Furthemlore, manning levels in the design groups are reduced or shifted
elsewhere as the design effort related to th.e first of a class moves further to the right of
the peak workload. With this reduced resource level, the introduction of design changes
is still a hardship, even for ship two in a limited production run of a class. The design
organization is stretched with its reduced resources busy making required changes, as
opposed to desired changes. As will be discussed in chapter 3.0, a foundation of
successful Change Management is a reduction to this baseline load of change. For design
improvement to be managed, it will need to be made part of the design culture.
21
1.3 CHANGE MANAGEl\1ENT OBJECTIVES
Design changes are more difficult to introduce later in the design cycie, and tIle
potential to impact overall system costs is reduced as time progresses. The 1991 National
Research Council report, "Improving Engineering Design: Designing for Competitive
Advantage" estimates that over 70% of a product's life cycle costs are determined during
concept design. The potential savings associated with the introduction of any given
strategic design change, initiative, or revised standard is reduced as a contract progresses.
As time goes on, even a good idea will become costly due to delays, disruption and
rework. This is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
1000/0
Savings
Potential
AREA OF
OPPORTUNITY
0%
Effective Change
f'ICiURE 1.3 - DI~1INISHING OPPORTUNITIES
Contract Stage
ange
The total potential savings, or benefit, is largely a function of the meriis of tIle
initiative. Effective Change Management can inlpact the total actual benefit by allowing
the maximum potential to be realized for a longer period of time. It is important to
recognize that Figure 1.3 illustrates the reduced effectiveness \vith regard to a particular
contract. Most design initiatives will impact more than one contract, and there will never
be a time when it is convenient to introduce changes. A healthy shipyard strives to work
on multiple contracts and ideally \vould have little or no lag time between design effort~.
An effective Change Management strategy addresses the need to incorporate design
innovations under these circumstances.
Change Management strives to maximize the potentiai savings or "area of
opportunity" in a number of ways. As illustrated in Figure 1.4, the shape of the curve can
be modified to reflect an extended period vvithin which 100% or near IOO°;i. benefit can be
achieved.
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In addition, effective Change Management strives to move the intercept of the
curve with the time (x) axis further to the right, minimizing the costs associated with
delay and disruption as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
100%
Savings
Potential
AREA OF
OPPORTUNITY
Effecti'/e Change
Contract Stage
Disruptive Change
FIGURE 1.5 - MINIMIZATION OF DISRUPTION
An idealized, but admittedly impossible, systenl of Change Management would
permit maximum benefit potential to be realized regardless of the contract stage or
timeline as illustrated in Figure 1.6. This '"vould represent a lI~uper-Adaptable"
organization, able to introduce changes at any time and achieve the full positive potential
of the initiative.
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1.4 A FRAMEWORK FOR DESIGN CHANGE MANAGEMENT
In order to study Change Management, it is useful to first develop a stage model,
or framework, describing the overall process. This serves to guide the research. Each of
the stages illustrated in the framework serve as a focus for study. In chapter 2.0 the
supporting theory from the literature is discussed and placed in the context of this
framework. As the research progresses, each of the stages identified in this model will be
further refined and described. The research will conclude with each of the stage's
procedures and implications fully explored. A global framework of Change Management
is illustrated in Figure 1.7.
Motivation refers to the source of the change and the objectives of the change. As
has been mentioned, design changes may be mandatory or elective. In order for a change
to take place, there must be some mechanism for identifying the potential change. Once a
motivation exists, there must be a means for identifying the relevant "universe" of design
changes or solutions which address the motivation in question_ This is the role of the
identification stage. It gathers a set of motivating factors and translates that information
into a set of possible design changes and solutions.
Once a set of design changes has been proposed, it is necessary to evaluate each
proposal. A mechanism for evaluating the benefits, risks, and costs must be in place
which quickly and consistently reflects the comparative merit of proposals within the
context of the shipyard's overall strategy. The information developed in this evaluation
stage is then used to prioritize this universe of potential changes in order to assure that
resources are expended wisely. Effective decisionmaking is then possible, based upon
the knowledge gained in the preceding stages.
Once a set of "approved" proposals is decided upon, detailed planning can take
place to\vards implementation of the proposals. Finally, measures of success are needed
which can be fed back into the Change Management system for consideration for future
changes. Throughout the entire process, support, commitment and direction from upper
management in the form of resources~ leadership, direction towards an overall strategy
and a consistent Change Management infrastructure is required.
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1.5 TERMINOLOGY
CI,ange and CI,ange Management:
As noted earlier, to change is to MODIFY or to SUBSTITUTE. "Change Management"
in the context of design is then defined as the coordination, organization, and leadership
of the processes associated with rrlodifying and substituting design elements.
Framework:
The dictionaI)' defines a framework as Pta structure, usually rigid, serving to hold the parts
of something together or to support something constructed or stretched over or around it;
skeletal structure; basic structure; constitution; adjusted arrangement; system." In the
context of this thesis, "framework" refers to a top level flowchart illustrating the steps or
phases associated with design change. The framc\vork does not illustrate the means for
completing a step or for moving from one step to another. It is a generic document
independent of the characteristics of a change or its implementation and is synonomous
with "stage model."
Metllod anti Metllodology:
Webster's dictionary defines a methodology as "a system of methods" where a method is
"a way of doing anything; mode; procedure; process; especially a regular, orderly,
definite procedure." In the context of this thesis, a "method" refers to a detailed
description and process flow illustrating the means of completing a given step of the
framework. A "method" details a process or procedure and a description of the input to,
and output from, that procedure. In the context of this work "method", "procedure", and
"process" are synonymous. "Methodology" then refers to a particular collection of
methods, or procedures, which together comprise a system for managing design change
successfully under a given set of conditions. Individual chapters will discuss methods
associated with each stage of the framework. The conclusion to the thesis r\Vill
summarize the methodology comprising the collection of methods presented throughout
the thesis.
Tool(s):
The dictionary refers to a tool as "a means." In this thesis the \\'ord "tool" to refers to
hardware or software which are useful or required to apply a particular 111ethod to a
framework step. These may take the fornl of documents, databases, standards, computer
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programs, forms, quality analysis charts, or anything else that can be manufactured to
facilitate a procedure. A tool enables the application of a method and is synonymous
with "enabler."
Tlleoryr:
The dictionary defines a theory as "ail idea or mental plan of the way to do something; a
systematic statement of principles involved; a formulation of apparent relationships or
underlying principles of certain observed phenomena which has been verified to some
extent." In the context of this research, "theory" \vill refer to an explanation of the
reasons, or underlying principles, which justify a particular method or methodology. As
the National Science Foundation points out, these principles may be "founded jn
behavioral studies and social science, or in physical sciences and technology. II
Model:
The dictionary definition that is applicable here is "a generalized, hypothetical
description, often based on an analogy, used in analyzing or explaining something." A
model may be a subset of the "tools" defined above. The National Science Foundation
characterizes design process modeling into three broad areas: (1) descriptive/cognitive
models, (2) computational models, and (3) prescriptive models/normative theories.
Descriptive/cognitive models are models of the design process that are based on and
infonned by close observation of human design activity. They are representations of how
people perfonn design activities. Computational models express methods by which a
computer can perfonn a design task. Optimization routines are examples of
computational models. Prescriptive models specify how design should be done. This
research utilizes all three and draws a distinction between a model and a theory. A model
seeks to predict outcomes or suggest actions and is valid if it can be demonstrated to be
accurate through observations. A theory seeks to explain the underlying principles which
drive the behaviors predicted by the model.
Strategy:
In this research, the word "strategy" refers to a set of goals and objectives to be achieved
by a methodology or a set of methodologies within the context of an organizational
structure, corporate culture and business practices. "Strategy" defines the intent, purpose,
or context within which methods are developed and applied.
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1.6 CHARACTERIZING PROPOSALS
Design changes can be described in terms of a number of characteristics. These
characteristics include:
• Motivatioa
• Extent
• Timing
• Focus and interdependency
• Focus elements
• Costs
• Benefits
• Risks
1.6.1 Motivation as a characteristic
As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, change is driven or motivated by
problems and opportunities which are identified in a variety of ways. This motivation
can be in response to a number of different factors, such as:
MANDATORY:
• Errors and Omissions
• Customer Requests
• Regulatory Requirements
ELECTIVE
• Time/Cost Saving Technologies and Competitive Opportunities
• Market Driven Goals
• Lessons Learned
The distinction between these differing motivations is important. The first three listed
(error correction, customer requests, and regulatory requirements) represent motivation to
change which the shipyard MUST (or is at least compelled to) respond to. The remaining
three motivations (competitive opportunity, market driven goals and lessons learned)
represent motivations which a shipyard can ELECT to respond to. Most shipyards
already have systems in place with varying degrees of success to deal with mandatory
changes. The emphasis of this research is on ELECTIVE changes. In chapter 4.0 the
results of a shipyard survey are presented which support this fOCliS.
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In order to facilitate discussions of engineering change, it is important to develop
a consistent set of definitions to use when classifying motivations. r-rhe following
definitions will be adhered to in the course of this research.
"Errors and Omissions" refer to changes made in response to an error which is
unacceptable, and must be corrected in order to meet specifications Ot pennit pruduction
to proceed. In this regard it is a mandatory motivation.
"Customer Xequests" represent a motivation which the design organizations must
respond to. This motivation is brought about by a new requirement requested by the
customer. Once the change has been approved by program management, the change is
mandatory. The design groups mayor may not recover the costs associated with these
changes.
"Regulatory Requirements" can result in mandatory changes. New requirements
may apply to a work in progress. In addition, tht= interpretation of requirements may be
altered, requiring changes. A failure on the part of the design to address a requirement
which has not changed and has no alternative interpretation would result in an "error
correction" change rather than a change brought about by changing regulatory
requirements.
"Time or Cost Saving Technology", is a motivation to change which is made in
response to a previously unidentified competitive opportunity. Such a proposal mayor
may cot be in support of an overall preconceived initiative or strategy. "fhese proposals
are characterized as being in support of continuous design improvement. These proposals
may present themselves as the result of ongoing research or benchmarking, and not
necessarily as part of a focused effort to meet a particular objective.
"Market Driven Goals" represent proposals identified singly or in conjunction
with other proposals in support of a strategy or initiative. Changes such as these would
be in support of quantifiable targets and goals which the shipyard has identified as
necessary to compete. These changes are differentiated from those motivated by
"competitive opportunities" in that they are conceived as a direct result of a strategic
decision or goal, rather than in response to a previously unidentified opportunity.
Changes motivated by "market driven goals" are identified as part of a program to
identify and assess potential design solutions to meet a stated objective. Changes
motivated by "market driven goals" are examples of objectives generating a set of ideas
(desigrl alternatives) or linking other previously identified proposals to goals and
objectives.
"Lessons Learned" refer to proposals made in response to experience gained
during the design process or during construction. Such a change is made in recognition
of greater understanding. Such a change differs from those motivated by "error
correction" in that these changes are not necessary to allow design or production to
proceed, but are desirable. Such changes differ from those nlotivatcd by conlpetitive
opportunities and market driven goals in that they are identified through direct
experience, rather than alternative means such as benchmarking or vendor proposals.
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1.6.2 Extent as a Characteristic
It has been pointed out that the word "change" implies that one of two distinct
processes takes place. To change is to MODIFY or to SUBSTITUTE. The approach
required to implement a change which involves an alteration is likely to be different from
that required to implement a change which is substitutive in nature. "Extent" as a
characteristic of change refers to whether an elernent is simply modified (evolutionary),
or has a different element substituted in its place. It is a measure of the degree to which
the original configurati(\n can be recognized after the change is made. Extent is associated
vlith the degree to which rework may be required and the degree to which cooperation
Inay be required. It is also associated with the complexity of the change.
1.6.3 Timing as a Characteristic
With regard to Change Management, it may often be true that "timing is
everything". Timing is an important characteristic for both the identification of a
potential change, as well as the implementation of the proposal.
The point in the designlconstnlction cycle that a proposed change is identified is
an important factor. Two similar changes may have different relative impacts depending
upon the time at which the change was identified. The type of strategy required to
implement the change may also vary depending on the time the c~lange is identified.
Just as the timing of the identification of the change is a key characteristic, so too
is the timing of its implementation. The approach required to successfully implement the
change is likely to vary depending on the amount of time av?jlable to make tIle change
between the change's identification and its proposed implenlentation. In addition to the
time available, the timing relative to the point in the design cycle at which the
implementation is to be made will also be a detennilling characteristic for the approach
utilized. Issues associated with timing will manifest themselves as schedule risks and
delays. It should be noted that the Change Management approach utilized is one of the
driving factors that will determine how long a change takes to implement.
1.6.4 Focus and Interdependency as Characteristics
Changes can be made to any of the processes and products which make up the
busirless of shipbuilding. The focus can be PROCESS oriented, or OBJECT oriented.
For example, the focus can be on any of the following.
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PROCESS
• Business Process Change
• Production Process Change
• Design Process Change
•
OBJECT
Facilities Change
Design Change
Organizational Change
While this research IS aimed at facilitating design changes, it will be important to
recognize that changes in each focus need not be independent of the others. The focus
categories serve two purposes in classifying changes.
• Identify the PRIMARY FOCUS of a cllange (Design Change in the case of this
research)
• Help indicate the relative INTERDEPENDENCY of changes
Every change will have a primary focus, which is associated with the change's
stated objectives. In addition, a primary focus may require changes in otht=r focus areas
in order to be successful. This is an example of interdependency.
The primary focus is important, because the appropriate strategy and tools may
vary from one focus to another. Most notably, changes in either the PROCESS or
OBJEC1-' categories are likely to require similar strategies and tools as otller changes in
the same category.
Object oriented changes may be made within the context of existing business,
production and design processes, or they may require any combination of process
changes to meet their objectives. An object oriented change which can be made within
the context of existing processes is likely to be easier to implement than those that require
process changes. Similarly, changes to production processes may require design changes
to be made in order to support the new production process. Therefore both object
oriented and process oriented changes may be made independently or in conjunction with
other changes. For these reasons, it is important to understand and recognize
interdependency.
A distinction sllould be made at this point between the tenn "initiative" and t.he
tenn "change". For the purposes of this research, the term "initiative" will be used to
indicate a goal supported by a collection of related changes. These related changes may
be in any of the focus areas discussed. While an initiative is a collection of related
changes all in support of a common goal, an initiative need not have a high degree of
interdependency. It is possibJ.e for an initiative to require changes in only one focus.
However, it is likely for an initiative to have a higher degree of interdependency than a
single change.
Deming made a similar distinction in discussions related to Total Quality
Management. He pointed out that it is not enough to have enlployees perfornling their
jobs perfectly, it is also critical that they perform the right jobs. Deming suggested that it
is the role of upper management to identify the right johs in support of a corporate vision,
while it is the role of the employees to perform tllese jOilS to the best of their abilities and
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to continuously improve their performance. Similarly, an organization can be very good
at implementing changes, but very poor at identifying the changes which are important.
Conversely, an organization may be very good at identifying necessary changes in
support of initiatives consistent with market driven goals, but very poor at implementing
the required changes. Therefore, two issues are critical to overall success. A Change
Management plan must address the developm~nt of initiatives, and selection of their
supporting proposals, as well as the meajlS for implementing changes.
1.6.5 Focus Elements as Characteristics
In turn, each focus can be further subdivided into a variety of elements. For
example, the Design Change focus can be further divided into the myriad of interim
product families that exist representing trades and zones. Change Management requires
that psychological, organizational and technical issues be understood and managed in
order to lead an initiative through to success. The "focus element" will serve to better
define the degree to which each of these issues is relevant.
Note that some elements are not exclusive, and can be worked together. In some
cases there is overlap between elements. For example, system hangers may be improved
as a whole, even though one could also examine pipe hangers independently of those for
wireways or dueting. 1'his is an example of further defining the breadth of a ~hange by
expanding the number of elements that apply.
1.6.6 Cost, Benefit and Risk as Characterstics
The anticipated benefits, costs, and risks associated with a change represent
nleasurable characteristics. These are associated with elements of the competitive
environment, to be described in greater detail in chapter 2.0. These characteristics also
serve as the basis for evaluating alternative proposals by comparing their relative
benefits, costs and risks. The characteristics mentioned in the previous sub~cctions are
focused on identification, planning and implementation stages of change. Benefits, costs
and risks are used in the evaluation, prioritizing, and decisionmaking stages.
Durillg the evaluation of change proposals, costs, benefits and risks can be
estimated and used to compare or contrast different changes. An estimate of the
resources required to implement a change can also be used to characterize changes.
During the evaluation of proposals, estimates for the requirements for nlanning,
equipment, and expenditures can be made. The level of resources required may impact
the type of change strategy utilized.
The risk associated \vith a particular change proposal is an important
characteristic which may impact the strategy used in implementing the change. Risk is a
general term which we use to recognize the probabilistic nature of events. Risk can be
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divided into a number of categories which need to be addressed individually, but together
represent the possibility that the change may bring about undesirable results.
Later in this research, specifc pai'ameters will be identified asscoiated with
benefit, cost and risk as they relate to the competitive environment and the development
of a decision model.
1.7 RESEARCH ApPROACH AND ORGANIZATION
This research seeks to develop a descriptive/cognitive model of the succe~sful
Change Management process as it reiates to design. NSF defines Cognitive/Descriptive
models as models of the design process based on, and infonned by, close observation of
human design activity. The approach is justified, given the current "state of the art" in
design research.
There is general agreement that the design process is a synthetic process
which is not totally amenable to be studied by the tools of hard
science...There is also debate about the nature of a design theory: is it
founded in behavioral studies and social science, or in physical sciences
and technology?...there is still strong agreement that design research needs
to investigate and understand design processes so that strong guidance can
be provided for all practitioners. Even fragments of theories, if used
appropriately, will be useful. Since, with few exceptions, design is in the
pre-theory stage we should not be looking for complete, prescriptive
models yet. Instead we need to gather more empirical data (descriptive
models). [NSF, 1996, p. I8]
By studying the mechanisms which cOlltribute to the success and failure of
initiatives, a framework and decision model for managing competitive design changes
can be created which shipyards can further develop based upon their own individual
cultures. Such a model will be created based upon conclusions drawn in the course of
this research combined with appropriate decision theory. It will incorporate the lessons
learned from the literature, from a survey of domestic and international shipyards, as well
as insights from a variety of non-competing industries with similar objectives and
conditions. The resulting decision analysis model will be tested using one of the
shipyards in the study as an "Industrial Lab." The research approach is illustrated
schematically in Figure 1.8. In chapter 2.0 a detailed review of supporting theory and
methods for Change Management from the literature is provided and placed in the
context of shipbuilding. In chapter 3.0, Design Change Management is placed in the
context of the overall design process and design/production integration. In chapter 4.0
the development and results of the industry survey are provided. Chapter 5.0 examines
the identification stage of the design change framework in detail.. Alternative Inethods
for evaluating proposals are examined in chapter G.O. Of particular importance is the
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decision model developed as part of this research, which is presented and tested in
chapter 7.0. Chapter 8.0 relates the output of the model to the decisionmaking, planning
and implementing stages. Finally, in Chapter 9.0, conclusions and recommendations are
provided.
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2.0 RELATED THEORY AND METHODS FOR CHANGE
MANAGEMENT
The material presented in this chapter illustrates relevant thinking and theory from
a variety of perspectives. Commonality and linkages between these perspectives will be
sought as they relate to managing design improvement. The lessons learned will serve as
a foundation for subsequent development of a procedural context and model for
managing design improvement.
The nature of competitive advantage is discussed first and placed in the context of
shipbuilding and design. A representation of the dynamics of innovation in the
manufacturing firm is presented next. This model provides the context within which
design and production activities operate and illustrates the correlation bet\veen product
changes and process changes. The "mass customization" nature of shipbuilding is
discussed and contrasted with mass production. Next, the history of the "quality
movement" is reviewed and it is shown that a natural progression of events has resulted
in a recent realization of the importance of managing change processes within the context
of an overall strategy. In subsequent chapters an emphasis will be on methods for linking
the design improvement process with strategic planning through the use of a decision
analysis model. This is followed by a discussion of traditional and contemporary views
of "organizational learning". The methods and tools professed by a number of leaders in
the field of Organizational Change are then compared, and related to the problems
associated with design change in shipbuilding. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of
the key points and a discussion related to "success factors". In chapter 4.0 shipyard
feedback is used to illustrate the importance of these success factcJrs and the strength
which shipyards judge themselves to have relative to these factors. The lessons learned
in this chapter will lay the foundation for the development of a process and set of tools
associated with Design Change Management in shipbuilding, which is presented in
subsequent chapters.
2.1 THE NATURE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
In the introduction to this research, it vias suggested that design inlprovement
management is a key ingredient for competitive advantage in shipbuilding today. "As a
result of the increasing complexity and instability of external business conditions, the
ability to manage internal change and development processes has become vital. .."
[Berger, 1992, p.32] George Day of the \\'harton School wrote that "as advantages
become increasingly temporary, managers are shifting their emphasis from seeking an
unassailable static advantage to building organizations that continually seek nc\v sources
of advantage...An environment of rapid shifts in advantage is a double-edged s\vord. The
shifts create opportunities for companies to establish new advantages in a market., but as
the competitive environment continues to change, these new advantages are thenlselves
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vulnerable to attack. This is what economists have referred to as the 'Law of Nemesis' ,
by which every situation bears the seeds of its own reversal." [Day, Reibstein, Gunther,
1997, p.4~] The implication is that in today's environment, shipbuilders must
conti"uously assess their competitive position, identify their strengths and weaknesses,
and plan accordingly. To fully appreciate this statement, it is necessary to understand
what constitutes competitive advantage and the means available for maxilnizing it.
Ther~ are two traditional views of competitive advantage. The first emphasizes a
firm's 'position' in an industry. The second emphasizes a finn's resources and
capabilities. The contemporary view IS that there is a dynamic relationship between
resources/capabilities and position.
'Position' in the industry traditionally relates to one of two conditions. Either a
finn has adopted a low cost position or a product differentiation position. The low cost
position presumes the existence of a market for standard (acceptable) products at low
cost. The differentiation position presumes the existence of a market for products with
key features for which a premium is paid. The principal deficiency of this view has been
that historically companies pursue both, and that this is becoming increasingly necessary
in today's markets. [Day et. aI., 1997, p.55] A second deficiency is that this vie\v implies
that greater customer value must come at higher costs, whereas the quality movement of
the past decade has demonstrated that this is not always the case. Superior product
quality can directly and indirectly lead to lower costs in some circunlstances. "Quality
improvements may raise product quality while lowering total costs because of lower
reject rates, lower costs of adjustments and field repairs, and higher customer
satisfaction." [Day et. aI., 1997, p.55] In shipbuilding these two positional views have
been discussed in terms of "sellers of capacity" and "sellers of products", and similar
debates among the shipbuilding community have been prevalent.
During the 1992 Ship Production Symposium, Andersen and Sverdrup of
Burmeister and Wain A1S (Drnmark) argued that there are two types of shipbuilders. A
shipyard that is a "seller of capacity" responds to an owner which requires a ship
specifically designed and built for their purpose. A shipyard that is a "seller of products"
designs and builds standard ships in accordance with expected requirements in the market
and offers the standard designs to potential owners. [Andersen, Sverdrup, 1992, p.46]
Limited options are incorporated into the design for a particular owner. They argue that
by being a seller of products, the benefits of series production can be exploited. These
benefits are associated with an accelerated learning curve (lower costs due to repetition
and optimization of manufacturing processes for a particular design), a higher capacity
utilization, and a shorter throughput time. As will be discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.5,
this view is not shared by everyone in the shipbuilding community, or in manufacturing
in general.
A refinement of the positional view expresses the position in tenns of custonlcr
value. One model of customer value relates to three facets. [Day et. aI., 1997, p.56]
Customer value is expressed in terms of operational excellence or the ability to provide
consistent quality at the least cost (what Shiba refers to as 'fitness to standard 'I and
~fitness to cost' in the context of Total Quality Management to be discussed later),
customer responsiveness which stresses customization (which may be some\vhat
analogous to 'fitness to use'), and perfonnance superiority which stresses innovation and
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enhancements beyond customer expectations (which is aligned with 'fitness to latent
requirements' ).
Kaplan and Norton provide a more detailed model they call the Hcustomer value
proposition." The customer value proposition consists of attributes associated \vith three
categories, product/service attributes, customer relationship, and image/reputation.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the Hcustomer value proposition." [Kaplan, Norton, 1996, p.74]
~= """-p_ro_d_U_CtI_S_e_rv_iC..e_A_tt_r_ib_u_te_s..... +~ + I Relationship J
FIGURE 2.1 - GENERIC CUSTOMER VALUE PROPOSITION FROfv1 KAPLAN AND NORTON
The resource/capability VIew suggests that competItIve advantage lies in "the
distinctive, hard to duplicate resources of the finn. These resources - comprising
integrated combinations of assets and capabilities - are cultivated slowly over time." [Day
et. aI., 1997, p.52]
The contemporary view of competitive advantage is that "tIle position and
performance of the firm in the industry describes the state of advantage, but this
positional superiority is a consequence of relative superiority in the resources a business
deploys. In tum, these resources are the result of past investments made to enhance the
competitive position...At any time, businesses are endowed with a mixed bag of
resources. Some of the assets and capabilities are no better than the competition, others
are inferior, while a few are superior to the competition. These superior assets and
capabilities are ttie source of positional advantages...Positions of advantage deal with the
what of competitive advantage, while superior resources - assets and capabilities - address
the how of competitive advantage. Taken together, these two sources of advantage
represent the abillity of a business to do more (or do better) than competition." [Day et.
aI., 1997, p.52]
In the COllfse of this research, six major shipbuilders (four u.s. and two foreign)
were asked if the:y regard themselves to be sellers of capacity or sellers of products. All
of them considered themselves to be a seller of capacity which markets their expertise,
services and facilities to provide a customer with a tailor made product which has been
specifically contracted for. And all of them added an additional caveat that their
customers are v'ery cost sensitive as well. Based on the contemporary view of
competitive advantage, this suggests that shipbuilders must concentrate on building
resources and capabilities which are superior to those of their competition which will
contribute to tht:ir domination of the industry. To do so \vill 111ean culti'!ating strengths
which contributle to the customer value proposition described earlier, \vhich will include
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capabilities in both low cost and custom/responsive design and production. This is a
position of flexibility which emphasizes continuous change. Therefore the capability to
manage change well is at least a core competency in today's competitive environment,
and a yard that wishes to have a dominant position must cultivate this capability to make
it distinctive.
Because forces are at work to continually erode a position of competitive
advantage, these distinctive capabilities must be sustainable and/or shipyards must
continually work to build their portfolio of distinctive capabilities. ::Sustainability is (i
matter of degree. Most advantages are transitory because they can be readily duplicated.
The most contestable are price advantages because they can be readily countered by
competitors...Even improvements in internal processes are hard to protect - 60 percent to
90 percent of all learning eventually diffuses to competitors." [Day et. aI., 1997, p.67]
Capabilities or competency can be considered in four degrees. The first is distinctive
competency which is the type just described as being desirable to achieve a position of
advantage, the second is an essential core competency which is common and necessary to
the industry (a "must have" to play at all), the third is a routine competency which is
common to most organizations and the fourth are those competencies which have become
so routine that they can be more econonlically outsourced. [Vollmann, 1996, p.56]
Distinctive competencies have a tendency to erode and become core and routine over
time.
The highest level activities of management with respect to competitive advantage
must then relate to the identification, nurturing, and sustaining of distinctive and core
competencies. The identification of distinctive and core competencies and the strategic
planning necessary to align the organization to the task of nurturing these capabilities is
one of the most important and undelegatable roles of upper ~anagement. In section 2.4
the relationship between strategic planning, competitive advantage and \vhat is generally
referred to as "the quality movement" is discussed and it is shown that the "latest wave~'
of the quality movement addresses the need to align initiatives with strategic response.
Nurturing and sustaining these capabilities relies on the entire organization as strategic
objectives are associated with competencies, which are in tum associated with
capabilities, \vhich are in tum associated with processes and resources. Goals and
objectives flow down through the organization guiding the activities required to support
strategically important competencies.
A tool for visualizing and facilitating the activity associated with identifying,
nurturing, and sustaining competencies is the "competency map". Vollmann describes a
process of "competency mapping" which involves the construction of a hierarchy.
[Vollmann, 1996, p.183] At the top of the hierarchy is a key strategy or strategic
response proposed by the highest levels of management. This strategic response is
associated with internal or external discontinuities and changes in expectations which
collectively represent changes to the competitive environment within which the company
operates. An extension of the concept which incorporates the customer \'alue propositioc
of Kaplan and Norton would be to link such competitive responses to components of the
customer value model. It should be noted that while most of the literature links strategic
responses to the product market and market conditions, there are a nunlber of other
environmental factors to which there may be a strategic response in the manufacturing
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finn, including such things as the materials market, capital market, labor market, and
discontinuities or changes in the regulatory system. [Winch, 1994, p.43] The strategic
response is in turn supported by a set of core competencies at the top of the hierarchy,
supported by capabilit:~s, which are supported by processes and organizational systems
which are further supported by resources. The process of developing the map involves
shipyard management first examining the major changes, forces and constraints that will
influence the future of the shipyard. I suggest that these influences will manifest
themselves in components of the customer value model. In addition, management must
consider what the expectations of customers and principal stakeholders are, and how
those expectations are changing. Competency is defined as the ability to integrate
technical, managerial, and other expertise with capabilities, processes, and knowledge
base with the emphasis of enabling a strategic response to the market. [Vollman, 1996,
p.185] The focus or nature of "competency" is strategic and a competency in this
exercise represents an objective. A capability is operational and supports a strategic
competency. It is a means or subcriterion to a competency. Processes are defined as
being able to be flow-charted and measured in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
Resources include people, infonnation and technology (i.e. hardware and software). The
use of the hierarchical composition facilitates identification of key issues and cause-effect
relationships. Research has shown that a hierarchical representation helps to identify
issues and values which can otherwise remain hidden (see Keeney, Saaty, or Vollmann).
A second advantage of this approach which was not identified by Vollmann is that
it is consistent with the objectives of structured decision analysis. An extension of
Vollmann's approach is that careful construction of the hierarchy pennits the use of a
system of pair-wise comparisons known as the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to
prioritize these competencies, capabilities, processes and resources relative to each other.
The use of AHP to fonnulate decision models is described in further detail in chapter 6.0.
This prioritization in turn can be used in strategic planning to determine which
capabilities and competencies to concentrate on to support a given strategic response. As
will be discussed shortly, a recent outcome of the quality movement in the U.S. is the use
of "Hoshin" planning and other strategic planning tools such as the "balanced scorecard"
of Norton and Kaplan, which in essence are means of converting the output of a
competency map into measurable objectives and goals and the means of achieving them
deployed throughout an organization. The results of the competency mapping activity,
together with "Hoshin-like" activity provides focus for the organization in terms of
measurable objectives which are linked back to strategies and capabilities which will
impact upon the ultimate bottom line, competitive position as defined by the
contemporary view and customer value proposition.
Having established what core competencies and distinctive competencies exist
and need to be nurtured, the next issue is how to sustain them. Sustainability of
competencies is associated with five conditions. [Day et. al.: 1997, p.69] The first and
most obvious condition is that it makes a significant contribution to superior cust0l11er
value. A competency cannot be distinctive if it does not add value. The second condition
is that it is durable and not vulnerable to rapid depreciation or obsolescence. An
additional condition is known as causal ambiguity; \vhich means it is unclear to the
competition how it works. This is nl0st often the case when the capability requires a
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complex pattern of coordination among diverse types of resources. The fourth condition
is that it is difficult to duplicate even if it is understood because they cannot amass the
same assets or capabilities or they cannot find different resources to serve the same
purpose. This condition is related both to the existence of resources and the time required
to make them viable. A capability which has been developed over a long period of time
and involves core beliefs and work habits is difficult to duplicate despite the fact that the
competition understands it superficially or even fully. It cannot be realized quickly
enough to do any good and any effort to rapidly introduce it may be met with a serious
decrease in productivity due to the delays and disnlptions associated with improperly
managed change (the topic of the later discussion of Change Management). A fifth
condition is that early movers ale able to deter efforts at dUlJlication with a threat of
retaliation provided that the threat is credible. This is not applicable to all industries and
generally applies in litigious environments or where cooperation among competitors is
necessary under certain circumstances.
The lesson here is that shipbuilders must think in terms of strategic objectives and
how these are supported by distinctive and core competencies. They must assess their
capabilities in a number of areas and cultivate distinction in those areas \vhich they see as
strategically important. This distinction may be due to tangible assets, such as facilities
improvements, or may be knowledge and process based. These distinctive competencies
will not be limited to either production or engineering in isolated ways, but must be fully
integrated into a unified strategic plan that recognizes the dynamic interplay between
process and product improvement.
2.2 MODELING THE LINKAGE BET\VEEN PRODUCT AND PROCESS INNOVATION IN
THE MANUFACTURING FIRM
Process and product innovation are closely related and this relationship has been
the subject of considerable study. In 1974, James Utterback (MIT Sloan School) and the
late William Abernathy (Harvard Business School) developed a basic representation of
this relationship. Their model provides a context within which any design improvement
strategy must operate. They hypothesized, and subsequently demonstrated, that the rate
of product innovation, or introduction of new features, is highest during an industry's (or
product's) early years. This period is refen'ed to as the "fluid phase". During the fluid
phase, there is not an established market or set of expectations. During this phase,
product function is the basis of competition as the entrepreneur works to develop a
marketable design. The fluid phase is followed by the "transitional phase" during ~\vhich
time the rate of product innovation slows and the rate of process innovation increases.
"Competitive emphasis in this phase is on producing products for ~nore specific users as
the needs of those users become nl0re clearly understood." [Utterback, 1994, p.96]
During the transitional phase, a "dominant design" emerges which represents a core set of
market expectations or standards. 'I.With the marketplace forming its expectations for a
product in terms of features .. form and capabilities" the bases on \vhich product innovation
can take place become much fewer, and the focus of R&D narrows to increnlcntal
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innovations on existing features." [Utterback, 1994, p.81] During this phase, the focus
shifts from design perfonnance to the means of production. During this phase, a
manufacturing process is developed and invested in. Specialization and autornationbegin
to be introduced to the process. The transitional phase is followed by the "specific phase"
which is characterized by a reduced rate of both product and process innovation. In the
specific phase, differences between products become few, and they become viewed as
commodities. During this phase, "the linkages between product and process are now
extremely close. Any snlall change in either product or process is likely to be difficl"lt
and expensive and require a corresponding change in the other." [Utterback, 1994, p.96]
Thus, as the rate of process change increases, so too will the pressure for product change.
"Total Quality Control (TQM) programs, for example, almost always require changes in
technology in order for quality to be manufactui-ed into the products..." [Vollmann, 1996,
p.65] l~he Abernathy-Utterback model is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Product Innovation
High Product
Variety
Highly skilled labor,
general purpose
equipment, flexible and
ineffICient
DonUnant design
emerges
Process Innovation
Low skilled labor, capital
intensive,~ efflCient
Heavily Stand.ardized
F1.UID PHASE
Entrepreneurial Organic
TRANSITIONAL PHASE SPECIF1C PHASE
Hierarchical Mechanistic
FIGURE 2.2 - ABERNATHY-UTIERBACK MODEL [SOURCE: UTTERBACK, 1994]
This relationship between product and process rates of innovation can be
associated with the corporate culture and organization during each of the three phases.
The fluid phase represents a time when "unencumbered by universal technical standards
or by uniform product expectations in the marketplace, the early participants in these new
industries experimented freely with new forms and materials." [Utterback, 1994, p.81]
During the fluid phase the organization enlphasizes frequent change, invention, and a
limited hierarchy. Such an organization is referred to by Bums and Stalker as -'organic".
[Utterback, 1994, p.84]
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With the emergence of a dominant design and increased market demand, th~
changing focus to nlanufacturing and distribution emphasizes greater standardization in
the transitional phase. "As a product becomes more standardized and is produced in a
more systematic process, interdependence among organizational subunits gradually
increases, making it more difficult and costly to incorporate radical innovations."
[Utterback) 1994, p.85] Informal control gives way to an emphasis on structure, goals
and rules; Structure becomes more hierarchical and rigid, and tasks more formalized; and
major innovations are less and less encouraged with continuous incremental improvement
becoming the norm. The resulting organization is referred to as "mechanistic".
[Utterback, 1994, p.84]
The mechanistic firm is characterized by routines established to increase
efficiency. These daily routines offer powerful resistance to change, and can be
represented as "momentum". "Momentum" is a term often used to describe resistanc.e to
change in the study of organizational change. The greater the link between a product
design and established routines, complex organizational relationships, and production
processes, the greater the momentum that will resist design changes. "Momentum
stemnling from structure exists in a wide array of fonns: policies, procedures, how people
are organized to do work, computer systems and so on. In workforce capability,
momentum exists in work routines, skills, knowledge, at'litudes and values. Try to
change anyone of these items and you will bump up against momentum." [McCarthy,
1995, p.32] In a period free from transition, momentum serves to keep the operation
moving quickly and efficiently. During a period of transition, momentum acts to resist
change.
With increased organizational complexity and size, Change Management becomes
more about managing people rather than managing the product. In other words the
product, processes, and people become inseparable. ..A.ny adjustment to one will
invariably result in~ or require, a change to the others. "When production processes are
highl}" integrated within a system, and a high degree of interdependence exists among
subprocesses, the disruption and cost associated with major changes becomes a concern.
Innovation and change - prized in the organic firm - are a threat and expensive nuisance
in the mechanistic firm." [Utterback, 1994, p.86]
The shipbuilding industry appears to share many of the characteristics of the
transitional and specific phases described by Abernathy and Utterback. Table 2.0
identifies the significant cha:acteristics of the three phases of industrial innovation as
defined by Utterback. While the industry as a whole could easily be viewed as being
mature, and therefore entirely in the specific phase, it shares a number of characteristics
of the transitional phase due to the nature of the industry. Shipbuilding is heavily
regulated, global in perspective, highly cyclical witll changing market demands and a
broad range of customer requirements. Shipbuilding is characterized by 10"/ nlargins, a
long design/build cycle and a custom "seller of capacity" approach. l"his alters the
relationship of the industry to the model. Even so, when examined closely, shipyards and
shipbuilding appear to fit clements and spirit of the model well. As Utterback points out,
"not all industries or products pass through these tidy phases." An inlportant objective
for any organization should be to examine the means by which they can avoid this pattern
altogether and renlain in a cycle whicll balances innovation and control.
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FLUID PHASE TRANSITIONAL PHASE SPECIFIC PHASE
Innovation
Source 01 Innovation
Frequent major product changes
Industry pioneers, product users
Diverse designs, often customized
Major process changes required by Incremental for product and with
rising demand cumulative improvements in
productivity and quality
Manufadurers, users often supphers
At least one product design, stable Mostly undlfferer.liated, standard
eilough to have significant production products
volume
Production Proc••••s Flexible and ineffICient, major dlanges Becoming more rigid, with changes
easily accommodated occurring in major steps
EffICient, capital inlensiv8, and rigid,
cost at change high
Egulpment
Cost 0' Process Change
Competitors
Basis of competition
Organizational Can Itol
Vuln.rabillty of Industry leaders
Focus unspecdied because of high
degree of technical uncertainty
General purpose - requinng skilled
labor
Small-scale, located near user or
source of innovalion
Low
Few, but growing in numbers With
Widely fluctuating market shares
Functional product performance
Informal and entrepreneurial
To imitator,
FOQJS on SpecifiC prwuct features Focus on incremental product
once dominant design emerges technologies, emphasis on process
technolcgy
Some subprocesses automated, SpeCial purpose. mostly aulomatlc, Wllh
creating islands of automation labor focused on tending and
monito:",inA equipment
general purpose with spec;alized Large scale. highly speCifiC to par1lcular
sedlons products
moderate high
Many, but declining in numbers arter Few; classic oligopoly wllh slable
emergence of dominanl deSign market shares
Product variation, fitness for use Pnce
Through proJect and task groups Structurtt, rules and goals
To more efficient and higher quality To technologIcal innovations that
producers present supertor product substitutes
TABLE 2.0 - PHASE CHARACTERISTICS [UrrERBACK, 1994, p.94]
Recall the discussion in section 2.1 of "sellers of prLducts" vs. "sellers of
capacity." A shipyard that is a seller of products will more closely resemble
characteristics described by the specific phase of the Abernathy-Utterback lnodel. Such a
shipyard has optimized its facility for a particular set of designs. The yard \vill be more
highly specialized by comparison to one which is a seiler of capacity. Such yards should
be a 10\\' cost producer for their type of ship. Their vulnerability lies in their market
moving to a different type or size of ship. A seller of capacity would more closely
resemble the characteristics of the transitional phase of the model. Their vulnerability is
that another yard can provide greater value (features or quality for the same or lower
price). A seller of capacity would be working in a market which has a baseline set of
standards representing what the expectations for a ship type are. They \vould be
competing on the basis of being able to provide a customer "best value" as defined as a
tailored ship with desirable design features at a competitive price. This is nlore aligned
with the contemporary view of the nature of competitive advantage.
It would seem natural to assume that there is a progression for shipyards to evolve
from the seller of capacity, or transitional phase, to the seller of products, or specific
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phase. In truth, many make a strategic decision to be one or the other. Andersen and
Sverdrup argue that a seller of products has greater profit potential due to the economies
associated with a learning curve. [Andersen, Sverdrup, 1992, p.46] This is a debatable
position which may also be rooted in an old paradigm regarding what constitutes
learning. One must remember that such a yard must first obtain tile opportunity to
become a seller of products. To have this opportunity, they must become a low cost
producer for a particular type of ship. This requires that they either evolve to become the
low CDst producer for a given ship typ~, or that they invest heavily to target a given
market. The seller of capacity maintains a general purpose facility with pockets of
automation and specialization, while a true seller of products will tend to optimize and
specialize their facility. This is consistent with the Abernathy-Utterback model. Frank
Rack of summed up this point at the 1992 Ship Production Symposium in response to the
position taken by Anderson and Sverdrup.
In addition, what course of action do the authors propose the shipbuilders
should take during the years (estimated up to five) required to become
competitively productive, notwithstanding that the competition is also
improving? The Theory of Constraints (TOe) looks at a company as a
money making machine, and as such its resources are available for
anything they are capable of servicing. It is hard to believe that a shipyard
that has an opportunity to obtain a profitable contract for a ship (navy new
constnlction, repair, or conversion) or for any other product would turn it
down based on a 'seller of products' policy. [Andersen and Sverdrup,
1992, discussion]
With respect to tht u.S. shipbuilding industry, there are significant hurdles which
would need to be overcome to adopt a "seller of products" policy. Rafael Gutierrez-
Fraile of Astilleros Espanoles (Spain) pointed out, in response to the paper by Andersen
and Sverdrup at the 1992 Ship Production Syn1posium, that there is little demand at this
time for large numbers of identical ships. He also points out that standard ships are in
general very simple ships. Complex ships are seldorn built in large numbers. Under
these circumstances it is difficult to compete with low cost, low technology, semi
industrialized countries which emerge to build ships. The future for u.s. shipyards
appears to be more closely aligned with a seller of capacity approach. As will be
discussed shortly, a view of the shipyard as engaging in what is now known as "mass
customization" may bridge the gap between the seller of p!"oducts and seller of capacity
viewpoints. While these two views are tied to the traditional view of market po[:itions,
the mass customization approach is aligned with the notion of best value and balancing
flexibility and control.
The need to stay within an optimal zone of organizational development is also the
subject of considerable research and literature. Winch \vrites that "'the paradox of
productivity and flexibility is at the heart of the matter. As Ford showed, a highly tinle
compressed production process is consistent with a singular focus on product~vity, so
long as product variety is minimized." [Winch, 1994, p.25] 'A'inch also points out II-the
paradox that organizations that are good at innovation are not necessarily good at
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implementation - the flexibility required for the fonner undermines the integration
required for the latter.~' [Winch, 1994, p.35] Horwitch and Pralahad expressed this idea
as the paradox between continuity and chaos observed in successful high technology
manufacturing finns. "Sonle of the behavioral patterns that these companies displayed
seemed to favor promoting disorder and informality, 'Nhile others would have us
conclude that it was consistency, continuity, integration and order that were the keys to
success." [Roberts, ed., 1987, p.149] "On the one hand, business focus, organizational
cohesion, and integrity imply stability and conservatism. On the other hand, adaptability,
entrepreneurial culture, and hands-on top management are synonymous with rapid,
sometimes precipitous change. The fundamental tension is between order and disorder."
[Roberts, ed., 1987, p.161] They conchJded that the successful finns alternate between
the t'NO points of view at different times.
Ichak Adizes has popularized the tenn "prime" as indicating this optimal stage of
development where there is an appropriate balance of flexibility and control. Before this
stage, organizations are in stages of development which are flexible with little discipline
and few controls. After prime the organization has discipline but has lost its flexibility.
A key element of remaining "prime" is maintaining flexibility with as many of the
benefits of control and standardization as possible. Therefore, a "mass custolllization"
model which emphasizes the flexible use of standard components may be a more
desirable model for shipbuilding than "mass production'~.
2.3 MASS CUSTOl\1IZATION MODEL OF PRODUCTION
A ship can be considered to be an assembly of standard, or relatively standard,
interim parts. These parts can be produced and assembled based upon standardized
processes. These pa!1s can be designed based upon standard design guidance and
procedures. Shipbuilders, by the very nature of their business, are operating in an
environment more closely aligned with the approach of "Mass Customization" than with
the approach of "mass production". Pine's book "Mass Customization: The New Frontier
in Business Competition" popularized this phrase and approach in 1993.
Pine points out that the system of mass customization reinforces the emphasis on
process innovation, and in this way is consistent with the notion that shipbuilding .fits into
the transitional and specific phases of the Abernathy-Utterback model.
Technological innovation plays a vital role in mass customization... the
application of new product technologies.. .that increase the adaptability of
products can also reinforce greater variety and shorter.development cycles.
Similarly, the application of new process technologies... reinforce the
system's drive toward greater variety by making it increasingly
economical to produce such variety. Indeed, in this new system processes
are more important than products...Customers in increasingly
heterogeneous markets demand customized products, which creates the
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need to re-engineer processes for mass customization. Individual new
products then flow from these flexible, responsive but long tenn and stable
processes. In mass production, products are developed first and then the
processes to manufacture thern are created, each process coupled to each
product. In mass customization, the processes are generally created first
and remain decoupled from the ever changing flow of products. [Pine,
1993, p.47]
MASS PRODUCTION MASS CUSTOMllATION
FOCUS
GOAL
KEY FEATURES
Efficiency through stability and Variety and customization through Variety and customization through
control flexibility and quick flexibility and quick
rasponsiveness responsiveness
Developing. producing, marketing Developing, producing, marketing, Developing. producing, marketing,
and delivering goods and services and delivering affordable goods and delivering affordable ships
at prices low enough that near1y ~nd services with enough variety with enough variety and
everyone can afford them and customization \hat nearly customization that nearly every
everyone finds what they want shipowner can get what they want
St2b:e demand, large Fragmented demand, Fragmented demand,
homogeneous markets. low-(".ost heterogene:Jus niches, low cost heterogeneous niches, low cost
standardized products "r high quality customized goods high quality customized ships,
consistent quality, long product and services, short product long product development cycles,
development cycles. long product development cycles. short product long product life cycles
life cycles life cycles
TABLE 2.1 - MASS CUSTOMIZATION AND SHIPDUILDING [ADAPTED FROM PINE, 1993, P.47]
Abernathy has written about witnessing "de-maturity" of companies and
industries when they re-engineer their processes to re-enter a more fluid or transitional
phase. [Pine, 1993, p.57] In many regards, other industries are benefiting by applying
whal shipbuilders have done historically by necessity. Under a systern of mass
customization, processes are coupled with interim products rather than with the final
product. Pine points out that mass customization does not overcome the benefits of
economies of scale associated with mass production, it simply shifts the focus from the
final product to standard interim parts.
The best method for achieving mass customization - minimizing costs
while maximizing individual customization - is by creating modular
components that can be configured into a wide variety of end products and
services. Economies of scale are gained through the components rather
than the products; econolnies of scope are gained by using the modular
components over and over in different products; and customization is
gained by the myriad of products that can be configured. [Pine, 1993,
p.196]
In shipbuilding, standard or parametrically scaleable interim parts can be found
throughout a ship. Even more parts that can be grouped by a common standard process
can be found. Thus a process change is still likely to require a comparable change to the
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way the interim part is developed. In this way, the conclusion of the Abemathy-
Utterback model that product, process and organizational structure become nearly
inseparable is still valid under the mass customization model of product development, but
under the mass customization model this process is much more efficient. Mass
Customization enhances the benefits of value analysis, industrial engineering and
Production Engineering activities by focusing on interim parts which can then be utilized
in a variety of end products. By enhancing standardization capabilities, shipyards can
take advantage of mass customization. Furthermore, it provides a means for design
improvement in a controlled manner which reduces the stress associated with change.
Standardization contributes to the management of expectations, which will be shown to
be a key to managing change well.
2.4 HISTORY AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE QUALITY MOVEMENT
The history of the quality tnovement is both interesting and informative. It is
rooted in developments in the U.S. during World War II and subsequent efforts to rebuild
Japan. During the war, the United States achieved record efficiencies and
accomplishments. This has, in retrospect, been attributed largely to the overwhelming
sense of urgency and the cohesive effect which it had on organizations and our society as
a whole. After the war, the u.s. largely ignored the lessons learned. It was. in Japan that
the quality movement flollrished and grew, only to be recently revisited in the U.S.
2.4.1 Quality Movement in Japan
Total Quality Engineering, Inc. credits the movement's origins in Japan with
Homer Sarasohn, an engineer from MIT, who headed the Civil Communication Section
charged by MacArthur with disseminating infonnation throughout Japan. Sarasohn
arrived on the scene in February of 1946. One of the CCS' first orders of business was to
develop the capacity to manufacture radios for dissemination of American education
programs. The environment was not conducive to the task.
No port city was less than 70 percent destroyed, no industrial city less than
40 percent destroyed, and many were worse than that. [Dobyns, Crawford-
Mason, 1991, p.ll ]
Never in history had a nation and its people been nlore conlpletely
crushed. [MacArthur from Dobyns, Crawford-Mason, 1991, p.12]
Production facilities and materials were scarce and managernent was unskilled because
more experienced managers with wartime experience were precluded frolll responsible
positions. CCS established a National Electrical Testing Laboratory to hinspect in
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quality". In 1949, Frank Polkinghorn from New Jersey's Bell Laboratories, joined the
team as Sarasohn' s boss. [Dobyns, Crawford-Mason, 1991, p.l1] Shortly after that the
emphasis shifted to educatioll in management methods, particularly those of Shewart.
W.A. Shewhart fonnalized continuous improvement througll statistical methods in the
1930's while working at Bell Laboratories.
Their training manual quoted Collis P. Huntington, founder of Newport News and
Shipbuilding, to help emphasize their key interest; "We shall build good ships here; at a
profit if we can, at a loss if we must, but always good ships." [Dobyns, Crawford-Mason,
1991, p.ll] In other words the focus was on quality rather than cost, and at this time
quality was defined as conformance to standards.
This early work emphasized "fitness to standard" as evaluated through Statistical
Quality Control (SQC). [Shiba et. aI., 1992] The focus of the CCS was to build up
Japan's capability to mass produce goods as quickly as possible, starting with radios, and
get them into the hands of the Japanese. The emphasis was the development of standards
and specifications, and development of a hierarchical organizational structure in which
engineering developed specifications and handed them over to production and QA
assured confonnance to the specifications. The emphasis was on reproducing an efficient
mass production industry. CCS worked with the Japanese Union of Scientists and
Engineers (JUSE) to conduct training. JUSE later asked Sarasohn to recommend an
expert to facilitate and accelerate the training of a broader segment of their industrial
population.
w. Edwards Deming had already visited Japan in 1947 as part of a survey rnission
associated with establishing Japanese population Figures, and Japanese officials were
familiar with him. He was a friend of Shewhart and a fonner statistician with the U.S.
Census Bureau. [Dobyns, Crawford-Mason, 1991, p.lS] Deming was recommended when
Shewhart was not available, and he came back in 1950 for two months of intense training
for Japanese managers, engineers and academics regarding the Plan-Do-Check-i\ct
(PDCA) cycle, causes of variation and statistical process control (SPC) in addition to
SQC. [TQE, Inc.] The emphasis of SPC is the process~ rather than the output of the
process as is the case with SQC. Subsequently the Deming Prize was established in
Japan in 1951 as a means of recognizing significant improvement.
Professor Shiba of MIT suggests that Fitness to Standard as a sole emphasis has
two weaknesses. First, it generally leads to overemphasis of inspection which in tum can
lead to demoralizing of workers and shifting of responsibility for quality awa)' from the
doers. Secondly, it does not address the degree to which the standard is itself correct or
fulfills market needs. Both of these weaknesses exist~d in Japan and were exacerbated by
an overelnphasis of SQC, standardization and inspection. While this emphasis was
appropriate for the goal of ramping up mass production capability, it would not lead to
satisfaction of market demands when Japan moved to re~enter the commercial markets.
While significant improvements were nlade, workers resisted the efforts of the engineers
charged \vith implementing SQC and top management began to lose interest. The efforts
were still focused on inspection. In 1954 JUS)~ invited Joseph M. Juran to lecture.
Juran emphasized management's role and responsibility. A key element of this
focus was the establishment of a quality policy and assurance that everyone in the
organization understood it. Peter Drucker's book, '''The Practice of Managenlent" was
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translated into Japanese at this time and the concepts of management by objectives were
blended with illose promoted by Deming and Juran. Juran's lectures continued and in
1960 he made another visit where he stressed the importance of setting goals and
planning for improvement. [TQE Inc.] At this time, Japanese companies were acting to
correct the weaknesses of Fitness to Standard emphasis by emphasizing Fitness to Use.
[Shiba et. aI., 1992] Fitness to Use stresses the satisfaction of market needs and customer
requirements. This shift was associated with the fact that by the early 1960's Japan was
no longer urgently concerned with replacing essential goods and now desired to compete.
Manufacturers started competing, not on how many usable units they could make, but on
the variety of goods they made. [Shiba et. aI., 1992] During this time the concept of
Quality Control Circles developed in Japan. Juran wrote about the approach in the
1960's in his paper, "The QC Circle Phenomenon". The circle is a small group of
departmental work leaders and line operators who have volunteered to spend time outside
of their regular hours to help solve departmental quality problems. The movement
originated in Japan in 1962.
At this time Japanese planning techniques continued to improve. In 1965
Bridgestone Tire published a report analyzing the planning techniques used by the
Deming Prize winners and coined the name "Hoshin Kanri" which means a course,
policy, plan or aim (Hoshin) associated with administration, management and control
(Kanri). [TQE Inc.] Hoshin management forces managers to run the PDCA cycle on high
level business processes as part of their function, aligns all the people in the organization
toward key company goals with such a sense of urgency that even the lowest level
employees are influenced to choose activities with strategically important objectives, and
it aligns all jobs and tasks with these key company goals focusing and coordinating
efforts and resources. [Shiba et. aI., 1992] The concept of Hoshin is entirely consistent
with the concept of identifying distinctive and core capabilities as described earlier in the
discussion of the nature of competitive advantage and the concept of competency
rnapping. It is also similar to the goal-setting process described by Juran and Gryna in
"Quality Planning and Analysis" (1993 ed.). For a detailed explanation of Hoshin, the
reader is referred to Shiba or the book by Yoj i Akao which is credited with bringing
emphasis of the concept to the U.S. in 1991. The concept will be explored in greater
detail later in this research when identification and prioritization of proposals is
discussed.
Slliba refers to the next level of quality as Fitness to Cost with an emphasis on
controls and direction from the top with consideration of market needs, low variability
and low costs taken as a whole. Shiba suggests that this emphasis was triggered by the
oil embargoes of the 1970's. Japan, with no alternative domestic sources, was forced to
focus on reducing costs in order to export in an environment that stressed market needs.
During this time, the use of Quality Circles became more popular in Japan along with
what are now known as the "Seven Quality Control Tools" and an extension to the
PDCA cycle known now as the "Seven Steps.'" [Shiba et. aI., 1992] The tools are widely
understood; the reader is referred to popular textbooks for further explanation of the tools
and steps. By 1975 Hoshin was a widely accepted practice in Japan. [TQE Inc.] Shiba
writes that "With Fitness to Cost there was an evolution requiring everyone to focus on
cost goals and moving infonnation for improvement activities up and down the
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hierarchy." "Vertical alignment is about the rapid deployment of business strategy tllat is
manifested in the actions of people at work. When vertical alignrnent is reached,
employees understand organization-wide goals and their role in achieving them."
[Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.26]
In the 1980's Japan was facing two new challenges. Japanese goods became more
expensive in world markets due to exchange rates. Secondly, the more basic technologies
and management methods that had been distinctive core competencies for Japan in the
1970's were easily transportable elsewhere. As was discussed in section 2.1, the erosion
of distinctive capability is generally inevitable. The transportation of these competencies
to the rest of Asia which enjoyed lower labor costs represented a serious threat to Japan.
This resulted in an emphasis of "fitness to latent requirements." [Shiba et. al. 1992] This
emphasis focused on predicting market needs before the market knew 'Nhat it wanted and
shortening product development cycles in an effort to develop a distinctive capability to
predict needs and provide for them before the competition. This resulted in the concept
of leading the market rather than following it. By leading the market, one could control
the rules of the game rather than be constrained by them. During this period, horizontal
integration was strengthened and the customer was made an integral part of the process.
What are now known as the Seven Management Tools came into frequent use at this
time. Again the reader is referred to texts for additional infonnation. The main point is
that while the tools of the 1970's were really focused on problem solving, the tools of the
1980's were proactively focused on opportunity identification and alignment of the
organization with key opportunities or strategies.
2.4.2 Quality Movement in the United States
Meanwhile in the U.S, the murmurings of the quality movement began in the
1970's. The quality of u.s. products had deteriorated significantly to the point that the
country slowly began to take notice. The U.S. balance of trade in manufactured products
went negative for the first time this century in 1971. [Hayes, Wheelwright, Clark, 1988,
p.l] Prior to this point, the postwar economy had triggered a quantity based rather than
quality based mentality. Dr. Juran, who had played a key role in Japan and had been
trying to spread the word in the U.S. wrote in his paper "Mobilizing for the 1970's''';
We approach the 1970's with the apprehension that we are about to
encounter some very uncomfortable experiences with respect to quality of
products and services...The foregoing is the central theme for the 1970's.
The user has made his decision to live behind those dikes of quality
control, and the dike builders are in a new ball game. The stakes are
simply enormous. It is not merely that huge sums are at stake in product
failures, in down time, in recalls, in law suits. The biggest stakes are in
share of market, in the very existence of the companies who produce the
goods and services in question. [Juran, ]969, p.l]
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!n 1980 the vidf:O "Juran on Quality Improvement" went on the market. l~his was also
coincident with the television documentary "If Japan Can, Why Can't We?" which
appeared in the: summer of 1980. Most observers see this as the point when the
movement explc,ded in America.
The mo\'ement in the U.S. began with Quality Circles which were observed by
Americans who visited Japan in the 1970's. Recall the discussion of the nature of
competitive ad'/antage and sustainability of distinctive competencies. Japanese firms had
built a distincti\'e capability over a period of time with respect to a total quality system.
When the U.S. companies visited Japan, they picked up on only t.he most superficial
aspects of this system. "Since total quality is largely an attitude and mental process,
American visito,rs to Japanese plants could not see it and therefore did not import it."
[Dobyns, Crawford-Mason, 1991, p.15] Berger suggests that " ...history tells us that
transferring conlcepts from one organizational context to another can lead to (more or
less) complete failure." [Berger, 1996:4, p.2] The Japanese approach defied rapid
duplication just as the theory of competitive advantage would predict. Subsequently two
key ingredients were lost in the translation. The first is ihai the word "control" was
dropped from the original name, forecasting the lack of emphasis on control and
coordination that was to follow. [Dobyns, Crawford-Mason, 1991; also Lillrank, Kano,
1989] The se·cond is that while in Japan management was heavily involved in the
process, the U .:~. visitors only came away with the knowledge that teams of line workers
were being tasked with gathering to discuss and troubleshoot problems on their own time.
They were thoroughly impressed by the level of commitment of the workforce, and lost
sight of the equally impressive level of commitment of upper management in Japan.
The first quality circle in the U.S. was established in 1974 [Dobyns, Crawford-
Mason, 1991, !p.ll] Publication of quality circle experience in the shipbuilding literature
appeared in the REAPS transactions of 1982. By the publication of Crosby's "Quality
Without Tears" in 1984, quality circles had lost their luster. Crosby wrote "there is
nothing wron;s with QC and SQC. They are excellent tools in the battle for quality
improvement, but they are only tools. They are not management tools, yet they do not
work unless management becomes completely involved. I meet fe\\' managers who
understand h·ow these techniques work, let alone how to properly implement them."
[Crosby, 1984] Cultural differences and a lack of key management support and direction
integrated within a total system lead to a string of failures. For example, American
culture stresses individuality. Many people had a hard time working on teams. This is
also reflected by the explosion of employee suggestion programs that sprang up at the
same time as quality circles which rewarded individuals rather than teams for cost cutting
ideas. Conlpanies had difficulty understanding how to motivate and reward a team.
Most of the shipyards visited in the course of this research expressed
disappointrnent with employee suggestion programs and quality circles that VJere
developed during this time period. Feedback collected by one yard regarding their
employee suggestion program at the time indicated that there \\'as dissatisfaction \vith the
program for a variety of reasons including an ineffective and slo\v evaluation process,
poor or no response, a poor management attitude and repeated implementation failures
after approval. A senior manager at another shipyard commented that quality circles and
team building had mixed results. "Some improvement was seen on micro issues, but the
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overall quality performance of the company...was not fundamentally improved. These
efforts died away as we got busy with project work, or as the champion lost influence."
Stresses between management and labor were often made worse rather than better.
Questions as to the legality of the approach were actually raised with respect to the
National Labor Relations Act by some unions which saw them as a ploy to encourage
workers to put in more hours and negotiate with management without the benefit of
representation. These quations continue teday, with consideration being given to new and
revised legislation to protect the concept of quality teams. [See Fuldner, 1996 and the
Teamwork for America Initiative]
An additional problem, and the primary issue to be addressed by this research, is
that within the context of ship design/production integration the bottom-up and
uncoordinated approach of quality circles and subsequent waves of the quality movement
have had a destabilizing effect in engineering. The emphasis was placed on production
and improvement of production methods without an equal emphasis within engineering.
In the discussion of the Production Engineering function in chapter 3.0, it will be shown
that this is in part due to the nature of the entire industry in the U.S. which prior to the
1970 maritime bill had little or no incentive to do up front design work v/ithin a shipyard.
Concepts regarding ship construction which experienced designers, many of whom were
at design finns rather than the yards themselves, had come to understand over time were
becoming increasingly irrelevant.
As the Abernathy-Utterback model showed, product and process change are
linked. Even when production processes could be successfully improved through QC
suggestions, Engineering and Management did not follow through and make the
corresponding changes in design required to best take advantage of these processes. N0
Inanagement process had been established to effect elective design change in a timely
manner. The increased rate of change coupled with schedule pressure often resulted in
poorer engineering quality which resulted in significant production rework. This \vould
in tum spark additional work in production to improve their processes to make them nlore
robust and flexible, while Engineering struggled with the concept of doing more with
less. With the introduction of quality circles, not only did Engineering need to reduce
their own costs and address design for production to compete, they also needed to address
design for production \vhen the production methods were unstable and in a continuous
state of flux. There was significant resistance to this continuous change.
Books such as Feigenbaum's "Total Quality Control" published in 1983, Crosby's
"Quality Without Tears" introduced in 1984, Deming's "Out of the Crisis" introduced in
1986, and Juran's "Juran on Planning for Quality" introduced in 1988 are representative
of the next wave of the quality movement in the U.S. This next wave focused attention
on some of what had initially been missed in the transfer of the Japanese quality tools.
The causal ambiguity which made it difficult for the U.S. to duplicate their results was
steeped in the culture that had been developed in Japanese corporations over time and the
activity of management that was required to nurture that culture. All fOUf "quality gurus'"
focused greater emphasis on culture and upper management support. This \\las the start
of "Total Quality Management".
Reference to TQM in the shipbuilding literature fir~~ appears in the nlid to late
1980's. This wave corrected some of the problems associated with the earlier
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introduction of quality circles. It fostered an environment of greater cooperation and a
greater willingness to change. Management measured success during this time with
metrics associated with number of employees trained, established entire departments to
run the 'quality program', and trackeu the number of improvement ideas identified and
implemented. "It was the perfect way to help organizations move from a newly
awakened stage to a more active one." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.ll] Unfortunately,
this wave suffered from two significant problems. First, it geometrically increased the
rate of change throughout organizations and "they inadvertently fell into the 'activity
trap' - lots of teams working on lots of problems but with no connection to the Main
Thing of the business...Because TQM focused on cycle time and defect reduction without
a clear link to strategy, senior managers often failed to make the ongoing commitment
critical to any TQM effort. The responsibility was often delegated to quality zealots for
whom short tenn results became a goal unto itself." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.ll]
Secondly it focused on incremental, continuous improvement. Me:Inwhile the
competition was not standing still. "A 1986 survey of manufacturing...showed that
quality had become American managers' chief concern. But it was also the chief concern
of Japanese and European managers. Hence, American producers were chasing a moving
target. .." [Hayes, Wlleelwright, Clark, 1988, p.8]
2.4.3 Reengineering Wave of the Quality Movement
The thirst for more significant achievements ushered in the next major wave of
the quality movement. The focus turned from continuous incremental improvement in
many organizations to the search for breakthrough, order of magnitude, improvement.
"Let's face it - steady in~remental improvement is not something that rivets executive
interest..." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.12] This move began in 1990 with Michael
Hammer's Harvard Business Review article "Reengineering Work: Don't Automate,
Obliterate" and built widespread momentum after the 1993 introduction of the book
"Reengineering" by Hammer and Champy. Hammer \\Tote in 1990, '~Instead of
embedding outdated processes in silicon and software, we should ohliterate them and
start over. We should 'reenegineer' our business: use the power of modern information
technology to radically redesign our business processes in order to achieve dramatic
improvements in their perfonnance." Reengineering was defined as "the fundanlental
rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements
in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service and
speed."
The major thrust of reengineering efforts in the US were in the area of
organizational structure and reducing manpower despite the fact that HanlI11Cr and
Champy stressed "processes, not organizations, are the object of reengineering."
[Hammer, Champy, 1993, p.117] Hammer and Champy also wrote
Today, fragmented organizations display appalling econonlies of scale,
quite the opposite of what Adam Smith envisioned. The diseconolnies
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show up not in direct labor, but in overhead." [Hammer, Champy, 1993,
p.29] "Companies today consist of functional silos, or stovepipes, vertical
structures built on narrow pieces of a process...Classicai bU,':iiness
structures that specialize work and fragment processes are self
perpetuating because tlley stifle innovation and creativity in an
organization...For an idea to win acceptance, everyone along the way must
say yes, but killing an idea requires only one no." [Hammer, Champy,
1993, p.28] "Companies take a natural process...and break it into lot.~ of
little pieces-the individual tasks that people in the functional departments
do. Then the company has to hire all the king's horses and all the king's
men to paste the fragmented work back together again. [Hammer,
Champy, 1993, p.29]
Businesses focused on the structure rather than the processes that had resulted in
that structure. Reengineering was iJlterpreted as a means to significant cost savings
through staff reductions. The euphemism 'rightsizing' was developed to describe the
downsizing that was inevitably associated with these efforts. While Hammer and Champy
had suggested that the question that needed to be asked first was "If I were re-creating
this company today, given what I know and given current technology, what would it look
like?" [Hammer, Champy, 1993, p.31], many believe that the question that was generally
asked first was "If I cut x% of people out of the organization, how must I modify my
processes to pick up the slack?" While the formal definition of reengineering included
the words cost, quality, service and speed; most companies were focused on cost. "In
many cases, companies have simply used reengineering as a convenient cover for the cost
cutting they needed to produce short-tenn, bottom line improvements." [Labovitz,
Rosansky, 1997, p.13] The unfortunate truth is that a comparison of US and foreign 'best
in class' manpower levels suggests reductions are inevitable in many industries, including
shipbuilding. While we produced less than 1o~ of the world market for shipbuilding in
the U.S. in 1994, the U.S. private shipbuilding industry employed 200/0 more people than
Japan which produced 30% of the world shipbuilding outrut at that time. [Frankel, 1995,
p.2] Manpower reductions should be the result of rationalization of the processes rather
than the objective in and of itself.
Concerns with the necessity to manage change had been building throughout the
quality movement, as each successive wave either reacted to or increased the rate of
change. This is evidenced by an increase in the number of publications associated with
"Change Management" in the late 1980's. This turned into an explosion in the mid
1990's. Hammer and Champy recognized that an entirely nevv way of looking at Change
Management would be required for reengineering to be successful. "Reengineering
involves, as welJ, a different approach to Change Management. .." [Hammer, Champy"
1993, p.49], "Once processes are identified ... ,deciding which ones require reengineering
and the order in which they should be tackled is not a trivial part of the reengineering
effort. No company can reengineer all its high level processes simultaneously.'"
[I1ammer, Champy, 1993, p.122] They offered three criteria for prioritizing processes
(dysfunction, importance, and feasibility) and also discussed the importance of five roles
in the process (leader, process owner, reengineering team, steering committee"
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reengineering czar) but they offered only rudimentary advice as to how to actually
perform this effort. Those companies with particularly good insight into the processes
and intricacies of change, which are able to link strategic response with objectives and
means, would succeed while others would fail at their reengineering efforts.
Management of change could be considered to consist of two components, a
procedural context and the organizational psychology associated with resistance and
reaction to change. The procedural context is associated with issues identified in the
design change framework introduced in this research like identification, evaluation,
prioritization, decision-making and implementation. The field of Organizational Change
Management evolved to deal with issues associated with the resistance of people and the
organization to change. \Vhat became popular at this time was research and books
associated with the psychological and organizational aspects of managing change, largely
as a reaction to the extraordinary disruption and de-motivation that reengineering had
achieved. "Perhaps its greatest weakness had been its utter disregard for people, both
managers and workers alike...Hammer pointed out 'I wasn't smart about that. ..I was
reflecting my engineering background and was insufficiently appreciative of the human
dimension." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.13] In section 2.5 lessons learned from the
body of work on Organizational Change Management are reviewed. The next wavt= of
the quality movement focuses on issues associated with the procedural context for linking
activity to strategic objectives.
2.4.4 Current Trend in the Quality Movement
The latest wave of the quality movement has been referred to as the "Age of
Alignment" by Labovitz and Rosansky and the "Age of Paradox" by Handy. The present
efforts emphasize a systems approach, managerial responsibility for goals and objectives
linked directly to an understanding of the competiti'fe environment rather than broad
uncoordinated activities, and a change of focus away from cost reduction and even
quality in the traditional sense of the word. The essence of this perspective is that the
many initiatives underway at any given time must be aligned to the strategic purpose of
the company by managl;ment and that they must have specific goals and objectives.
Recent articles such as that by Nohria and Berkley (1994 HBR}, "Whatever Happened to
the Take-Charge Manager?", and the 1994 Quality Digest article "Why Teams Don't
Work" by Uhlfelder are indicative of a call for managerial responsibility and a shift in
focus. While the early history of the quality movement was about bottom up
improvement throughout the organization and reflected a misunderstanding of the
concept of "empowennent", today's movement is toward top do·wm assignment of goals
and objectives followed by bottom up efforts to achieve them. "Many management teanlS
in organizations have become initiative junkies. They have no real fonnula or
process...Rather than let the needs of the organization drive their approach to transition,
the transition is driven by the independent directives of various initiatives." [McCarthy,
1995, p.3]
55
This perspective has its roots in Hoshin Kanri begun in Japan in the late 1960's
and popularized there in the 1970's. It would not be until 1991 when "Hoshin Kanri:
Policy Deployment for Successful TQM" by Akao was published in English that this
approach began to gain popularity and lead to other related research in the United States
almost 30 years after the development of I-Io~hin in Japan. After 1991 numerous articles
and books related to Hoshirl and other strategic planning approaches related to
improvement initiatives have appeared. This concept is not new in the U.S., but the
intensity and focus of effort on it is. Deming emphasized the need for constancy of
purpose in the early 1980's. Only recently is this being fully appreciated and pu~ into
practice by following a procedural framework. For example, a 1992 MIT 13-8 study,
which the author participated in, concluded that with respect to Naval shipyards, "in
general, the strategic plans have brought an awareness of long term goals to the yards; the
plans have not been fully implemented." The same study concluded that there was a
"lack of understanding of what to measure, there is no prioritization of processes." More
recently, shipyards are conducting Hoshin training.
Kaplan and Norton have developed a system for "translating strategy into action"
which they call the "Balanced Scorecard." Note the reference to balance, which was
discussed earlier as it relates to keeping an organization "Prime" ~ The "balanced
scorecard" has evolved over time since first being studied in 1990 when the emphasis was
on an alternative accounting or measurement system rather than 011 a strategic planning
system. It evolved into a "Hoshin-like" system which is consistent with the concept of
competency mapping described earlier and was introduced through a Harvard Business
Review article in 1992. Their recent book "The Balanced Scorecard" was published in
1996. Some excerpts follow.
Currently, many organizations have a myriad of Initiatives
underway...Unfortunately, these initiatives are frequently not linked to
achieving targeted improvement for strategic objectives. Thus, the efforts
are managed independently, sponsored by different champions, and
compete with each other for scarce resources, including the scarcest of all,
senior management time and attention. [Kaplan, Norton, 1996, p.230]
The Balanced Scorecard complements financial measures of past
performance with Jneasures of future performance. The objectives and
measures of the scorecard are derived from an organization's vision and
strategy...Corporate executives can now measure how their business units
create value for current and future customers and how they must enhance
internal capabilities and the investment in people, systems, and procedures
necessary to inlprove future perfonnance...they are derived from a top-
down process driven by the mission and strategy of the business unit. The
Balanced Scorecard should translate ... nlission and strategy into tangible
objectives and measures. [Kaplan, Norton, 1996, p.8]
Labovitz and Rosansky developed an approach which they describe in ·~Thc
Power of Alignment" published in 1997. Their approach, like that of Kaplan and Norton,
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seeks to align initiatives with what they refer to as "The Main Thing". "The main thing
for the organization as a whole must be a common and unifying concept to which ever;
unit can contribute. Each department and team must be able to see a direct relationship
between what it does and this overarching goal. The main thing must be clear, easy to
understand, consistent with the strategy of the organization, and actionable by every
group and individual." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.43] They discuss their approach in
tenns of vertical and horizontal alignment. "Vertical alignment is about the rapid
deployment of business strategy that is manifested in the actions of people at work.
When vertical alignment is reached, enlployees understand organization-wide goals and
their role in achieving them." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.26] Horizontal alignment
refers to the integration of customer requirements in processes across the organization.
One of their contributions is a diagnostic tool for assessing the condition of the
organization with respect to alignment. The second is a process they refer to as the PDR
cycle (Planning, Deployment and Review) which is an adaptation of the PDCA cycle and
Hoshin planning. Their process starts with identifying "the main thing" for the
organization, establishing critical success indicators which support it, stretch goals which
support those and acti'w·ities and tactics that support the stretch goals. "Stretch goals
should be few...since organizations cannot successfully pursue more than that at one
time...The pJanning phase of PDR identifies the main thing and a few critical stretch
goals." [Labovitz, Rosansky, 1997, p.87]
They utilize a hierarchical model in much the same way as Vollmann
(competency map). They stress that stretch goals are ambitious, highly targeted
opportunities for breakthrough improvements in perfonnance. They also suggest that
every level, department or unit of the enterprise must have its own tree or hierarchy
which can be connected to that of a higher level unit. In this way organizational strategy
is deployed throughout the organization in tenns of measurable objectives. I-ligh level
trees will be framed in more general terms. The stretch goals for a higher level tree may
serve as the "main thing" for a lower level unit. As was mentioned earlier, the
hierarchical structure will allow decision analysis tools to be used to prioritize tactics and
means. This will be described in more detail in chapter 6.0.
In addition to the renewed focus on strategy, an emphasis on measures other than
cost has become prevalent. About the same time that Juran, Deming, Crosby and
Feigenbaum were becoming popular, Eli Goldratt first published his book, "The Goal" in
1981. The goal introduced the Theory of Constraints (TOe), which emphasized a
systems approach and move away from the perspective of cost-cutting. The concept of
TOC has been refined over the years and has resulted in additional probleln solving tools.
Goldratt published "What is This Thing Called the Theory of Constraints?" in 1990 to
further emphasize the point. Additional books and papers further refining Toe were
published since. The very name of the book 'The Goal' makes an important point, that
the focus must be goal oriented rather than activity oriented, and ultimately the goal nlust
be described in broader terms than cost. Furthermore, goals should be defined in ternlS of
an understanding of the nature of competitive advantage in order to assure success.
Otherwise, TQM and reengineering can generate a much improved process for conlpeting
in an environment that no longer exists. [Garvin, 1995] If cost is not the nl0st inlportant
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measure in today's environment, then traditional accounting and cost/benefit measures
are no longer the most relevant issue in decision making.
The quality movement made much of the issue of cost. Juran emphasizes
quantifying the Cost of Quality (COQ) as a means of motivating and
rationalizing continuous improvement. The central theme of Crosby's
book, 'Quality is Free', is largely the cost saving aspects of quality...There
is evidence to suggest that the emphasis on the cost-reducing benefits of
quality improvement may be excessive, short sighted, and
misplaced...While cost reduction produces an instant impact 011 the bottom
line, equating quality with cost reduction oversimplifies a complex
economic relationship. Moreover, quality alone is not sufficient for
ultimate success in an increasingly competitive business environment.
Witness the fact that a recent Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Award
winner filed for bankruptcy...A lesson to be learned here is that it is
impol1ant to distinguish between a goal and a necessary condition.
[Dettmer, 1996, p.l]
The performance improvement efforts of Inany companies have as much
impact on operational and financial results as a ceremonial rain dance has
on the weather...This rain dance is the ardent pursuit of activities that
sound good, look good, and allow managers to feel good...At ine heart of
these programs, which we call 'activity centered', is a fundamentally
flawed logic that confuses ends with means, processes with outcomes.
[Schaffer, Thompson, 1992]
Goldratt defined the operation of a company in terms of throughput, inventory and
operating expenses which are defined as the rate the system generates money through
sales, money that is tied up within the system and money being spent. While the
traditional emphasis of the quality movement was on cutting costs, Goldratt emphasized
that improvement must be tackled first by increasing throughput, then by reducing
inventory, and finally by reducing operating expenses. The general principal is that
throughput has no theoretical limit while costs and inventory have a theoretical limit of
zero. In addition, he made the point that the company must be viewed as a system, and
optimization of a system does not stem from the independent optimization of its parts.
This implies that there must be a means for determining which parts to concentrate on,
how they relate~ and an understanding of what is constraining the system as a whole.
Schaffer and Thompson suggested that there are major problerTIs with activity
centered programs. They are not keyed to specific results and are often too large scale
and too diffused. Associated measurements and expectations are often delusional. The
focus on activities as ends in themselves leads to a staff and consu)lant driven
philosophy rather than one which involves upper management. And finally ~ .... because
of the absence of clear-cut beginnings and ends and an inability to link cause and effect~
there is virtually no opportunity... to learn useful lessons and apply thern on future
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programs." [Schaffer, Thompson, 1992] By contrast they suggest that a results driven
program be instituted in which innovations are introduced as they are needed, where
empirical testing proves what works, utilizing shorter tenn succes~es to frequently
reinforce the improvement process, and where management creates a continuous
learning process for building the lessons of previous phases into the next phases of
programs.
2.5 ALTERNATIVE VIEWS AND MODELS OF LEARNING
Thinking regarding the impact of learning and experience on productivity has also
evolved over time. This effort has been focused on examining the effect of learning as a
means of predicting future costs. This infonnation is of importance to both the builder
and the owner. \\'hile the quality movement was focused on developing problem solving
and continuous improvement through active change, the topic of learning has
traditionally focused on how productivity improves while repeating the ~ame or similar
tasks.
More recently, the research has focused on explaining how the rates at \vhich
competing organizations learn is different. Change Management, as a concentration for
research, is concerned with taking advantage of this improved understanding of how
organizations' rates of learning are different to achieve a competitive advantage by
managing learning and implementing productivity enhancements faster than the
competition.
The traditional learning curve is "founded on the presumption that individuals and
organizations learn and performance improves solely as a result of experience gained
through repetition of similar work." [Spicknall, 1995,p.209] Learning has been defined
as "the ability to do the same task faster and better as experience is gained." [Erichsen,
1994, p141] Thurstone developed the experience curve function in 1917 as:
Y = a "nbn
Where:
n =
Y n
a =
b =
Sequential production number
Objective measure of performance for Nth unit of production
Value of Y for first unit produced
Fractional exponent describing rate of improvemer~t
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ALTERNATIVE LEARNING CURVES
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FIGURE 2.3 - LEARNING CURVES
Wright reinforced the notion of the learning curve in 1936 with the publication of
"Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes" in the Journal of Aeronautical Science. A
review of Figure 2.3 illustrates that the traditional learning curve effect is more
significant early in a series rather than late in a series. This implies that there is greater
benefit in adding a hull to a short series than in adding a hull to a long series. This is
because the curve flattens as units are added to the series. This can be illustrated
mathematically as a derivative which shows that as the number of units increases, tht:
incremental savings decreases;
oYn = b a n b = b Yn
on n n
The traditional learning curve points out that experience improves performance
due to repetition of the same or similar tasks. I t is suggested that the learning curve effect
comes in addition to savings obtained through improvements in the construction 111cthods,
documentation or managerial approach. [Erichsen, 1994, p.141) Alternatively, the
learning curve effect would need to be considered in conjunction with losses associated
with changes to production methods and corporate policy as well. The traditional view of
learning as illustrated in Figure 2.3 suggests that there is a disincentive to introduce
change, particularly during the earlier portion of a nlulti-hull contract for fear of
disrupting the learning effect.
Past experience has shown that actual productivity returns often do 1101 follo\v the
pattern predicted by the modeL This is due to factors other than repetition that can affect
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learning. Erichsen observed this when examining returns from a number of Norwegian
shipyards which were involved in series production during the late 1970's. This is
illustrated in Figure 2.4 which shows the impact on "normalized" series production costs
of adding a longer forecastle for hulls five through seven, and lengthening the ships
themselves for hulls thirteen through fifteen. The actual cost data is compared to a
learning curve with b=-O.12, which Erichsen observed to be appropriate through
regression analysis.
Reefer Vessels of Same Basic Design
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FIGURE 2.4 - EFFECTS OF CIIANGES ON THE LEARNING CURVE [ERJCliSEN, 1994, P.144]
Among the factors that Erichsen was able to link with rises in cost off the learning
curve were:
• Interruption of series production by an odd contract
• A shift to a new owner for the same basic ship in a series
• Turnover of the workforce
• Shift of subcontractors
• Changes in the seasons
• Changes to the wage system
• Introduction of new laws and regulations
• Changes to vacation and benefits system
Although all curves show a clear tendency toward less hours per ton as the
number of units increases, there are great variations in the hours from ship
to ship within each series...When the building of a series of standard
vessels was halted in order to build a non-standard ship, the hours \vould
rise almost to the level of the first one \vhen the building of standard
vessels was taken up again. The cost of interrupting series building by
accepting cdd contracts may thus be considerably higher than the cost of
the contract itself. [Erichsen, i 994, p.] 45J
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In the course of researching this research, data was collected from one shipyard
related to weld rates for two recent series of ships. The weld rate represents a composite
of hours billed to "welding". These may incJude hours spent doing things other than
welding due to production inefficien~ies, such as rework or logistic delay times. Figure
2.5 illustrates actual returns superimposed over appropriate learning curves, with all
values normalized to start at 1000/0 for the first hull. Ship series A is representative of a
series which did not involve a great deal of disruption or customer change orders. Ship
series B shows variation off a learning curve similar to that observed by Erichsen. In this
case, the series was interrupted between the second and third ship. This disruption was a
significantly different type of ship which was begun towards the tail end of production of
the second ship. Furthennore, the last ship in the series included major customer change
orders. In addition, series A was begun in parallel to the completion of the final ship of
series B and this was noted to be a difficult period for the yard. Ship series C is similar to
series A. In this case the series did not witness major disruption from interrupting
contracts or change orders.
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FIGURE 2.5 - WELD RATE LEARNING CURVES
The accelerated rate of learning for ship series A_ is of interest, since all of these
series were built in the same yard. Series C is the earliest of the group, follo\ved by B
and finally A. Had series B not suffered from significant disruption, it is possible that the
learning curve may have fallen between that described by series C and A as suggested by
the rate returns for the third hull of series B. The accelerated rate of learning for series A
could be attributed to two factors which were present at the time. The first of these is that
at the start of series A, the shipyard had significantly increased production nlanning. rrhis
!abor, which was relatively "green", would be expected to "learn" at a faster rate than
62
more experienced labor. This explanation is further illustrated when the actual weld
rates, rather than percentages of the first hull, are examined. Series A rates are 830/0 and
74% lower than those for series Band C respectively (looking at the first hull), possibly
attributable to the manning situation. An additional factor that contributed to the
accelerated learning curve was a concerted effort on the part of the shipyard to improve
its processes between the first and second ship in the series. Some of these improvements
related to weld proces~es. The final ship in series A had weld rates which were greater
than the final ship in series B or C.
The examination of weld rates illustrates two important points regarding learnjng
curves. The first of these is that data illustrating a rapid learning curve does not suggest
high productivity, but it could simply be indicative of poor initial performance. When
comparing learning curves, the data is significant only if the starting point is the same.
Secondly, the introduction of new contracts and "green" labor clearly had a disruptive
effect while the introduction of process improvements appears to have had positive
effects.
Erichsen suggests that two conditions must be satisfied in order to have a
significant learning curve effect. The first of these conditions is that the work must have
some degree of difficulty and the second is that there must be a high proportion of manual
labor. If the work is not difficult, then learning will not be significant since peak
efficiency will be attained early, possibly with the first unit. Manual labor is necessary to
see a significant learning curve effect because the effect is defined as the ability to do the
same tasks faster and better as experience is gained, and implicit in that definition is the
idea that people are gaining the experience. This would imply that the importance of the
learning curve effect del:reases with the degree of automation and that the learning curve
effect is more significant for complex ship types than less complex ones. In addition,
Erichsen reported research by Gustmann in the 1970's that illustrated that the savings
attributed to doubling the number of units produced varied based on the conditions
existing at the shipyard. The effect of learning was found to be least when building ships
of a type well known to the yard. When more complicated ships were built, the effect of
the learning curve was found to increase. The effect of the learning curve was found to
be greatest for yards starting to build ships from scratch of a type they are unfanliliar
with. The effect of learning was found to be almost as great as that for a new ship type
when a significant new technology was introduced to a previously existing ship type.
These insights suggest that the traditional notion of the learning curve is beconling
significantly less relevant today with rationalized production planning and tasking. The
traditional learning curve model has at its roots the notion of mass pi oduction. l~he
greater the degree to which a shipyard adapts to a mass customization model of
production as described earlier, the less relevant the traditional notion of the learning
curve becomes. By taking advantage of standard interim products and rationalizing
production around tasks and "group technology" rather than the craft approach \vhich
existed many years ago, learning is taking place on the interiIn parts rather than the
contract itself. '[he learning effect still exists, but it wilJ be more a function of the mix of
skilled to "green" labor and stresses on the organization's capability to manage a conlplex
or intense workload. Learning from experience becomes more of ~ reflection of
improvements in relationships and infonnation flow rather than improved perfornlance or
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skill associated with individual production tasks. Learning curves today likely serve as
evidence of active productivity improvement efforts and the introduction of lessons
learned into subsequent hulls rather than repetition of identical unchanged tasks
associated with a contract.
The traditional concept of the learning curve has proven to be useful by
illustrating that "all other things being equal", productivity "NiH improve predictably with
the number of units produced. The current competitive climate has forced organizations
to seek improvements in productivity beyond those that the trac1itional learning curve
could explain. Recent research has focused on the fact that "all other things" are rarely
equal, and identified the problems that this can cause for the traditional learning curve
model. This new research emphasizes the model's problems in an effort to explain why
competing organizations can have widely different levels of performance.
The deficiencies of the traditional learning curve were discussed by Spicknall as
well as by Lapre (et. al.). These deficiencies are associated with the fact that an
organization's level of perfonnance cannot be solely attributed to the number of units
produced while the traditional learning curve is entirely empirical. While it can be shown
that series production results in improved perfonnance for a given organization, research
has shown that this cannot explain why some organizations perform better than others.
Additional deficiencies include its failure to predict two often observed patterns of initial
downward concavity and a plateau effect. Learning rates have been shown to vary widely
from one company to another and over time within a single company and not necessary
connected to the number of units produced. Research has shown that investments and
scale-up of production generally triggers an accelerated learning rate.
The traditional model implies that "an organization's capability in producing a
product is only a function of its capability when it started to produce the product, and the
number of products it produced since it started." [Spicknall, 1995, p.209] This has been
proven to be incorrect, as data from a variety of industries has sho\vn that two firms
competing in the same industry, both with similar production histories that started at
similar rates of productivity can have widely different rates of productivity years later.
Furthermore, the competitor which has produced fewer units can, and often does, take the
lead contrary to what the traditional lnodel would predict. Spicknall illustrated this
concept using a shipbuilding industry example of price data for the LSD-41 class of
ships. In Figure 2.6, the data Spicknall obtained is superimposed over applicable learning
curves (b = -0.19, -0.3 and -0.5 respectively). The Figure illustrates that there are other
factors that influence productivity than are accounted for in the traditional model. It is
these other factors that may have allowed Lockheed to reach its bid price. The only way
to reach their target would be to improve beyond the learning curve indicated by their
first three ships. In addition, it is these differences that would allo\v Avondale to produce
their lead ship at less than half the cost for Lockheed to produce their lead ship (even
when non-recurring engineering costs were included).
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FIGURE 2.6 - LSD-41 CLASS PRICES [ADAPTED FROM SPICKNALL, 1995]
By looking only backward in time to project future performance, the model in
essence only recognizes "unconscious" learning. It does nothing to foster or account for
"conscious" learning. "Unconscious" learning is "accomplished through experience,
either through imitation, or more formally through reaction to reward and punishment."
[Spicknall, 1995, p.210] This type of improvement is continuous, incremental, and
reactive in nature. On the other hand, "conscious" learning is proactive. It recognizes
future requirements and jniti~tes the changes necessary to get there. Conscious learning
"relates to fonnal education and problem solving." [Spicknall, 1995, p.210]. Conscious
learning is evidenced by discontinuities in the learning curve, either as a step (order of
magnitude improvement) or as a significant change in the rate of improvement.
Conscious learning pennits an organization to learn from the experiences of
others. Conscious learning is promoted through the use of structured problem solving
techniques. Such problem solving techniques and their application have been the subject
of the "quality movement." The notion that there are a variety of types of learning is not
new. Argyris and Schon described three types of learning in 1978. Th~ first of these is
"single-loop learning". This type of learning involves the detection and correction of
errors followed by no significant changes in policies or goals. "Double-loop learning"
involves questioning followed by changes to procedures and objectives. It is related to
"generative learning" as defined by Senge in "The Fifth Discipline." It involves
expansion of capabilities beyond simple error c()rrection. "Deutero-Ieaming" is learning
that is associated with how to conduct single anu double loop learning better. It is
learning about learning. The traditional notion of the learning effect is associated with
single-loop learning.
The current movement is with respect to double-loop and deutero learning.
VonHippel and Tyre also made a distinction bet\veen two types of learning in their 1995
article in Research Policy. They refer to these types of learning as 'lobehaviorar' and
"cognitive". Behavioral learning is the learning that the traditional 1110del explains.
Cognitive learning is associated with increased productivity of tools~ processes and
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organizations due to problem solving. Lapre, Mukherjee and Wassenhove referred to
conceptual and operational learning in 1996. Conceptualleaming involves developing an
understanding of why a problem occurs (acquisition of know-why). Operational learning
involves developing a skill of how to fix a problem (know-how). It could be suggested
that in addition to the types of learning identified above, two additional classes should be
considered. The first of these is proactive and the second is reactive. Reactive learning is
the type generally discussed above. It is learning that is triggered by an identifiable
event. That event Inay then lead to single or double-loop learning (and either conceptual,
operational or both). For example, in the model illustrated in Figure 2.7, reactive
learning includes both the unconscious learning that takes place after production begins
as well as any deliberate double-loop learning that takes place after a perfonnance gap is
recognized due to production results. Proactive learning, on the other hand, is not
triggered by an event in the traditional sense but by the recognition of opportunity. It
would always involve double-loop learning and generally both conceptual and
operational leanling. In the model, it is represented by deliberate activity that results
from recognition of a perfonnance gap that is not the result of production having been
begun but rather the anticipation of a gap through strategic planning or benchmarking.
One is associated with failure to meet targets while the other is associated with the
creation of those targets and the planning activity associated with anticipating how they
will be met. These activities often occur prior to production, but can also take place
throughout the entire cycle. The quality movement has resulted in significant efforts
associ:Jted with proactive learning. Activities at a shipyard will generally involve both.
Note that "start production" could also refer to design, where perfonnance gaps will also
exist.
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FIGURE 2.7 - NE\V MODEL OF LEARNING [ADAPTED fROM LAPRE ET. AL.]
Recent research has been referred to collectively as the field of '~Organizational
Learning." In a 1954 Harvard Business Review article Andress described learning in
terms of the traditional learning curve. '(The basic tlleory of the learning curve is simple:
a worker learns as he works; and the more often he repeats an operation, the nlore
efficient he becomes..." [Andress, 1954] It is interesting that at that time, Andress noted
the existence of additional factols. "A distinction must be nlade between a) learning in
the literal sense...and b) a whole series of other factors of which management innovations
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appear most significant. ..For example, new machinery introducf:d by the company will
bring about savings in labor hours; so may time studies or design changes." [Andress,
1954] For the most part, these additional factors were dismissed. ,C,The significant fact is
the consistent behavior of the curve, which indicates that of the various factors learning in
the literal sense is the predominant influence." [Andress, 1954] These finding were
perpetuated despite the changes in industry including automation, a rationalization of
tasking and the adoption of significant standardization of interim parts and "mass
customization'·. In 1985 Fiol and Lyles defined learning as "the process of improving
actions through better knowledge and understanding". Thus the emphasis had evolved
from error correction to improvement in general.
The field became popular with the introduction of Peter Senge's "The Fifth
Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization" in 1990. In large part, the
field of organizational learning centers on three guiding principals. The first is the
"primacy of the whole", or the notion that the whole must be the focus rather than the
parts. The second is the "community nature of the self' which is a focus on relationships
and interdependency. The third is the '-generative power of language" which focuses
upon the role of observation and communication. Research in the field of organizational
learning attempts to integrate issues associated with different types of learning (single-
loop, double-loop and deutero as described earlier), different learning processes, different
learning focuses and different levels of learning ranging from individual to trans-
organizational. As of 1994, almost one hundred books and journal articles on
organizational learning had been published, sixty percent of them since 1991. [Roth,
1996] There have been two primary focus areas for research. The first area of focus is in
improved analytical models for predicting learning effects that take into consideration
both behavioral and cognitive factors. The second focus has been on the theory, means
and methods for nurturing learning in organizations. Examples of work on improved
modeling techniques include that by Levy (1965), Adler and Clark (1991), and more
recently Lapre, Mukherjee and \\'assenhove (1996). An example of research regarding
methods associated with cultivating learning in organizations is the extensive recent work
on "learning histories" (see the work by Roth of the MIT Center for Organizational
Learning). Research regarding learning histories deals with how documentation is used
to capture, assess, facilitate, diffuse and sustain organizational improvelnent initiatives.
[Roth, 1996]
Huber identified fOUf processes that contribute to organizational learning in 1991.
These include knowledge acquisition, information distribution, infonnation
interpretation, and organizational memory. Nevis, DibElla and Gould similarly identify
three stages of learning. The first is knowledge acquisition, the development or creation
of skills, insights and relationships. The second is knowledge sharing, the dissemination
of what has been learned. The third is knowledge utilization, the integration of learning
so that it is broadly available and can be generalized to new situations. Schein has
extended this concept with the 4l.adaptive coping cycle'" \vhich consists of six steps.
[Schein, 1996] The first of these steps is accurate sensing of changes in the external or
internal environment. This requires that sonlC sort of sensing structure be in place. The
second step is getting information to the right place where it can be acted upon. The third
involves analysis and drawing conclusions from the information available. The fourth
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step involves making transfonnations without creating undesirable side effects. The fifth
step involves exporting new products or services that incorporate the transfonnation. The
final step involves obtaining feedback on the success of the measures. Pawlosky and
Reinhardt provide a similar model in'volving identification and creation, diffusion,
modification and integration.! and finally action. These cycles can be seen to be similar to
the PDCA cyc.le in many respects, as it would relate to a learning process.
Lapre et. al. developed a learning curve model which has a theoretical basis
associated with recognized perfonnance gaps and conscious initiatives to improve
perfonnance. Their model seeks to recognize that a performance gap "induces the
organization to search for alternatives to reduce this gap. A larger discrepancy spurs the
organization to exert more effort in searching for better knowledge. The effectiveness of
acquiring new knowledge depends on the learning rate...Consequently, we can model the
rate of improvement as the product of the learning rate and performance gap." [Lapre et.
aI., 1996] Furthermore, they modeled the learning rate as the sum of an autonomous, or
unconscious, factor and the sum of a set of induced learning factors associated with
individual initiates. In addition, they linked the learning rate with time. They then
utilized their model in a number of manufacturing firms to identify the contributions of a
variety of projects to the learning rate. Their findings suggested that projects which
relied on operational learning alone had little impact on the learning rate, while those that
relied on both conceptual and operational learning enhanced the learning rate. They also
found that '''unproven theories", or projects that relied on conceptual learning without an
operational or empirical component had a tendency to dislupt the learning rate.
When examining the "learning effect", it is therefore important to consider the
effects of cognitive as well as behavioral changes, conceptual and operational learning,
proactive and reactive modes, and the means for accelerating the rate of learning
associated with each. Earlier in this chapter Erichsen's points regarding the detrimental
effects of changes were discussed. These detrimental effects come about because change
introduces a period of disruption which must be managed properly. Research by Lapre
et. al. suggested that projects which acquired both know-why and know-how, empirically
proven theories, accelerated the learning rate while others had no ilnpact or impeded the
learning rate. For this reason it is important to focus on both conceptual and operational
learning in projects, more easily done when projects are aligned to shared goals and
objectives as described earlier, and to understand the theory and methods associated with
Change Management to insure implementation with minimal disruption.
2.6 THEOR\' AND METHODS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
Alvin Toffler coined the tenn "future shock" in 1965 and later \\Tote a book by
the same name in 1970; "Future shock is the shattering stress and disorientation that we
induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a ti me. ~~
[Toffler, 1970 from Conner, 1992, p.51] Conner elaborated that '''future shock relates to
the overlapping impact of too much change that is too cOlnplex to deal with and occurs at
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too rapid a pace. The results are high levels of stress...and the inability to act quickly
enough...Essentially, future shock occurs when people are asked to absorb more
disruption than they have the capacity to take on....future shock is that point when
humans can no longer assimilate change without displaying dysfunctional behavior"
[Conner, 1992, p.51] So the field of Organizational Change Management is largely
concerned with the human reaction to change and how it manifests itself in organizations
seeking to implement changes. As was discussed with respect to the quality movement,
the ability of Engineering to adapt to the twin requirements of facilitating improved
production methods and reducing design cycle times has resulted in "future shock" in
many engineering offices in shipyards. For this reason, an examination of the lessons to
be learned from research in Organizational Change Management will assist in the
fornlulation of procedures, methods, and models for managing design improvement in
shipbuilding.
The field of Organizational Change Management has become popular in recent
years as a reaction to the rapid pace of change evident today. This pace has been
increased as a result of the quality movement, or more precisely changes in the
competitive environment that motivated companies to embrace the quality movement.
Conner wrote " ...the change encountered in previous eras was different. What has
changed about change is its magnitude, the approach it requires, the increasing
seriousness of its implications, and the diminishing shelf life of the effectiveness of our
responses to it." [Conner, 1992~ p.38]
A broad study reviewing 'total quality' programs in 584 U.S.
companies...released by Ernst & Young and the American Quality
Foundation in early 1992, found that because many quality programs are
overly broad aIld undefined, and because they are not implemented in a
consistent and focused way, they fail to achieve their intended results...
[lick, Cohen ed., 1993, p.343]
The field of Organizational Change Management approaches the procedural
context with respect to cycles of change beginning with the identification of a need
through sustaining implementation. It is a significantly different perspective than that
offered by configuration management. Configuration management is merely the process
for incorporating changes on documents, identifying revisions and communication
revisions. Configuration management may be a component of a broader Change
Management process, but alone does not insure success. The Change Management
literature generally addresses the following facets of Change Managenlent:
• Anecdotal advice, or common features of those that succeed
• Procedural context and phases or cycles of change
• Differing roles of stakeholders involved in change cycles
• Psychology of the resistance to change and the means to conlbat it
• Organizational readiness for change and the rneans of measuring it
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Carr, Hard and Trahant suggest that successful companies address change in a
comprehensive manner, meaning they address both procedural and psychological aspects
of change. They follow a systematic process for introducing change. McCarthy offered
the following as seven objectives which successful fi-nns address when introducing
change:
• Align orgClnizational strategy, structure, and workforce capability
• Maintain organizational momentum
• Upgrade employee skills
• Minimize instability by anticipating change
• Identify and follow an efficient transitional sequence
• Communicate clearly and frequently
• Minimize unnecessary disruption
2.6.1 Change Management Stage Models
Several researchers and writers have discussed procedural contexts for change.
Conner writes that "you will be much more effective if you approach change as a
manageable process with definite structures and outcomes that can be reliably
anticipated." [Conner, 1992, p.61] Several of these stage models were reviewed in the
course of this research. Heifetz in "Leading Change, Overcoming Chaos" (1993)
propos~s a seven stage model which is representative of those reviewed. The approach
promoted by Heifetz represents an example of a typical "collaborative mode" Change
Management process which emphasizes teambuilding and empowemlent. The
significance of motivation, patience, and commitment are emphasized. The nlotivating
force is described by Heifetz as "discomfort", and a variety of researchers have concluded
that pain and discomfort are strongly linked to success because the effort required to
make the change must exc~ed the discomfort with the status ql,;O. This will be discussed
in more detail as it relates to alternative implemelltation strategies in chapter 8.0.
While the desire for change can be linked to recognized opportunity,
discomfort is more often the motivating factor. [Heifetz, 1993, p.6]
The caution here is patience. It takes people a long time and a great deal
of discussion, independent thought, formulation, trial, reformulation, and
retrial to assimilate a significant organizational change ...The kind of
communication required spans the entire change cycle and cannot be
rushed...There is little that can be done to leapfrog the step by step process
of ch~.nge, or the assimilation time that people require. [Heifetz, 1993,
p.32]
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Motivation is described as being discomfort brought about by either internal
pressures or external pressures. He suggests that the proposed change cycle can be
successful regardless of the motivation to change, provided that the pressure is strong.
His experience suggests that external pressures present greater levels of discomfort and
therefore are most often the motivation to change. In examining the internal pressures
listed more closely, it appears logical to assume that employee expectations, employee
skill levels and company size are themselves a function of external pressures. The key
lesson is that without significant pressure, or a "sense of urgency", it is unlikely that
efforts will be successful. Motivation initiates the seven stages of the change cycle,
which are presented as:
1. Choosing the target
2. Setting goals
3. Initi~ting action
4. Making connections
5. Rebalallcing to accommodate the change
6. Consolidating the learning
7. Moving to the next cycle
The first stage represents the initial response to the motivation. At this point a
proposed change is identified, evaluated and selected from alternative possibilities for
responding to the motivating force. During this stage, preparation is made for the next
stage by clarifying, formulating and refining the idea. Heifetz suggests that by the end of
stage one, a small core group of people should emerge that has defined a target. The
word "target" is used to describe both the idea, and the objectives of the idea. Heifetz
emphasizes that there must be a sufficient level of interest and visible commitment from
leadership in order for this core group to emerge and start the process of change. This is
referred to as sponsorship by others in the field. During this stage the vision should be
made clear. There must be definition of the corporate, agency or departmental direction
being discussed, as well as a clear understanding of how the organization will be different
after the change is successful. The scope of the change must be understood. Does the
change represent a major shift in focus or only an adjustment? The alternatives must be
recognized. What directions will not be taken as a result of this change? Finally, a target
must be defined for what is to be accomplished. The output from this stage is a proposed
change responding to the motivation which has been defined to a degree meriting further
study. This is consistent with the con~epts of competency mapping and Hoshin
management discussed earlier in this chapter.
In the second stage, greater definition and planning of the purpose, scope,
outcomes and implementation is developed for the proposed change. The core group that
emerged in stage one evolves into a design, planning and inlplementation team. Hc,jfetz
suggests that at this stage, while the team will interact \vith others, 111uch of their \vork
will be accomplished as an independent entity. While acting as an independent group, the
team must be staffed cfoss-functionally to achieve adequate representation. I-Ieifetz
warns that not integrating the appropriate people into the teanl could ultirnately lead to
failure, but that the size of the team must also be limited to allow a viable plan to be
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formed prior to the organization as a whole developing strong resistance. In chapter 3.0,
the implications this has for the Production Engineering function at a shipyard will be
discussed in more detail. In this stage the capabilities of the organization are analyzed to
determine if they are in alignment with the proposed change. This analysis includes an
assessment of the impact of the change upon the products, policies, priorities, customers
and internal systems of the corporation. During this stage the team analyzes the change
and organization to detennine where resistance is expected to be encountered. A plan is
developed for addressing roadblocks. Heifetz proposes that the significant difference
between the first two stages is that the first stage is broad based and emotional while the
second stage is data driven. During this stage questions of time, effort, and expense are
given serious consideration. These issues all relate to the three areas of emphasis for
Heifetz' model of change (motivation, patience and commitment). The c~ange proposal
will either be dropped or given even greater definition at this stage. The output from this
stage is commitment to the proposed change from the stakeholder leaders.
The will of the organization is given a more severe test now, as the
resource level needed for the project becomes clearer. Your organization
should either assure the resources required to accomplish the goals of the
project, or reconsider its position with respect to those goals. [Heifetz,
1993, p.9]
The third stage, "initiating action", is characterized by an unmistakable shift from
planning into action and the involvement of the organization as a whole. An output from
this stage could be thought to be the "clarity of purpose" described by Deming. This
clarity of purpose is measured both in terms of the clarity of the vision and the clarity of
commitment of the organization.
The effectiveness of the goals and plans of stage two lies in large part in
their ability to stimulate interest and appropriate action within the
organization beyond the stage two planners. [Heifetz, 1993, p.9]
In the third stage many new individuals will get their first significant exposure to
the change. Heifetz makes the point that these individuals need to reach "alignrrlent with
the core team" (otherwise known as clarity of purpose) and wi!l need to move through
their own personal stages one and two. "They need to integrate the project into their own
work lives and commit energy and talent to move it forward." [Heifetz, 1993, p.IO] This
could take time and energy on the part of the sponsors of the change. There nlust be
incentive for the rest of the organization to take action. This often requires restructurinij
jobs around the project, evaluating employees based on progress towards achieving the
change's goals, and insuring that the organization as a whole understands why the
change is important and how it fits into an overall plan. Understanding is necessary in
order for restructuring and evaluations to be effective rather than denloralizing.
It is not enough to ignite commitnlent. To be successful comnlitnlent 1l1ust be
sustained. Heifetz argues that during inlplementation it is vital to provide everyone \vith
feedback on a continual and ongoing basis. This will maintain momentum and interest in
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those already 011 board and make it difficult for those that are not yet supporters to
become roadblocks.
2.6.2 Change Management Roles
Associated with the stage process models are roles that must be fulfilled.
Considerable research has been conducted regarding the roles necessary for successful
change and innovation. Conner suggests that there are four roles associated with
managing change. These include sponsors, agents, targets and advocates. LaMarsh
refers to only thr~e roles including sponsor$, agents and targets. A sponsor has the power
to legitinlize a change. They are the de~isionmakers who should have the authority to
decide which changes will happen and what the priorities are. An agent is the person or
group responsible for making the change happen. They are distinct from the targets who
actually must change. In the context of design change, the agents would be those
responsible for developing the proposal and managing its implementation. The advocates
are those who want to achieve a change but lack the power to sanction it. The general
concept is that an advocate identifies a need, convinces a sponsor to support it, an agent
manages the project and the target perfonns the change. In the context of shipbuilding,
the advocate for a design c~lange may be production or Production Engineering. The
agent is generally Production Engineering, the target is design engineering and the
sponsor may be a director or VP in production, planning or engineering. To be successful
using this terminology, sponsorship must include engineering executive management.
Furthermore, to consider the agent and the target to be entirely sepflrate entities is not
often successful. Production Engineering as a separate function cannot make a change
happen in engineering without their cooperation. This leads to a variety of issues
associated with how to organize for Production Engineering. These will be discussed in
chapter 3.0.
Roberts and Fusfeld identify five critical roles in the innovation process which
must be fulfilled with respect to R&D organizations and processes. [from Roberts ed.,
1987, p.27] The roles they identify are similar to those identified by other researchers
who have studied innovation in firms. They are useful when one considers the
Production Engineering function to be similar in many respects to a research and
development function. These roles include Idea Generating, Entrepreneuring or
Championing, Project Leading, Gatekeeping and Sponsoring or coaching. Idea
generating is associated with analysis of the environment and identifying an idea. The
person best in a position to identify a new idea will have special knowledge of the focus
of the idea and be able to deal with conceptualization and abstraction. The champion role
deals with selling ideas to others and acquiring resources. Such an individual possesses a
wide range of interests and is less likely to contribute to the basic idea but is aggressive
and has the detennination actively pursue support. The project leading role is associated
with providing leadership and motivation and the planning/organization skills required to
implement a proposal. l~hey have an understanding of the organization and \vhat is
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necessary to get things done. They are sensitive to the needs of the organization and can
integrate a broad range of disciplines. Gatekeeping involves gathering information which
is passed on to the other roles. They keep abreast of what competitors are doing and what
has been published in the journals. These individuals are "connected" and approachable
and serve as an infonnation resource for all the other roles. The sponsor provides access
to the power base within an organization a..,d provides the needed encouragement. They
are senior individuals who help the team get what it needs. They noted that some people
may serve multiple roles and that some roles may require multiple people. As will be
discllssed later, the intensity of the roles required vary from one phase of the stage model
to the next. Understanding these roles and their relationships to the stage model will have
implications for how a Production Engineering function might be staffed and organized.
2.6.3 The Psychology of Resistance to Change
In addition to an understanding of the procedural context and the roles that people
throughout the organization play, Organizational Change Management research has
yielded a psychological or theoretical understanding of how people react to ~hange which
is useful in managing the implementatiorl of changes. A common theme throughout the
literature regarding Change Management is that change is in the eyes of tIle beholder.
There are inherent difficulties in describing development efforts only in
tenus of "gradual" and "radical"...or in tenus of "increment:;" and "steps",
due to the dependence upon the level of analysis and
perception...Developing new routines in a work team may be perceived &s
very radical by an indiviudal who is used to ten-year-old working habits,
while it passes unnoticed by even the first line manager. [Berger, I996,
p.6]
Conner relates the resistance of change to issues associated with expectations, capabilities
and control.
When the challenges we encounter are matched equally with our
capabilities, we are usually able to predict what the outcome of the
situation will be. When chalJenges are greater than our capabilities, this
balance is upset and we are usually not able to accurately anticipate what
will happen. When our equilibrium disintegrates, our expectations are
disrupted and change is at hand ...Change is minor when it does not
significantly disrupt what you anticipated would happen. In these
circUolstances, you sinlply fine-tune your expectations and adapt to the
change... lf the disruption is major... it invalidates your
expectations...Regardless of how conscious or unconscious the effort,
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\vhen you gain a sense of control over your life it stems from your ability
to match expectations with perceived reality. [Conner, 1992, p.69]
In the context of introducing design changes, this equilibrium is broken when an
engineer or engineering manager is not able to predict the stability of their processes, the
reaction of their superiors, and the availability of their resources v/ith respect to the
outcome of the decision to move forward with a change. For this reason, a significant
component of managing design improvement proposals is managing expectations. This
will include creating an expectation that producibility motivated change WILL occur, and
an emphasis on creating an expectation within engineering of the types of changes that
these will be. Furthennore, an environment must be created within which engineering
staff know what to expect from their superiors with respect to commitment to addressing
these cllanges.
The benefits of Concu.rrent Engineering, Standardization and Build Strategy
development include providing a means for managing these expectations. Incorporation
of new approaches and explicitly stating that new standards or design details are to be
implemented in the Build Strategy assists in managing expectations and reducing
resistance. Furthennore, future changes should be identified in the Build Strategy as
well, and it should be shown how these link back to strategic objectives, in order to
manage expectations. While the precise changes may be unforeseen, areas of priority
should be identified for which it is desired to reduce costs or cycle time. The Build
Strategy should explicitly identify areas where future improvements are anticipated but
were not yet at a stage of development to be incorporated. There should be a method in
place regarding the potential introductions during mid-cycle, either due to further
development of an existing concept during detail design/production of the first hull or as
a result of lessons learned during production of the first hull. l-'he Build Strategy for a
multi-hull contract should set targets for improvements between hulls and the focus areas
which may result in changes between hulls to support these targets. For example, a
concept may be piloted on the first hull with the understanding that it will be re-evaluated
for full introduction into the second. Doing so will hf;lp to manage expectations and
assist engineering in developing budgets which anticipate improvement activities. This
will be discussed in more detail later in this research.
There are two "personality types" which are associated with attitudes towards
change and the amount of change an individual can assimilate. The traits exhibited by
someone will be a function of their personality and their function in the organization. To
the extent that an organization is structured functionally in "silos", these differences are
intensified because people perceive their roles as being champions for tasks and functions
rather than the achievement of the whole or the goal. In utility theory and decision
analysis these are often referred to as risk prone and risk averse. Later, in chapter 6.0 it
will he shown that these two distinct personality types do in fact exist in shipyards and
have a direct impact upon the ability to introduce change. Conner refers to these
personality types as type-O and type-D, or opportunity oriented and danger oriented.
[Conner, 1992, p.232] A type-D person has a lower tllresllold for assinlilation of change
and perceives change as threatening. A type-O person has a higher threshold for
assimilation and sees change as opportunity. The failure of a type-O person (such as a
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production engineer tasked with identifying and implementing improved methods) to
appreciate the perspective of a type-D person generally results in misunderstandings and
serves as a roadblock for any further activity. There is a common concept of a cycle such
that misunderstanding leads to confusion and anger on the part of the targeted type-D
individual or group, which ultimately leads to blaming and alienation of that group which
leads to future hostility and misunderstanding. Therefore, it is important to understand
the needs of the type-D individual before proceeding to initiate other activity. It is
important to recognize that a type-D individual can entirely agree on the magnitude of the
benefits, but is preoccupied with the risks. The type-O individual needs to focus on the
means of averting risks which are what the type-D individual actually cares about. They
need to be shown how this change fits into their framework, or expectations. This means
showing them the true costs and difficulties associated with the change and working with
them to explore how they can accommodate it. This is easier when expectations have
been managed properly and upper management has developed strategic goals which the
changes can be shown to support.
Everyone has a limit or cap on the amount of change they can assimilate, or the
amount of activity one can handle which is not aligned with one's expectations or sense
of control. "The dysfunctional behavior associated with future shock is not usually due to
a single change event. It more typically occurs from the effects of multiple, overlapping
changes." [Conner, 1992, p.81] This explains the frustration of production and
production engineers who cannot understand why a seemingly simple change proposal
faces such extraordinary resistance from the design departments. The '~simple" proposal
is actually major because it causes the organization or the people involved to exceed their
allotment of "assimilation points" [Conner, 1992, p.81].
The problem is that management doesn't collect the proper information to
develop a complete picture of what is about to happen.. .If you haven't
built a comprehensive picture of tlle total assimilation drain on tIle people
affected by multiple changes, you may be seduced into thinking that a
particular project will be assimilated without much of a problem. [Conner,
1992, p.82]
The lesson for managing design change is that those interested in introducing
changes must be sensitive to the total assimilation drain. T'his implies that the capabiiity
to screen, prioritize and link efforts is critical. If a change causes major disruption for
any of its constituencies, then it must be approached as a major change. In addition, there
are two issues which the shipyard must deal with. The first of these is how to increase
the number of assimilation points people and organizations have available to them and
the second is to reduce the number of points expended in introducing changes. [Conner,
1992]
One common theme throughout all the research into change processes is that the
inlplementation of change requires a background of stability to succeed. The argunlent
implies that prior to engaging in significant change efforts, it is first necessary to nurture
a stable environlnent or an environment \vhich is understood. The processes, procedures
and design elements already in place must be understood and predictable before change
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can truly be managed. Otherwise change is not being managed, but is ad hoc. This is a
concept related to the "change readiness" of an organization. "Pettigrew argues ttlat
'change processes can only be studied against a background of structure or relative
constancy' ...Organizational change only exists in relation to organizational stability -
change is from a state towards a state." [Winch, 1994, p.38] The risk that a change may
not be successful due to organizational factors such as instability or a lack of
understanding of fundamental processes must be considered during the evaluation and
implementation phases.
2.6.4 Alignment and Other Factors Critical for Success
The consulting finn Coopers and Lybrand suggests that there are five primary
'''critical success factors" that help to differentiate successful from failed change efforts.
All of these relate to the "change readiness" of an organization.
The following formula illustrates the critical success factors for
overcoming resistance to change:
SC = V + N + M + R + F
Successful Change = Vision + Need + Means + Reward + Feedback
Successful change will follow when:
V: A shared vision of the desired change has been developed,
articulated, and communicated by the change leaders.
N: The compelling need for the change has been developed and is
shared by all employees.
M: The practical means to achieve the vision has been planned,
designed and implemented.
R: The reward systems of the organization have been aligned to
identify and encourage appropriate behaviors compatible with the
change vision.
F: Feedback is given at each stage of the process to monitor progress
and provide information for continuous improvement. [Carr, Hard,
Trahant, 1996, p.157]
Coopers and Lybrand also identify the inlportance of assessing the organization's
"readiness for change". "The odds of successfully im11lementing change grow as the
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similarity grows between the eXisting culture and the behaviors and assumptions
required by [the] change initiative." [Carr, Hard, Trahant, 1996, p.165] They refer to a
"baseline load factor" and a Hculture climate survey" as two tools useful in evaluating
change readiness. "The baseline load factor shows that the implementation phase of a
change effort can be jeopardized if its sponsors, agents, and targets aloe experiencing
work-related stress before the change is announced...The Culture Climate Survey (CSS)
measures the readiness of an organization for change and the likely cultural resistance
factors that might inhibit full achievement of the specific change objectives." [Carr,
Hard, Trahant, 1996, p.163]
McCarthy has also suggested the importance of organizational preparedness in
his book "The Transition Equation." He identifies the importance of aligning three
critical components in order to achieve success. The degree of the alignment of these
factors can be considered to be a measure of "organizational risk." "The importance of
alignment and the need for transition planning becomes clear as one examines the
repeated failures of initiatives and other undertakings in organizations." [McCarthy;
1996, p.19] In evaluating preparedness "a translation needs to occur that acconlplishes
two things: identifies what we are required to do and how capable we are of doing it."
[McCarthy, 1996, p.53]
A technique I use to boil down all of the issues to an understandable level
is based on three critical components: strategy, structure and workforce
capability.
Strategy is a specific course of action necessary to help achieve vision or
mission statements.
Structure refers to the tangibles, such as systems, processes, standards,
brick and mortar, policies, procedures, training programs, and equipment
necessary to support the strategy.
Workforce Capability is made up of the skills, knowledge, attitude,
commitment, and values necessary to work within a given structure In
support of the strategy. [McCarthy, 1995, p.15]
In examining how well a change proposal is aligned with an overall strategy~
organizational structure and workforce capability, it is often found that:
1. fv10st aspects of the organization will not need to be altered
dramaticall~/ in the short term.
2. Some aspects of the transition need immediate attention.
3. Some aspects of the desired change require significant departures
from how the organization is accustomed to operating...
78
4. Many skills ingrained in the organization's workforce may have
little or no relevance to the future state. [McCarthy; 1996, p.83]
The extent to which each of tIle above is true is a representation of the
organizational risks associated with a particular change proposal. McCarthy defines a
"preparedness scale" which he uses to describe how prepared an organization is to
implement a proposal given their current experience, demonstrated capabilities, and
existing resources. [McCarthy, 1996, p.93] This scale Call be considered to be a
"constructed attribute" as defined by Keeney. "Most constructed attributes are meant to
measure more than one facet of a complex problem" and they tend to describe subjective
conditions. [Keeney, 1992, p.l 04] Such scales can be utilized for screening projects.
This particular scale is defined from A through E and is applied to each of the three
"critical factors" as follows:
A = No experience. Don't think we are ready to do this. Many unknowns.
Strategy:
Structure:
Capability:
Strategy is not fonnulated
Structure is not defined, or necessary structure does not exist
Skills, knowledge and capabilities necessary to perform this
activity are absent or unclear
B = Marginal capability, no direct or related experience. Not sure of our capability to
perform this activity.
Strategy:
Structure:
Capability:
Strategy fonnulation is incomplete. It is difficult to see hO'N or
why we might do this.
Most aspects of the required structure are unclear. It is obvious
that there are gaps in infonnation over what is required.
It is apparent that the workforce is not equipped with all of the
skills and knowledge necessary to perfonn this task and that
external input and training will be necessary.
C = Partial capability, no direct experience. Seems feasible but not completely
thought through.
Strategy:
Structure:
Capability:
The overall strategy and the reasoning behind it are apparent. It is
relatively easy to see the logic to do this and how it will be
approached.
Most of the key systems, processes, equiprnent, etc., necessary to
perform this activity are kno\vn and appear doable.
Some skiJI and kno\vlcdge is required in order to perfornl this
activity. No critical skill and knowledge gaps are seen. SOOlC
workforce dcvelopnlent will be necessary.
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D = Some familiarity with subject. Have experience applicable to the requirements of
this activity.
Strategy;
Structure:
Capability:
The strategy is clear and most aspects of it can be easily translated
into specifics.
Most of the structural aspects of this activity are known and have
been done before.
Workforce is equipped with most skills and knowledge
requirements or can readily learn them.
E = Have perfonned before or have experience doing this activity. Have a successful
track record with this activity.
Strategy:
Structure:
Capability:
Strategy is formulated and is very clear and specific.
Structural components are identified, and how to create, acquire,
or logistically position them is known.
Workforce currently has the skill sand knowledge necessary to
support the named strategy and structure.
Nadler and Tusllillan echo the concept of the importance of alignment of the
change proposal with corporate strategy, structure and capability in their book
"Competing by Design." Their work focuses on organizational structure and its influence
upon adaptivity and competitiveness. They propose what they call the "congruence
hypothesis" which states that "Other things being equal, the greater the total degree of
congruence, or fit, among the various components, the more effective the organization
will be. Put another way, the degree to which the strategy, work, people, structure, and
culture are smoothly aligned will determine the organization's ability to compete and
succeed." [Nadler, Tushman, 1997, p.34] This is entirely consistent with the concepts of
I-Ioshin and strategic planning introduced earlier.
LaMarsh has also written about the need to integrate proposed changes within an
overarching vision or strategy. "Think about the changes in your company. Look at your
picture of the vision/mission. Does each of these changes help achieve that
vision/mission? Is its contribution clear?"[LaMarsh, 1995, p..23] There is an
organizational risk associated with the degree to which a change impacts four key
elements. "The changes required in Engineering will be based on those four interrelated
department aspects: process, structure, people, and culture. A change in anyone aspect
sets off changes in every other one. Therefore framing the change and fitting it into a
larger future must start by looking at engineering as an entity 1l1ade up of process,
structure, people and culture. Then each proposed change in any on~ aspect nlust be
examined to determine its impact on the other three.'~ [LaMarsh, 1995, p.20]
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2.7 SYNOPSIS
Shipbuilders must think in tenns of strategic objectives and how they are
supported by capabilities and cOlnpetencies. The design improvement process and
decision analysis models must address the means by which competitive advantage, and
therefore capabilities, will be supported by proposed design improvements. This is a
strategic concern which will require analysis that goes beyond traditional engineering
economic costlbenetit considerations.
Product and process are linked, and therefore process change generally requires
product change to support it. A shipyard which emphasizes continuous or breakthrough
improvement of production processes must be equally concerned with engineering
support. A mechanism for introducing design improvements must be put in place. Doing
so will require shipbuildiers to balance flexibility and control. A mechanism for
alternating between disorder/infonnality/innovation and stability/cons~rvatism IS
required.
Shipbuilding appears to be more closely aligned with a mass customization model
of production. Making standardization a distinctive competency will provide the
shipyard with a greater capacity to balance flexibility and c011trol. Concurrent
Engineering, StandardizationlMass Customization, Build Strategy development, and the
Production Engineering function address this issue (in part by managing expectations)
and will be discussed in chapter 3.0.
'loHman suggests that those organizations that succeed at balancing flexibility
with control are in a position to dominate their industry. He identifies a number of
observable characteristics of dominance:
• Anticipation of, and quick response to, changes in marketplace conditions
• Proactive, opportunity seeking atmosphere
• High rate of learning
• Flexibility, responsiveness and speed
• Internal sense of urgency, nonbureaucratic
• Team Spirit
• Setting of standards that competitors try to follo\v
• Changing the rules
• Growth of capabilities and competencies
Significant productivity advances are achieved through a conlbination of both
incremental and major innovations. "All the evidence points to the need to innovate both
with breakthrough products and processes and \vith regular incremental inlprovenlents.
Any finn that plans to win the race to commercial success by being either a steady
plodding tortoise or a swift-footed hare will find itself outpaced bJ' firms that have
developed the virtues of both." [Utterback, 1994, p.135] This inlplies a systenlatic
approach to Change Managerl1ent which addresses issues associated \vith ho\v the
organization can learn effectively, without disruption, and faster than the conlpetition.
Projects must focus on both conceptual and operational learning.
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The preceding history of the quality movement demonstrates that the chain of
events introduced earlier in the research is valid. It is further validated through shipyard
interviews. The introduction of TQM led to greater rates of change, which ultimately was
perceived as having many disruptive effects as well as successes. This has led to the
latest wave of the quality movement which emphasizes coordination (Hoshin) and
Change Management. In effect, these realizations could be considered to be a series of
cycles through Crosby's Quaiity Management Maturity grid (see HBS 1986 note 9-687-
011 for definition of the grid) with uncertainty, followed by an awakening, followed by
enlightenment, followed by wisdom followed by certainty. The issue is that the final
point in his grid, certainty, represents quality improvement being a regular and
continuous activity with the majority of problelns being prevented. Unfortunately, more
is necessary to compete than to prevent problems as defined by looking backward,
because new problems will always present themselves due to a dynamic competitive
environment. Thus, certainty is brief and followed by a new period of uncertainty in
reaction to changes in the environment. It is a continuous cycle.
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FIGURE 2.8 - CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO CHANGE MANAGEMENT
The total quality movement was a reaction to changes in the conlpetltlve
environment and changed the pace of change. The engineering organization was unable
to cope as well as it might have with the increased pressure, in part due to a lack of an
overarching strategy which clearly associated change proposals with strategic objectives
and in part due to the lack of a Change Management process. Shipyards must address
this issue by adopting a strategic planning process which links means with objectives,
which in tum are linked to responses to changes in the competitive environment. They
must also adopt a procedural context for change that facilitates linking design
improvement proposals with strategic responses, and prioritizes proposals to reflect an
understanding that organizations have limits to the amount of change they can assimilate.
Change implementation procedures must address hoth procedural and psychological
roadblocks.
The changes in the ship design and production cycle, increases in automation, and
development of standardized interim parts and \vork processes signaled a move away
from craft produ.ction and the increasing irrelevance of the traditional learning curve
model and notion of learning. While traditional thinking suggests that changes al\vuys
disrupt the learning curve, it has been shown that today more learning is as'iociated with
82
deliberate rather than unconscious activity. This would suggest that changes introduced
as part of a deliberate learning process can accelerate the learning rate. To do this
successfully will require an understanding of the theory and methods for enhancing
orgaIlizationalleaming as well as Change Management.
Product mix defines the co~petitive environment
Set of Product Market Value Propositions
I Value I= ProducllService Attributes
:
Materials Market Propositions
Rdationship t-------.----......
Regulatory Regimes
Labor Market Propositions
Competitive
env iroJ'lment
exerts pressure
on organization
to improve
Perceived
Performance
Gap
($/CGT)
(Tech. Survey)
(Conlpelency Map)
Goals
Targets
(Hoshin)
Unconscious
Learning by
Repetition
Del iberale,
conscio!.Js
learning
aClivities
Improved
perforrnance
exens pressure
on the
competitive
environnlcnt
ImprovemenLS & InveSlments
rJ·Facililies & Equipmenl• Organizalion & Process Redesign• Ship Design for CompelilivenessManaged inuoduction of
supponing design improvemenrs
throughoul all design slages
FIGURE 2.9 - MANAGED IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
As was made clear in this chapter, a key element of success is the development of
a procedural context for managing change. The lessons learned and discussed in the
preceding sections regarding the change process were important in developing the design
change framework introduced earlier in tllis research. Furthennore, the advice of Winch
was considered.
Any stage model is an analytic device to segment a flow of activity
through time. The point of transition, or inflection between stages,
therefore, ought to be meaningfuliy specifiable. Many stage models
attempt to describe the content of each stage, but do not specify the
outcomes of the activities within each stage. The inflection points,
therefore, tend to be arbitrary. A simple, but related, point is that the
nonlenclature of the stages ought to be intuitively nlcaningful as well.
There are, therefore, three basic criteria by which to assess stage models -
they should be theoretically justifiable, robust, and specify clearly both the
content and inflection points of each individual stage. [Winch, 1994,
p.127]
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Therefore, in developing the design change framework, it was desired to assign stages
which were intuit:ve. It was desired that the input, the content, and the output of the
sta~es was clear and definable. And finally it was desirab!e that the stage model be
robust, or applicable under a variety of circumstances. The lessons learned and these
considerations yielded the following stage model, which has been verified as workable
through discussions with shipyard personnel. l'his stage model begins with a motivating
force which leads to identification of a change proposal. This is folJowed by periods of
evaluation, prioritization, decisionmaking, planning, implementing and measuring. A
key element of this stage model is the evaluation phase. This research will review a
variety of evaluation techniques and develop an evaluation model that is consistent with
the strategic planning techniques described earlier. All of these phases, and the roles and
tools required to successfully address them, are discussed in detail in the chapters that
follow.
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3.0 FOUNDATION'S FOR rt'1ANAGING DESIGN IMPROVEMENT:
PRODUCTION ENGINEERING, STANDARDIZATION,
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING, AND BUILD STRATEGY
DEVELOPMENT
Design Change Management is an integral part of a design philosophy aimed at
improving competitiveness.
Change has becorrie an increasingly important cons,~deration in a product's
life cycle... In a design-for-change approach, the design team seeks to make
the inevitability of change compatible with the need for a stable and
disruption free manufacturing environment. ..Hard to control factors
include:
1. Changing day-to-day production, customer and market needs
2. Competitive pressure
3. Availability of new technology and materials
4. Design iteration due to uncertainties
5. Design iteration due to continuous improvement In product and
process
Several strategies for designing a product and process to be robust against
change appear to be possible. One of the most effective of these is
standardization...However, at some point in the design, ...new needs and
opportunities begin to emerge. This broaden~ the scope of design to
include many new possibilities and generally triggers a variety 0f redesign
activities. Recognizing the narrowing and broadening of design scope as a
natural tendency of product developnlent, we see that the best time to plan
for redesign is during the early stages... [Ettlie ann Stoll, 1990, p.l 04]
Design Change Management should be thought of as part of an overa) I schenle
incorporating Production Engineering, Concurrent Engineering, Design/Build Strategy ..
Standardization, and Change Management. Such a scheme might be referred to as
"Design for Competitiveness." Nunlerous books and papers have been written about the
merits of these associated methods. The purpose of this chapter is to place Change
Management in the context of the design process as it relates to these other elenlcnts of
design for competitiveness rather than to provide an exhaustive review of each. The
focus is on showing how the objectives of Design Change Managenlcllt are supported by
these other facets of Design for Competitiveness, and ho\v Design Change ManagCI11cnt
enhances their effectiveness.
A distinction is lnade between UDesign for Production~~, --Engineering for
Production", '·Isolated Engineering" and --Integrat~d Engineering" in NSRP 0219
~"Engineering for Ship Production" by Lanlb. Design for Production refers to "taking into
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account production methods and techniques which reduce the work content, simplify the
complexity of the work, and fit it to the facilities and tools available, yet meet the
specified requirements and quality. Engineering for production determines the best
technique to transmit and communicate the design and engineering infolmation to the
various users in a shipyard." [Lamb, 1986] Isolated Engineering refers to a sequential
approach where design details incorporate little production input and are not in a form
directly usable by production. Efforts to streamline engineering products resulted in
Integrated Engineering, where the information provided is in a format compatible with
the way the ship is to be buill and considers Design for Production. More recently,
Concurrent Engineering and Build Strategy development have become popular~ \vhich
seek 10 integrate Design for Production into the earliest possible design stage through a
teaming environment.
Much of the literature discusses the benefits of various approaches as they relate
to shortening design cycles and mitigating downstream rework. These activities can also
be linked to an effective Change Management plan. In Chapter 2.0 it \vas dcnlonstrated
that any organization has an ·"assimilation budget'" which is ora\vn down by change.
Change ~1anagement seeks to minimize this assimilation drain as well as to increase the
total availabl~ assimilation budget. The elements of Design for Competitiveness assist
both of these objectives. They are ainled at moving consideration of issues earlier into
design development. This acts to reduce the nu~ber of downstreanl changes decreasing
the assimilation drain, thereby increasing the organization' s capacity to handle changes
which are identified later. It also provides an opportunity to manage expectations early,
which was shown in Chapter 2.0 to increase the assimilation budget.
3.1 DESIGN FOR PRODUCTION AND PRODlJCTION ENGINEERING
It should be noted that Design for Cost, or Design for Production~ is not the sanle
as the notion of Design to Cost. Design to Cost has existed for quite some tirrlc and is
typically associated with trade-offs between functionality and budget. It is the activity
that is associated with "cost-down" effJrts during the contract design phase \vhi Ie
functionality and price are being negotiated \\'ith the owner. Design for Production, on
the other hand, is focused on reducing costs and cycle time while nlaintaining a given
level of functionality. It is generally associated with efforts to improve shipyard
profitability while Design to Cost is associated with efforts to negotiate a price or develop
an agreed upon understanding of functionality consistent with budgetary constraints.
At about the same time as the quality circle movement in the late 1970~s, a steady
stream of material associated with "producibility" appeared in the shipbuilding literature.
Papers focused on Production Engineering or Design for Production appeared at thc 1979
REAPS technical synlposium in San Diego and have been prevalent cver since. l"\\,o
significant changes occurred in the 1970'5 which can explain this increased interest. ~rhc
first is consistent \vith the Abernathy-Utterback 111odel's suggestion that as the ratc of
process change increases, there 111USt be a c0l11parable level of product change. The
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quality movement which began in the 1970's applied additional pressure on the
shipbuilding community to change the way ships were designed. In addition, the
introduction of the 1970 Maritime Bill changed the \vay the design \vas developed and
organized.
Tom Lamb provided an interesting historical perspective on Production
Engineering in "Engineering for Ship Production." The 1936 Maritime Bill required
shipowners that desired government financial assistance to submit preliminary data to
MARAD, which MARAD would subsequently approve. At that point, the shipowner
was required to submit a contract design package to MARAD who would handle
distributing the package to shipyards for bids. These bids were submitted to MARAD.
The unfortunate outcome was that shipbuilders had no incentive to spend time preparing
contract designs. The fnajority of the designs were prepared by design finns'l which did
not focus the design on taking advantage of any particular yard's facility. The 1970
Maritime Bill permitted shipowners and builders to work together. The outconle \vas a
new focus on Design for Production, as shipyards \vorked with design fimls to develop
designs that took greater advantage of their facilities.
Rack discussed the early focus of Production Engineering efforts at REAPS 1979.
These efforts were aimed at developing an understanding of the production processes and
designing to take advantage of them. Objectives included planning and scheduling \vork
upstream and/or in parallel to remove it from the critical path, erection of larger blocks
and units, utilization of better jigs and fi~·tures, improvements in manning and nlanpower
assignments, more automated welding equipment or better processes, and increased levels
of pre-outfitting. It is interesting to note that the focus generally remains the same today,
but with a greater sense of urgency and expectatic:1s. As the quality movelnent increased
the rate of improvement of the production nlethods, the Production Engineering function
would evolve to focus on improvillg production nlethods and integrating these improved
methods with the design work. The development of shipyard standards has pernlitted the
results of Production Engineering efforts to be formalized and distributed in such a \vay
as to capture the infonnation regarding optimal approaches for use in other contracts.
The Design for Production function was also described by MacDougalll and Carss
at REAPS 1979. Like Rack, they pointed out that productivity can be improved in four
areas including designing work content out of the ship, improving efficiency of
production processes, making better use of working hours and reducing ship production
cycle times. They defined the Design for Production function as an extension of the ship
design process with the following objectives.
To produce a design which represents an acceptable conlpronlise between
the demands of performance and production. To ensure that all design
features are compatible with known characteristics of shipyard facilities.
To apply individual Design for Production procedures in so far as they are
relevant to the particular shipyard \vhere D vcssel is to be built. 1"'0
coordinate the inter-relationship bet\veen the enginecring and outfitting
work with the structural work, in order to create a fully integrated design.
[MacDougall, Carss, 1979, p.465]
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MacDougall later refined th~ definition and objectives of Production Engineering
as follows. [MacDougall, 1980]
a) To assist production to achieve the targets and goals set out in the corporate plan
b) To monitor production technology developments in the industry
c) To identify opportunities for cost reductions in produclion processes
Furthermore, MacDougall and Carss identified a number of general rules for the
application of Production Engineering. Such an axiomatic approach to Design for
Production is popular in a variety of industries and has become known as "'Design for
Manufacture and Assembly", or DFMA. l~:iey also recommended that "the development
of improved producibility must parallel the design development \vork and will influence
it at every stage. Aspects of Design for Production are also capable of further
development during the production phase but even at the contract design stage, attention
should be given both to achieving a generally production-kindly design and allo\ving and
encouraging further Production Engineering work in a post contract context."
The emphas"ts during the early 1980's was still on the dctail design phase after
contract drawings had been developed. As Lamb pointed out, the slow acceptance of
Production Engineering method~ as a means to seek inlprovenlcnt was probably due to
reliance on outside design firms. [Lamb, 1986] For exanlple, in 1981 a paper \vas
published describing a cooperative effort between A&P Appledore and Norshipco to
examine producibility for a floating drydock aftl.. design drawings had been obtained
from a naval architectural consultant. [Bell, Flora, 1981]
The link between Production Engineering and Design Engineering at this tinlC
was through design reviews. These design reviews are often referred to as "i.Value
Engineering". Value Engineering was the precursor to DFI\1A. Value Engineering is an
orderly review process involving an interdisciplinary teanl which offers alternatives to
improve project value. Thus Value Engineering could also apply to inlproving qllality~
reduci~g weight, and other objectives. Ho\vever, as practiced Value Engineering is
largely equated with reducing cost. [Shillito, De iv1arle 1992] The key point is that it is a
revie\v process. Value Engineering \vas de""eloped in 1947 by [-J.D. Miles and applied at
General Electric. In the 1950's, the Navy established Value Engineering dcpartnlents.
The effectiveness of lhese departments was limited by the fact that the facility being
utilized for construction was not known at the tinle of design. Va~ue engineering as
applied by production engineers at shipyards could be thought of as part of the production
planning process as well. It involved both identifying alternative design dctails as \vell as
identifying the production processes best suited to the given design.
According to the Engineering Design l-Iandbook of the U.S. ArnlY Material
Command, Value Engineering consists of six rhases. Phase I is concerned \vith
collecting essential infonnation related to the project. Phase II consists of reviewing the
design and conducting "functional analysis'"'. This analysis is concerned \vith questioning
the function of design features and the value of those functions to dctcrnlinc if the details
are really necessary. Phase III is known ns '~spcculation"''' and involves identifying
alternative details for the functions and details identified in phase II. Phnsc IV is the
evaluation phase, where the original design features and the alternatives developed in
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phase III are evaluated with respect to feasibility and resource requirements. Phase V
involves selling the results of phase IV to gather support for change proposals. Phase VI
involves implementation of value engineering change proposals. This phase generally
involves getting management approval for the change proposals and tracking of the
results of the change proposal. The activities identified in these six phases describe well
the Production Engineering function as it rt=lated to engineering in US yards until very
recently. Curr~ntly, efforts are focused at bringing Production Engineering earlier into
the design cycle.
As the quality movement continued to pick up momentum and production
processes and technologies changed, it became increasingly difficult for Engineering to
keep up. MacDougall commented that "as technology continues to change, the task for
technical departments is to keep abreast of these changes." [MacDougall, 1980, p.9] The
Value Engineering approach met with difficulties because the number of change
proposals identified continued to increase as the pace of the quality movement increased.
This was due to both the rate of production process improvelnent as well as changing
expectations and goals for productivity improvement. "Designing for cost has two
dimensions, attitude and implementation. Attitude relates to the environlnent which
fosters consideration of cost in the design process. Implementation is the set of processes
by which cost is used as a design parameter." [Dean, Unal, 1991, p.l] The momentunl
built by the quality movement both intensified the attitude and added to the ~'toolkit" of
processes used to identify alternative details. The pressure to do better continually
increased and the Production Engineering function was tasked with facilitating this
improvement. Meanwhile the pressure for engineering to reduce design cycle time also
increased.
With this increased pressure, the paradox of the necessity to maintain a separate
group as well as the need to integrate the function within Engineering has been the
subject of much debate. This is evident in both the literature and shipyard feedback. The
crux of the debate does n01 appear to be whether such a function has its place, but rather
the timing of its in~1ut and how it fits into the structure of the yard.
While the correct application of Industrial Engineering techniques to
shipbuilding will be of significant benefit, its application has in many
cases only increased the isolation of the Engineering department [ronl the
production activity and resulted in increased cost due to its being applied
after the design is completed and the development of the detailed
engineering well underway. This is equally true of the situation when
Production Engineering groups are' established within the production
department. For this to be done, the shipyard managenlent nlust first
believe that it is beneficial to split and specialize engineering into two
parts, namely design and production...There is only one kind of acceptable
technical engineering, and that is when its producibility is fully and
adequately considered fronl its conception. [Lanlb, J986, p.13]
But is it realistic to assume that a designer can keep abreast of all that is desirable to
support a given yard, particularly in a tinle \vhere shipyard turnover in design personnel is
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cyclic? While management must not allow Engineering to delegate or not fulfill its
responsibility to Design for Production, assistance may be required fronl specialists who
may devote their time to identifying nleans and 111clhods and can coordinate activities
across departnlent and contract lines. I~amb recognized the paradox and wrote, in the
very same document as the previous quote:
Most ship designers will not have either the experience or the tinlC to usc
work measurenlcnt techniques... l-lowcvcr, if an Industrial Engineering
capability exists in their shipyard, they should take every opportunity to
use it, and to work with the Industrial Engineers to arrive at the best design
for their shipyard. If such a capability does not exist in the shipyard or it
is too preoccupied with the many other areas they are involved in, and it is
not reoriented by management, Design for Ship Production can (sti II] be
pcrfonned. The ship designer with a team from planning and production
can examine the different ways to design a detail, and rank thern on the
basis of a merit factor considering various producibility and cost aspects.
When complete, the selected 'best' design and the selection analysis can
be sent to other departments that are involved in the process, for their
review and concurrence. It is strongly recommended that a Design for
Ship Production team be established io review and maintain a shipyard's
existing standards, and at the early stage of all new ship design
development to ensure that the design will be the most producible and
cost-effective design for their shipyard. [Lamb, 1986, p30]
SonlC have commented that the difficulties associated with a separate Production
Engineering group are a necessary evil in the transition from an design organization \vith
a poor Design for Production track record to one in which Design for Production is
everyone's job. In organizations \vhere drastic improvement is required, thc introduction
of a separate group may be the only means of ilnprovcment. lJnfortunately, this is
precisely the time when the organization's "assimilation budget" is lo\vcst.
The workplace culture of the producibility engineer is generally in the
spirit of successful new product development, but with particular built in
conflicts. "The producibility engineer's role is akin to that of an
alnbassador seeking adequate representation for his homeland
(manufacturing) among those of foreign soil (product design). To bc
effective, such anlbassadors must be excellent conlnlunicators. They arc
likely to be judged on their ability to stop the equivalent of a foreign
invasion. This type of manufacturing engineering, ainlcd directly at the
design-nlanufacturing interface, is a necessary step in a traditionaL
functionally-donlinated organizational structure. It is the 111anufacturing
organization's atlenlpt to gain parity in the" chinlncy's of po\vcr," \\·'hcrehy
problcnls, once surfaced, are pushed to higher levels for ultinlatc
resolution. lEttlic, Stoll, 1990 p.38]
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Regardless of where it resides, the Production Eng ~neering function is necessary
for successful design improvement and Change Management. This is so in a number of
respects. Production Engineering implies an understanding of processes and the
development of axiomatic design guidance. This reduces the assimilation drain by
increasing the producibility content of Engineering products, reducing the number of
downstream ch(illgcs required to compete. The existence of Production Engineering
builds an expectation that improvement is an ongoing part of business, and nlanaging
expectations reduces resistance to change. The industry survey results discussed in the
next chapter reflect this.
Production Engineering, as a function, is directly associated with the
identification stage of the design change framework and involves proactive efforts to
improve. Wheelwright and Clark suggested, with respect to product development, that
"creative ideas need to be encouraged and nurtured...Potential ideas can come from
anywhere in an organization and from numerous sources beyond...However, rarely do
organizations have a systematic way of corralling these ideas. By and large, no one is
responsible for their identification, no mechanisms are in place for their evaluation, no
resources are available for further investigation, and many ideas wither from inattention."
[Wheelwright, Clark, 1995, p.66] The purpose of the Production Engineering function
should be to see that this is not so. It should by no means diminish the responsibility of
the rest of the organization for design improvement, but should facilitate their ability to
do so.
The Production Engineering function's relationship to engineering is very similar
to that of an R&D organization in a product development firm. The Production
Engineering function is responsible for benchmarking the competition, keeping abreast of
the latest production technology, and working with other departments to advocate
incorporation of technologies which are deemed beneficial. They are also typically
tasked with supporting the Standards group and developing axiomatic design guidance.
Each of the roles described in chapter 2.0 nlust be identifiable in the successful
Production Engineering function, regardless of whether that function resides in
Production, Planning or Engineering. Issues associated with organization design are
prevalent today as shipyards strive to obtain the benefits of Production Engineering
without the costs of a separate group.
The costs of having a separate group are associated both with tangible costs like
management and overhead as well as intangible costs such as friction and potential
disassociation between Design and Production. l'he benefits of a separate group include
visibility, better coordination, consolidation of people with particularly good Production
Engineering and problem solving skills, and continuity of focus across contracts and
departments. The question of organization design is not easily settled, and \vil! be unique
to each shipyard. What is clear is that the function is necessary and must be effectively
integrated with Production, Planning, Engineering, Purchasing and Contracts in order to
achieve its desired result.
Nadler and Tushman propose the ~'congruence hypothcsis'~ to describe the goal of
organization design.
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Each organization as a whole displays a relatively high or lo\\' level of
congruence. The basic hypothesis of the nlodel is this: Other things being
equal, the greater the total degree of congruence, or fit, among the various
components, the more effective the organization ·\vill be. I)ut another way,
the degree to which the strategy, work, people, structure, and culture arc
smoothly aligned will dctennine the organization's ability to conlpctc and
succeed. [Nadler and Tushman, 1997, p.34]
To the extent that ".Iignment can be achieved through the informal organization or
other means which enhance mutual trust and respect, the formal organization takes on
less s~gnificance. In the next chapter, shipyard feedback sheds light on how these issues
have been handlt.=d in practice. The desire to achieve balance between lhe advantages of a
traditional line organization and the need to integrate functions Ilkc Production
Engineering has led to considerations of alternative team-based approaches consistent
with Concurrent Engineering.
Ettlie and Stoll conclude in their book ""Managing the fJcsign-Manufacturing
Process" that successful Inanufacturers today exhibit five key integrating actions, ~rhcse
actions include:
• Use of cross functional teams in which all nlembers are trained In design for
manufacture methods.
• Manufacturing signs off on design reviews
• Novel organizational structures are used for coordination
• Job rotation is practiced in the engineering functions
• Personnel move betvleen engineering and manufacturing
Concurrent Engineering and Build Strategy development, discussed shortly,
represent efforts to integrate Production Engineering as early into the design process as
possible. l'he existence of a Production Engineering function supports the required
visibility and continuity for successful consideration of Design for Production at all
phases and across all departments. Effective Change Management can insure that
imprOVe111cnt proposals identified by, or preferably with Production Engineering as part
of a cross functional team, are prioritized and impleme=-tted vvith the least disruption
possible.
3.2 CON(.'URRENT ENGINEERING
Recent attention has turned to the timing associated with producibility related
considerations. Early efforts were associated with a design review or Io~Value
Engineering" approach. It has been realized for sonlC tinlC that design decisions \vhich
are made in the early stages of dcveloplllcnt have the greatest illlpnct upon cost. As the
number of change proposals increased, it hecanlc increasingly evident that a J11CanS for
reducing the anl0unt of change identified latc \voulC: need to be put in place.
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Furthermore, constraints are added with each design phase that cannot easily be changed.
Concurrent Engineering strives to convert design reviewers into active design
participants. It is synonymous \vith Simultaneous Engineering and integrated Pruduct
and Process Development (IPPD). Concurrent Engineering is defined by the Institute of
Defense Analysis as lIa systenlatic approach to the integrated, concurrent design of
products and their related processes, including manuf&cture and support." Cleetus et. al.
define it as "the process of forming and supporting multifunctional teanlS that set product
and process parameters early in the design phase." Dean and Unal define it as "getting
the right people together at the right time to identify and resolve design problems.
Concurrent Engineering is designing for assembly, availability, cost, customer
satisfaction, maintainability, manageability, manufacturability, operability, performance,
quality, risk, safety, schedule, social acceptability, and all other attributes of the product."
This approach is intended to cause the design team to consider all elements of the
product, thereby resulting in a lower cost and higher quality end product. This is
accomplished through improved communication by every means possible including a
combination of collocation as appropriate and leveraging of information technology.
Application of Concurrent Engineering to ship design and construction has been
steadily increasing over the last few years as a reaction to the fact that "'today the major
challenges facing U.S shipbuilders as they plan to enter the world commercial
shipbcilding market are how to shorten delivery time~ reduce s!-~ip prices, and improve the
world's perception of U.S shipbuilding quality." [Bennett, Larnb~ 1995, p.l] The
approach has also become very popular recently as U.S yards find themselves in teaming
arrangements together and with combat systems/aerospace cOlnpanies for a reduced
number of military contracts.
Bennett and Lamb report 65% to 90% reductions in the number of engineering
changes in manufacturing organizations that enlploy Concurrent Engineering. This
allows the organization to focus valuable resources on higher payoff, higher risk,
improvernent initiatives. "As CE [Concurrent Engineering] is not a single event but a
continuous journey, the final part of the implementCl.tion process is continuous
improvement of the product and the design process by monitoring and measuring the
product design process.'" [Bennett) Lamb, 1995, p.12]
Concurrent Engineering recognizes that the cost of a product is established early
in the design staqe, and that the cost to make design changes increases geonletrically as
the product progresses through the development cycle. [Bennett et. al.] By considering
these elements early on, downstream rework associated with design changes can be
avoided by anticipating the requirements of downstream designers and users. ConculTen~
Engineering facilitates Design Change Management primarily by reducing the
assimilation drain and improving communication which helps to establish expectations.
Design/Build strategies are integral to the approach, in that they define a set of
parameters determined to represent low-cost and high-quality solutions to design issues
\vhich downstream designers should adhere to. Design/Build Strategy addresses the issue
of expectations directly.
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3.3 BUILD STRATEGY
"A Build Strategy is an agreed design, engineering, Inaterial management,
production and testing plan, prepared before work starts, \vith the aim of identifying and
integrating all necessary processes." [Clark, Lamb, 1995, p.l] The notion of the
development of a "Build Strategy" has become popular recently in shipbuilding. Winch
discusses the development of a "production strategy" as a necessity in a variety of
manufacturing industries. '~The interdependent relationship between manufacturing
strategy and engineering strategy strongly suggests that their development might be best
seen as a joint activity... Perhaps the most useful way of thinking is in terms of the
production strategy as a component to the business' financial, human resource,
marketing, and technology strategies." [Winch, 1994, p.45]
A&P Appledore is credited \vith developing the formal Build Strategy process for
shipbuilding in the 1970's. [Clark, Lamb, 1995, p.2] It may be better to refer to a
Design/Build Strategy to more accurately reflect the interdependence of Design and
Production and the purpose of the document. The objective is to provide in a single
document a description of how the ship is to be produced and the design features that are
anticipated to facilitate those production methods. Just as critical as the document is the
process by which it is developed, which is hand-in-hand with Concurrent Engineering.
Clark and Lamb identify a number of ainls of Build Strategy development. l"'hese
include:
• Applying a shipyard's overall shipbuilding policy to a contract
• Establishing a process for ensuring that design development takes full account of
production requirements
• Systematically introducing Production Engineering principles that reduce ship work
content and cycle time
• Identifying interim products and creating a product-oriented approach to engineering
and planning of the ship
• Determining resource and skill requirements and overall facility loading
• Identifying shortfalls in capacity in terms of facilities, manpower and skills
• Creating parameters for programming and detail planning of engineering
• Providing the basis on which any eventual production of the product may be
organized including procurement dates for "long lead" material items
• Ensuring all departments contribute to the strategy
• Identify~ng and resolving problelns before work on the contract begins
• Ensuring communication, cooperation, collaboration and consistency between the
various technical and production functions
Based upon the theory and lessons learned presented in Chapter 2.0, it is clear that
Build Strategy development also provides an opportunity to 111anage change by 111anagillg
expectations. This is being explored by at least one of the shipyards that participated in
this research. Other irnportani ainls which should be added to the list above include:
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• Establishing targets and goals linked to the shipyard's strategic plan
• Identifying any design or production features which are contrary to past practice or
expectations, or features which are targeted for improvement
• Identifying standards which must be revised or developed
• Establishing a Change Management plan, including targets for each ship in a series
contract, and guidelines for design improvement throughout the design cycle
• Establishing expectations and schedules for ongoing improvement efforts to address
these targets
It has been suggested that prerequisites for a Build Strategy include a Business
Plan, a Shipbuilding Policy and a Ship Definition Policy. These provide the basis for
beginning a Build Strategy. The Business Plan "sets out the shipyard's ambitions for a
period of years and describes how the shipyard aims to attain them ... [Shipbuilding Policy
] defines the product mix which the shipyard intends to build plus the optimum
organization and procedures \vhich will allow it to produce ships efficiently... [and] will
also include methods for breaking the ships in the product mix into standard interim
products...Ship Definition Policy spf;cifies the format and content that the engineering
information will take i.'1 order to support the manner in which the ships \vill be built."
[Clark, Lamb, 1995, p.2] Clark and Lamb suggest that the Shipbuilding Policy is aimed
primariiy at design rationalization and standardization to stimulate the effects of series
production. This is associated \vith the discussion of Mass Customization and
Organizational J.L'3rning in Chapter 2.0. The Business Plan and Shipbuilding Policy are
consistent with the conclusions and recommendations of Chapter 2.0 regarding strategic
planning. identification of the product mix and interim products is also a critical step in
design improvement. In Chapter 5.0 it is sho'.vn that the identification stage of the design
change framework utilizes the Strategic Plan, which encompasses the elenlents of both
the Business Plan and Shipbuilding Policy, as input.
Build Strategy development is therefore consistent with design iOlprovenlcnt and
Design Change Management. The application of a Build Strategy will be facilitated by a
Change Management plan. Effective Change Management is supported by the existence
of the Build Strategy.
Because shipbuilding is dynamic, there needs to be a constant program of
product and process development. Also the standards to be applied will
change over time with product type, facilities, and technology
development. ..To link the current policy with a future policy, there should
be a series of projects for change which are incorporated into an overail
action plan to improve productivity. [Clark, Lamb, 1995, p.3]
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3.4 STANDARDIZATION
Standardization is a key element of this overall scheme. It has a direct impact
upon Change Management by reducing variety and providing designers with unifonn
guidelines. A change can be implemented by changing a standard rather than changing
many details in drawings. Standards act to stabilize processes, represent and
communicate agreements, and facilitate managing expectations. All of these were shown
to be key ingredients for managing change in the previous chapter. The results of the
industry survey, discussed in the next chapter, indicate that stanciardization is critical to
the success of design improvement activities.
l'here are a wide variety of levels, or tiers, of standardization including:
• Guidance, Requirements and Specifications
• Benchmarks
• Processes
• Baseline designs/engineering
• Interim and end-products
The benefits of standardization programs are numerous and documented in nlany
industries such as the automotive, electronics, aerospace and shipbuilding industries.
Some of those benefits which are directly associated with managing design improvenlent
include the following. [Tedesco, 1994, p.20]
• Reductions in design tirrle
• Reductions in changes due to errors in judgnlent
• Increases in the time available for work requiring special handling, such as elective
design changes
• Reductions in changes which could have been avoided with improved conlmunication
between engineers, draftsmen, production, etc.
• Reductions in the work content associated with redesign efforts
• Encourages and focuses design improvement
Standardization facilitates Change Management by increasing the level of
understanding and stability associated with products and processes.
In order to be improved, a process must be understood in detail, which in
tum means that variability and interdependence in the separate activities
and methods used to combine people, machines, material and information
have to be known and controlled. [Berger, Working Paper 4, 1996, p.4]
Stable processes are of the essence of viable, productive
manufacturing... Predictability is not possible without the inherent
orderliness of stable processes...Achieving stability of processes is
difficult. In shipbuilding it is especially difficult. Despite this~ stable
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processes are essential to worldwide competitiveness. [Storch, A&P
Appledore, Lamb, 1995, p.76]
Some have argued that standardization inhibits innovation, but the majority of
researchers in the area of Design for Production area agree that standardization actually
encourages innovation with respe·~t to design/production integration. Standards should be
viewed as agreements which are subject to change as the need arises, rather than as rigid
or constrailling. Standardization facilitates Design Change Management by providing
focus and enhancing communication. Standardization is capable of balancing stability
and innovation through the application of Change Management.
In fact, kaizen [improvement] is described as inseparable from maintaining
standards, since this relationship is argued to be one of the very
foundations for claiming that small ongoing ilnprovements can and do
accumulate to make a significant contribution to overall performance.
[Berger, 1996, p.15]
Only team proposals that are evaluated, assessed and finally approved by
management are implemented. l'hese replace the existing standardized
methods and thus become the new standard methods to be used until
further approved changes are implemented. In this way all the benefits of
standardization are achieved without the problems. Everything is a
candidate for change, but nothing is allowed to be changed arbitrarily .. ,
[Storch et. aI., 1995, p.79]
The reasons for highlighting standards can be traced to three general
characteristics which are claimed to follow witll the standardization of
operating procedures;
1. Individual authorization and responsibility
2. Enhanced learning through the transmittal, accumulation and
deployment of experience from one individual to another, bet\veen
individuals and the organization and from one part of the organization
to another
3. Discipline [Berger, Working Paper 4, 1996, p.6]
Standardization and design change are actually conlpletely consistent with one
another. Standardization pernlits design improvement activities to be effective, and
Design Challge Management practices permit the full range o{ standardization benefits to
be achieved.
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3.5 SYNOPSIS
Most. of the available research has focused upon the utility of Concurrent
Engineering and Build Strategy developmcilt to prevent or eliminate design changes
before the implementation phases. Both Concurrent Engineering and Design/Build
Strategy development seek to reduce the number of downstream changes by insuring that
infonned decisions are made earlier on. They seek to eliminate a number of the changes
resulting from "design reviews" by making those that would review the design
(downstream designers, planning and production) part of the development proce~s at an
earlier stage.
This research focuses on the fact that it is unrealistic to presume that Concurrent
Engineering, Build Strategies and Standardization will eliminate the desire to continually
improve. These are intended to reduce the need for changes \vhich should and can be
anticipated earlier in the design process. They do not eliminate the possibility for change
later in the contract as the result of additional, unforeseen opportunities or the realization
that performance gaps widen over time. The scale, complexity, and long design cycle
time of ship design projects, in conjunction with the intricate interdependency of design
decisions, suggest that opportunities for improvement will always present themselves at a
variety of stages throughout the design cycle. These tools, enhanced to maximize the
opportunity to manage expectations, provide a foundation for managing change but do
not eliminate the need for an effective Change Management plan.
These activities reduce the assimilation drain, allowing the organization to focus
on greater opportunities later on. They are compatible with, and conlplemented by, an
effective Change Management approach. "Because shipbuilding is dynamic, there needs
to be a constant program of product and process development. Also, the standards to be
applied will change over time witll product type, facilities, and technology development."
[Clark, Lamb, 1995, p.4 ] "Planning is important and necessary. It's just not sufficient.
SaIne organizations spend more time planning than executing and have gorgeous, elegant
plans but fall down in the execution." [Carr et. aI., 1996, p.191] A Change Management
plan is required to provide the design organization with the flexibility and adaptability
necessary to be able to react to these situations and opportunities, both technically and
organizationally. A Change Management system is also needed to insure that acquired
knowledge is integrated into future design decisions and build strategies.
In ihe next chapter the results of an industry survey are presented which support
the conclusion that the entire suite of Design for Competitiveness methods are required to
facilitate Design Change Management. In Chapter 5.0 tIle means by which strategic
planning can be linked to the process of identifying improvenlent proposals is discussed.
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4.0 ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
REGARDING DESIGN CHANGE MANAGEMENT
In the preceding Chapters, the theory and foundations of Design Change
Management were discussed. The conclusions drawn so far were based in large part on
an extensive review of the literature and the author's experiences involving design
improvement at a major u.s. shipyard. In this Chapter, the results of an analysis of a
broader range of industry feedback are used to:
• Validate the conclusions drawn so far
• Demonstrate that change management is a critical competitive ability
• Demonstrate that a decision analysis model for use in prioritization is essential
• Provide additional insight
• Further develop the elements of the design change framework
• Facilitate the development of an evaluation decision model
The selection of benchmarking questionnaire subjects includes both U.S. and
foreign shipyards. The survey group included four U.S. shipyards, of whicll three
provided detailed responses to the questionnaire. In addition, a Japanese shipyard
provided a detailed response. Additional insight was gathered from an aerospace finn
and the construction industry. A copy of the survey questionnaire is provided in
Appendix A. The shipyards involved in this research all characterized themselves as
sellers of capacity rather than sellers of products. Other basic characteristics of the
shipyards are illustrated in table 4.0.
4.1 ApPROACH TO BENCHMARKING
There are four categories of benchmarking that are widely recognized. The
following definitions are adapted from '~Benchmarking Global rv1anufacturing" [Miller,
Meyer, Nakane, 1992, p.19]:
I. Product B~nchmarking
Long standing process of carefully exanllnlng or "tearing do\vn'~ another
manufacturer's product. This does not require cooperation from the subject.
2. Functional or Process Benchnlarking
Focus of comparison is on functional process such as order entry., assenlbly ..
testing, product development, setup, etc. Requires cooperation frolll the subject.
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YARD NO. RECENT RECENT COMMERCIAl.: UNITS/YR UNDERSTANDING BASIC DETAIL PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE LEVEL COMMENTS
E~1PL. MARKETS g-IANGES VS. MILITARY OF GOALS DESIGr-.! DESIGN CYCLE
CYCLE CYCLE
U.s. A 4500 tot~1 N~val Aux., Emphasis of Currently 100% 2 Ranges from top and 18 to 24 15 to 19 months ] 8 months commercial, Numbers have been reduced in
has significant developing military non- newbuilds most middle months 54 months Naval Aux. engineering, but average skill levd has
prior t~nkcr commercial combaten t v.'i th management only to risen. Skill mix in engineering now
l·xpl'rience ~nd designs and effo:"ts underway understanding by all more consistent vvith commercial
containership work to obtain requirements. Skill level in Production
experience commercial work and Engineering varies Sign. with the
number of personnel at any time.
u.s. B 5300 total f\.1ix of military Became more 85% military I"'on- 2 t07 Top and most middle Unavailable Unavailable and Unavailable and varies Have not seen appreciable changes in
non-comb~tent proactive combatent, depending management and varies varies significnatly depending experience levels. They have invested
and regarding the contract managed on signi ficna tl y significnaUy on produ~t recently in cross-training.
commerci~1. international by seperate ::omplexity depending Jepending on
/'.11 sizes and and commercial groups with the on product product
types of market. same
vl"sscls. Significant constructic.n
Barges, moves towards ma'1agement
1'0/ I~O'S, teaming
Tankers arrangements.
U.S.C 7500 total Destroyers, Reduced 99% military, 2 Ranges from every Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable CA 0 experience has incrca~cd
some defense budget, majority n('",builds m~nagcrand dramatically in Enginecrin~. Tl'am
industrial incrc~scd combatents supervisor to based design h.3s resulted in bro;".Jl'r
modules competition understanding by all experience for most designl~rs. Team
both foreign based design/production has broadened
and domestic? skills of production workers. SSS
some increased incentives to learn new skills have
foreign worked.
demand.
u.s. 0 16500 \Viuc range of Entry in 90% military Unavailable Un~vailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable Unavailable
tot~l military commercial
(c('lmb~tl'nt market
and n~:m·
combiJtent) as
\\'l,1I as S(lme
COInn1Cn... ial
Japanl~sl~ 1950 tot~l LNG, LPC;, Greater Any military 7 to 8 Understanding by all 5 to 6 months 10 to 1-1 months 10 to 25 months (higher Experience Il"vcI in enginl'l>ring is 20
Shipyard Submarinl'. emphasis on \...·ork is ..Ionl' at a ne",builds for LNG incl. LNG years. Regularly rotate people bt:t\\'cen
VLee, I ligh more di(ferc-nt tanks) initial design and detail design groups.
Spl"l'd Ferries, sophisticated affiliated Yard Experience level in production is 24
Pure Car ships years. Regularly rotate personnl'1 in
Carriers, production, pn'dominently managers
RojRo's, and engineers.
Containerships
Table 4.0 - Yard Characteristics
3. Best Practices Benchmarking
Similar to functional benchmarking, but \vith a subtle difference in focus. This
approach focuses less on the "nuts and bolts" of a procedure, and nl0re on the
attitudes and management behaviors associated with a process.
4. Strategic Benchmarking
Strategic benchmarking is focused on the strategic intent of the subject. It is
based 011 the proposition that one must first consider how a competitor defines
success before understanding the secrets of that success. Strategic benchmarking
is not focused on a particular process, but examines what is important to the
subject. Understanding the strategic intent helps to identify those features which
may be important to use functional or best practices benchmarking to study.
This research utilizes strategic, functional, and best practices benchmarking in an
effort to supplement and validate the conclusions drawn. Strategic benchmarking looks
first at the ends which companies consider important. Functional and best practices
benchmarking examine the means to these ends. The precision and "shelf life" of the
infonnation obtained varies as one moves from strategic to functional benchmarking.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.0.
SOFT
Precision of
Information
HARD
STRATEGIC
BEST PRACTICES
FUNCTIONAL
PRODUCT
SHORT
Infornlation Life
LONG
FIGURE 4.0 - PRECISION AND DURABILITY OF INFORMATION [ADAPTED FROM MILl.ER £:T. AL.]
Strategic benchmarking is used to determine the importance given to cllange
management as a goal and the success of the industry in achieving effective change
management. Change management as a competitive ability is placed in context relative
to other competitive abilities. Strategic benchmarking validates the proposition that
Design Change Management is a significant competitive ability in shipbuilding which
\-vill continue to be of concern in the future. The attitudes and rnanagenlent practices that
support Design Change Management are revealed through best practices benchnlarking.
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The processes, procedures and tools that support successful Design Change Management
are examined through functional benchmarking.
'[he l1enchmarking questionnaire used in this research has been structured into the
following sections.
• Section A - Overview and Instructions
• Section B - Participant Identification
• Section C - Strengths and Importance of Abilities
• Section D - Critical Needs
• Section E - Change Management Goals
• Section F - Available Procedures
• Section G - Design Change Management Framework
• Section H - Case Studies
• Section I - Characterization of the Company
The role of the questionnaire data as it relates to developing a decision model,
together with the previously discussed literature review, is illustrated in r~igure 4.1. In
addition to assisting the development of a decision analysis model, the feedback obtained
has provided greater insight into the procedural context for managing design change. The
remainder of tilis Chapter is generally organized to follow the pattern of the
questionnaire.
Risk
Parameters
Decision Model
Cost
Parameters
Critical Decision
Needs Criteria
Benefit
Parameters
~__....... Analytic Hierarchy...__.,...
Process
Experience I
Identify
Parameters
Initial
Surveys
FIGURE 4.1 - ROLE OF SURVEY
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4.2 STRENGTHS AND IMPORTANCE OF AOILI1'IES
One of the primary messages of Chapter 2.0 was that "the essence of an effective
manufacturing strategy is the development of those conlpetitive capabilities that will best
position the firm for sustainable competitive advantage." [Miller et. aI., 1992, p.8] The
purpose of this section is to identify and demonstrate the importance of managing design
change relative to other competitive abilities. The data obtained in this section also
illustrates imbalances between the importance of various capabilities and the strength a
company thinks it has relative to these capabilities. Where an imbalance exists, an
organization is failing to address areas of critical strategic importance.
The data collected is similar to the strategic benchmarking data reported in the
book "Benchmarking Global Manufacturing". The study itself was titled "The
Manufacturing Futures Survey", and \vas conducted by Boston University. The data from
this study suggests that while the ability to quickly incorporate design changes is an
im,portant competitive capability, manufacturing industries are relatively weak in this
area. Table 4.1 illustrates some of the 1990 strategic benchmarking data collected by The
Manufacturing Futures Survey for the machinery sector. The abilities are listed in order
of decreasing importance and decreasing strength. This survey indicated that an
imbalance exists between the importance and strength with regard to the ability to make
rapid changes in design and the ability to profit in price competitive markets. \Vhile
these were considered to be important, industry strength in these abilities was less than
that which would be suggested by their importance.
JMPORTANCE
Provide reliable/durable products
afTer consistently low defect rates
Make dependable del ivery promises
Provide effectivc after sales servi('e
Provide high performance products/ameni~~es
Customize products to customer needs
Provide product suppon effectively
Make rapid changes in design
Make fast deliveries
Introduce new products quickly
Profit in price competitive market
OfTer broad product line
~1ake rapid product mix changes
Make rapid volume changes
Broad distribution
STRENGTH
Pro\' ide rei iable/durablc products
Provide high performance products/amenities
Oncr consistently low defect rales
Provide eOcctivc aficr sales servicc
f\1akc dependable delivery promises
Provide product support ctTeclively
Customize products to custonlcr needs
Broad distribution
f\1akc rapid product mix changc!)
OtTer broad product Iin~
Provide fast deliveries
Makc rapid volunlc changes
Introduce new products quickly
~1ake rapid changes in design
Profit in price-competitive market
TABLE 4.1 - IMrlALANC[ or: COMPETITIVE AniLITIES
As will be sho\vn shortly~ the shipyard data collected in the course of this research
demonstrates that the same imbalance exists in shipbuilding. This portion of the
questionnaire, while by no means identical, was 1110delcd after the Manufacturing Futures
Survey. 'For a number of abilities, shipyard personnel \vere asked to assign a value fronl
1 (unimportant) to 10 (very inlportant). In Figure 4.2, the results are illustrated \"ith
103
respect to the average of the responses for all the shipyards. While most of the abilities
were shown to be important, the results indicate that capabilities associated with
identifying and incorporating improvements are considered to be among the more critical,
\vith a rating above 9. This result tends to validate the importance of this research and the
conclusions drawn earlier from a review of the literature. Capabilities associated with
price and schedule were judged to be most important, illustrating that these are basic
needs which must be met to compete.
The results from each of the shipyards incliv!dually tend to agree with this
conclusion. The average standard deviation of the shipyard results with respect to the
importance of each ability is 0.81. This is indicative of the spread of the responses with
respect to each ability and is concerned with the importance rating assigned. The value,
less than 10% of the range of the scales us~d (one rate point), indicates that average
results are fairly representative of importance as viewed by all the yards. While individual
results are nut identical with respect to each capability examined, they tend to verify the
importance of identifying and incorporating design improvements.
In addition to data regarding the judged importance of abilities, data \\las collected
regarding the strength which shipyards deemed themselves to have with respect to the
abilities. While the majority of the capabilities were judged to be important, the data with
respect to the strength of abilities shows considerably more variation. Shipyards are not
evenly capable with respect to all the abilities even though the majority of then} are
important. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3 which provides the average results for all the
shipyards. The variability of the individual results with respect to strength is wider as
would be expected, with an average standard deviation of 1.13. While the ability to
identify and incorporate cost or cycle time saving design changes was considered
important, shipyards judged themselves to be weak in this area. The results also show
confusion on the part of engineering departments with respect to the amount of
information which must be conveyed in engineering products. A paradox exists in that it
is both important to minimize and maximize the amount of infonnation conveyed, and
shipyards consider themselves to be good at neither. The real emphasis perhaps should
be on conveying the right information in the right places. This is an issue which
shipyards are clirrently wrestling with in conjunction with the use of infornlation
technology. In addition, shipbuilders do not give theolselves high marks \vith respect to
budget and schedule which were judged to be the most important capabilities.
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Complete production to ~chedulc
Produce drawings and production infonnation to schedule
Complete design to schedule
Price
t\.1ect del ivery promises
Maximize direct labor productivity
Quality in eyes of end customer
'Complete production at budget
ID and incorporate lessons learned during design
10 and incorporate cost/cycle time saving design changes
Minimize material cost
Manufacturable designs
Maintain clear communication between eng. Depts.
Minimize engineering rework
Maximize eng. Productivity
10 and incorporate lessons learned during production
Minimize production rework
Maintain clear communication between eng. and prod.
Complete design at budget
Implement a simple and common product modeling system
Maintain clear communicalion wI customer
Produce accurate drawings and production information
Quality of engineering in eyes of pr(lduction
Cost
Rei iable products
Maintain high engineering employee morale
Capture market share
Maintain high production employee morale
Minimize inventories
Develop and implement a build strategy
Maintain design simplicity
Standardize parts
Customize products and meet customer requests
Maintain stable and predictable processes
Implement concurrent engineering
Increase produ~tion when needed
Profit
Ability to minimize number of design changes
Standardize material
Maintain clear communication with reg. Bodies
Complete design under budget
Maximize quantity of infonnation in eng_ products
Minimize quantity of information in engineering products
Complete produclion under budget
Complete production ahead of schedule
Exceed delivery promises
Complete design ahead of schedule
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Quality in eyes of End Customer
Meet delivery promises
Rei iable products
Maintain clear communication with customer
Maintain clear communication wI reg. Bodies
Complete production to schedule
Complete production at budget
Produce drawings and production information to schedule
Minimize inventories
Produce accurate drawings and production information
Customize producls and meet customer requests
Develop and implement a build strategy
Minimize material costs
Maintain clear communication between prod. and eng.
Maintain high production employee morale
Maintain stable and predictable processes
Maintain clear communication between eng. depts.
ID and incorporate lessons learned during production
Complete design to schedule
Profit
Standardize parts
Minimize production rework
Maintain high engineering employee morale
Implement concurrent engineering
Manufacturable designs
C"5t
Maximize direct labor productivity
Maintain design simpliciiy
ID and incorporate lessons learned during design
Complete design at budget
Implement a simple and common prcduct modeling system
Qual ity 0 f engineering in eyes of production
Maximize engineering productivity
Capture market share
Abilily to minimize number of design changes
Increase production when needed
Complete production ahead of schedule
Minimize engine~ring rework
Price
Exceed delivery promises
Complete production under budget
ID and incorpoi3tt" cost/cycle time saving design changes
Standardize materials
Maximize quantity of infonnation in eng. products
Complete design ahead of schedule
Minimize quanlity of information in eng. producls
Complete design under budget
-4 5 6
Strengl
7 8 9
Strength should be examined in conjunction with importance. What is critical is
achieving strength in areas which are competitively important. For this reason, additional
insight might be gained from reviewing the ratio of the strength and importance ratings
rather than looking at each in isolation. Such an S/I index might be considered to be a
proxy for the level of technological and organizational balance, considered to be a
necessity for success. "It is widely recognized however that an even level of technology
is important. .." [Binningham, I-Iall, Kattan, 1997, p.4]
It is interesting to examine the average results for the U.S. shipyards as compared
to the results for the Japanese shipyard, which is considered to be world class. This
comparison helps to denlonstrate the validity of the notion that balance, or S/I results
closer to 1.0, are associated with success. The average S/I value for the U.S. shipyards is
0.73 \vhile that of the Japanese shipyard is 1.0. The average standard deviation of the
U.S. shipyards' SfI values is 0.09. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the averaged results for the
U.S. shipyards involved in this study do not exhibit balance. Few capabilities are at least
as strong as they are important (SfI 2:: 1.0).
lOhe follo\ving list identifies abilities for which SfI is below 0.7 for the U.S. yards
(in increasing order).
• Standardize materials
• 10 and incorporate cost/cycle time saving design changes
• Complete design under budget
• Minimize engineering rework
• Maximize quantity of information in Eng. products
• Minimize quantity of infornlation in Eng. products
• Price
• Ability to minimize number of design changes
• Maximize Eng. productivity
• 10 and incorporate lessons learned during design
• Maximize direct labor productivity
• Capture market share
• Complete design ahead of sched~le
• Minimize production rework
• Maintain design simplicity
• Complete design at budget
• Complete design to schedule
• Manufacturable Designs
• Implement a simple and com'l1on product modeling system
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Exceed delivery promises
Rcliabl: products
Maintain clear communication wI reg. Bodies
Quality in eyes ofend CUStomer
Meet del ivery promises
Maintain clear communication with customer
Minim:ze inventories
Customize products and meet customer requests
Profit
Produce accurate drawings and production information
Comple.e production under budget
Maintain stable and predictable processes
Complete design at budget
Cost
Develop and implement :1 build strategy
Increase production when needed
Complete production to schedule
fv1aintain high production employee morale
Produce drawings and production infonnation to schedule
Maintain high engineering employee moral~
Standardize parts
Quality of engineering in eyes of production
Maintain clear communication betwecn cng. and prod.
10 and incorporate lessons learned during production
Minimize matcrial costs
Implement ~oncurrent engineering
Maintain clear communication between eng. Depts.
Implement a simple and common product modeling system
Manufacturable designs
Complete design to schedule
Complete design at budget
f\1inimize production rework
Maintain design simpl icily
Complete design ahead of schedule
Capture market share
Maximize direct labor pro~uctivity
ID and incorporate lessons ieamed during design
Maximize eng. Productivity
Ability to minimize number of design changes
Price
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I[) and incorporate cost/cuc~lc time saving design changes
Standardize materials
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It is clear that capabilities associated with managing design improvement, such as
identifying and incorporating changes, are lagging. In addition, capabilities associated
with price and productivity are out of balance. Furthennore, the ability to develop
manJfacturable and simple designs is also out of balance. The conclusion drawn earlier
regarding confusion with respect to the appropriate infornlation content for engineering
products is supported by the S/I index results.
Data was also collected regarding the improvement which shipyards judge they
have had relative to abilities in the past two years, and where they believe they will see
improvement in the next two years. Two U.S. shipyards provided this data rather than
three. Figure 4.5 illustrates the average resuits for the u.s. shipyards and the Japanese
shipyard with respect to recent improvement. It is apparent that the respondents from the
Japanese shipyard considered recent improvement to be relatively low in the majority of
the areas, \'lith the exception of the development of a simple and common product
modeling system, where they judged their improvement to be on the order of 1500/0. The
u.s. shipyards, on the other hand, judged their improvement to be significant in a variety
of areas.
This may be evidellce of a more focused strategic planning process being used at
the Japanese shipyard as discussed in Chapter 2.0 which limits efforts to those areas
deemed most important. In fact, when the importance and strength ratings of the
Japanese shipyard are reviewed, we find that the ability to develop and utilize a simple
and common product modeling system is judged to be important, but not very strong with
an SII value of 0.78. This ability is one of only three with SII values below 0.8 as listed
below.
• Increase production when needed (I = 10, S/I = 0.6)
• Complete design under budget (I = 8, S/I = 0.75)
• Implement a simple and common product modeling system (I == 9, SfI == 0.78)
The U.S. shipyards' S/I values show that improvement is required in a \vider
variety of areas in order to achieve balance. The broad range of abilities for \\rhich the
U.S. shipyards judge themselves to have recently improved significantly nlay be evidence
of their efforts to address this broad imbalance. Based on the recent activity and training
observed with respect to Hoshin and strategic planning at u.S. ship)'ards, it is also likely
that tlle u.s. shipyards have not been utilizing as focused an approach in the past. It may
also be possible that the u.s. shipyards overemphasize their improvement as compared to
the Japanese shipyard.
The average standard deviation for these values is 10.6, which is reasonable given
the scale. The following abilities, in increasing order, were judged to have been 1110st
improved (~ 1100/0) in the period [rOITI 1995 to 1997 by the u.s. shipyards. A significant
result is that abilities associated with managing design improvement have been
significantly improved in the past t\VQ years, demonstrating that the subject of this
research is an area of concern in industry. The greatest strides have been in '''basic need"
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abilities associated \vith schedule, budget, cost, standardization and production
information format.
• Complete design under budget
• Maintain clear communication between Eng. depts.
• Ability to minimize number of design changes
• Increase production when needed
• Maintain high production employee morale
• Price
• Complete design at budget
• Minimize material costs
• Maintain stable and predictable processes
• Capture market share
• Maintain design simplicity
• Manufacturable Designs
• ID and incorporate cosUcycle time saving design changes
• Implement Concurrent Engineering
• Minimize engineering rework
• Quality of Engineering in eyes of Production
• Standardize parts
• Maximize Eng. productivity
• Mailitain clear communication between Eng. & prod.
• Maximize direct labor productivity
• Produce drawings and production information to schedule
• Develop and implement a Build Strategy
• Minimize production rework
• Complete design to schedule
• Quality in eyes of End Customer
• Exceed delivery promises
• Complete production at budget
• Complete production ahead of schedule
• Produce accurate drawings and production information
• Meet delivery promises
• Profit
• Minimize inventories
• Cost
• Standardize materials
• Complete production to schedule
• Complete production under budget
• Minimize quantity of information in Eng. products
The anticipated focus for future improvements is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Again,
a more focused effort is evidenced in the responses fronl the Japanese shipyard. In fact,
implementation of an improved product modeling system appears to be the single 1110st
important focus for the Japanese shipyard, \vith modest inlprovements had and
anticipated in other areas. The results for the u.s. shipyards dcnl0nstrates that basic
abilities continue to be the most important focus, but that the rate of improvernent is
anticipat~d to increase with respect to ab!!ities associated \vith managing design
improVtl11ent.
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Minimize quantity of information in eng. products
Complete production under budget
Complete production to schedule
Standardize materia,s
Cost
Minimize inventories
Profit
Meet del ivery promises
Produce accurate drawings and production information
Complete production ahead ofschedule
Complete production at budget
Exceed del ivery promises
Complete design to schedule
Minimize production rework
Quality in eyes of end customer
Develop and implement a build strategy
Produce drawings and production info. to schedule
Maximize direct labor productivity
r~nint3in clear communication between eng. and prod.
Maximize eng. productivity
Standardize parts
Qual ity of engineering in eyes of production
Minimize engineering rework
ID and incorporate cost/cycle time saving design changes
Implement concurrent engineering
Manufacturable designs
Maintain design simpl icily
Capture market share
Maintain stable and predictable processes
Minimize material costs
Complete design at budget
Price
Maintai8n high production employee morale
Increase production when needed
Ability to minimize number of design changes
Maintain clear communication between eng. depts-
Complete design under budget
10 and incorpora!e lessons learned during production
Customize products and meet customer requests
Complete design ahead of schedule
Reliable products
Implement simple and common product modeling system
Maintain high engineering enaployee morale
ID and incorporate lessons learned during design
Maintain clear communication \,,'ith customer
T\.1aintain c1~ear communication with reg. bodies
Maximize quantity of infonnation in engineering products
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Standardize materials
Minimize quantity of infonnation in engineering. products
Complete design at budget
Complete production under budget
Complete production at budget
Maintain clear communication between eng. dcpts.
Maximize eng. productivity
Maintain stable and predictable processes
Minimize inventories
Complete design under budget
Standardize parts
Price
Develop and implement build strategy
Produce drawings and production information to schedule
ID and incorporate cost/cycle time saving design changes
Maximize direct labor productivity
Minimize engineering rework
Manufacturable designs
Ability to minimize number of design changes
Implement Concurrent Engineering
Maintain high production employee morale
Maintain clear communication between eng. and prod.
Implement a simple and common product modeling system
Complete design to schedu:e
Minimize production rework
Complete production to schedule
Capture market share
Maintain design simplicity
Qual ity of engineering in :yes of production
Maintain high engineering employee morale
ID and incorporate lessons learned during production
Customize products and meet cl;stomer requests
Qual ity in eyes ofend customer
Maintain clear communication with customer
Rei iable products
Profit
Produce accurate drawings and production infonnation
Complete design ahead of schedule
ID and incorporate lessons learned during design
Comple:e production ahead of schedule
Minimize material COSls
Maintain clear communication \\lith reg. bodi,:s
Increase production when nceded
Meet delivery promises
Cost
Exceed del ivcry promises
Maximize quantity of information on engineering products
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4.3 CRITICAL NEEDS
Having verified that the ability to effectively manage design change is of strategic
importance, the next section of the survey seeks to identify specific attributes of
management practices wllich contribute to the success or failure of change management.
This section represents a fann of best practices benchmarking, since it concentrates on
management attitudes and managenlent focus rather than on step-by-step procedures.
The shipyards were asked to rate the importance of factors identified in the preceding
Chapters. The average results (three U.S. and one Japanese shipyard) are illustrated in
Figure 4.7. The average standard deviation for these results is 2.1, which represents
approximately 20% of the scale. This significant variability illustrates that shipyards
have differing views regarding the ratings. For example, one of the U.S. shipyards
indicated that all of the items were equally important with a rating of ten.
identify related auxilliary changes
identify critical actions required to implement the change
prioritize proposals
maintain stable and predictable engineering processes
man the change effort .
avoid too many changes at once
develop robust designlbuild strategy
analytical tools to quantify cost and benefit
properly implemenl concurrent engineering
coordinate changes \vithin the context of a strategy _
avoid delays in decision-making from too many participants ..,
assess financial risks
assess technical risks _
engineering react to new production processes ..
standardize
demonstrate compelling need for change
fully utilize product modeling
identify high payoff changes
identify critical needs early in design
avoid implementing unsound proposals
provide proof of progress to key people ..
identify when change is complete and irreversible
assess organizational risks ••••••
provide budget for the change effort ..
avoid poor decision-making from too few participants ..
obtain sufficient interest ~om leadership ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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FIGURE 4.7 - CRITICAL NEEDS
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All of the factors identified are considered to contribute to success by all of the
shipyards. A significant result is that activities associated with planning, decisionmaking'l
prioritizing, stability, and manpower are considered to be most important. This SUpp011S
the emphasis given in this research (in Chapter 6.0) to developing a decision analysis
model for use in the evaluating, prioritizing, and decisionmaking phases of the design
change framework. The results also validate the conclusions drawn in earlier Chapters
related to the necessity for stability, coordination, Concurrent Engineering, and Build
Strategy development.
4.4 CHANGE MANAGEMENT GOALS
As was explained in the introduction to this research, Design Change
Management has a number of objectives. In Section E of the questionnaire, the subject is
asked to rate the importance of various goals. This section continues the use of best
practices benchmarking and allows processes and procedures to be placed in the context
of the objectives considered to be important. The following figure illustrates the average
results, indicating that all of the goals are considered to be important on a nearly equal
bas!s. The average standard deviation of these results is '1.1.
Change Managelllent Goals
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FIGURE 4.8 - GOALS
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4.5 AVAILABLE PROCEDURES
This section identifies the procedures which are in place for managing different
types of design changes at the organizations examined. The subjects are asked to rate the
relative strength of their procedures. By identifying areas of strength and weakness, best
practices can be identified and research focus further defined and validated. The results
demonstrate that processes and procedures associated witll elective change are weak
while those associated with mandatory changes are relatively strong. This provides
further validation of the importance of the research focus on d~sign improvement
resulting from elective change. The averaged results, with an average standard deviation
of 1.4, for the four shipyards are illustrated below.
Available Procedures
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FIGURE 4.9 - AVAII.ABLE PROCEDURES
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4.6 DESIGN CHANGE MANAGEMENT FRAI\IE\VORK
This section seeks to utilize functional benclunarking to identify the l.'nuts and
bolts" of different companies' procedures and practices associated with managing design
change. A variety of questions were asked which sought to gain a greater understanding
of the processes and procedures in place at the shipyards for managing design change.
The s11ipyards were also asked to rate a variety of decisionmaking criteria.
Decisionmaking criteria will be discussed first, followed by a review of each shipyard.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the average ratings with respect to decisionmaking criteria.
The average standard deviation is 1.35. This variation reflects differing attitudes
regarding benefit, cost, and risk.
Decisiorrmaking Criteria
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FIGURE 4.10 - CRITERIA RATINGS
4.6.1 Procedures at u.s. Shipyard A
A broad cross section of respondents fronl shipyard A participated in this research
and an in depth examination of their processes and procedures \vas possible. Figure 4.11
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illustrates their average feedback with respect to decisionmaking criteria. Based upon
these results, it appears that this shipyard is an opportunity seeker which favors benefits
over costs or risks as a decision criteria. It also favors cycle time reduction over a more
narrow view of cost reduction. The individual responses show variation from one another
(n = 9, s = 2.4), indicating that it is necessary to establish a policy and consensus within
the yard.
U.8. Shipyanl A
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4.6.1.1 Production Engineering at Shipyard A
At this shipyard, there is an active Production Engineering departnlcnt, consistent
with the opportunity-seeking attitude reflected above. This group identifies and
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coordinates time and cost saving technology, and lessons learned curing production. This
shipyard has recently undergone a reorganization, and for some time it was not clear if
there would be all independent Production Engineering department that would report to
Planning or Engineering. Ultimately, it was kept independent and reports to Planning
rather than Engineering. Production Engineering, which is relatively small, has been
collocated with the Design departments along with Detail Planning. Tl,is collocation is a
response to many of the problems associated with organizational design that were
discussed in Chapter 3.0. Respo'nsibility is shared between ProductioIl Engineering,
Production and Engineering/Design for elective design improvement.
This shipyard has utilized a variety of tools or "enablers" to facilitate design
change. These methods change depending on the program stage. During concept design,
the mechanism for identifying and incorporating design improvements is the Build
Strategy. Production Engineering is responsible for coordinating the Build Strategy,
which in\'olves Planning, Production, Engineering and Program Management as well as
the Customer. The Build Strategy identifies the design and production schedule as well
as unique production approaches and the corresponding action required in Engineering
and Design to support those features. More recently, effort has been made to more
closely relate the Build Strategy to measurable goals and objectives and to identify future
goals as suggested in Chapters 2.0 and 3.0.
During Detail Design, weekly discussions between Engineering and Production
have been ongoing. Design supervision is required to participate in "production walk-
throughs" with senior yard management including the President and Vice-Presidents.
These involve presentations by Production management/supervision at each workstation
regarding their efficiencies, progress towards achieving goals, and problems which have
occurred that week. In addition, production has an opportunity to create high visibility in
front of senior management for any engineering action they have requested or require.
There are designated points of contact, typically liaison personnel or design supervisors
in the Design departments for changes required for each block or interim product. The
Project Engineer assigned to a contract also serves as a point of contact for correcting
errors when cross trade issues C\.re involved as well as communication with the Customer.
These communication channels often result in the identification and high visibility for
errors or issues associated with the content and fonnat of engineering products rather than
elective design changes for the purposes of reducing cost or cycle time. Occasionally the
weekly rneetings or walk-throughs result in the identification of improvements.
In general, changes for the purposes of reducing costs and cycle time have been
identified through Production Engineering. The mechanism for identifying and acting on
these changes has evolved in recent years. Changes have been identified both through
value analysis of engineering products as well as lessons learned during production. At
this shipyard, recent contracts now in production have made extensive use of value
analysis. Production Engineering reviewed most design products for potential
improvements and held weekly meetings with Engineering to discuss these issues.
Production interacted with Production Engineering to identify typical problenl areas and
to explore where the greatest gains could be made. This review process resulted in the
identification of numerous changes and significant engineering rc\vork, but also resulted
in improved production efficiencies. This represented a difticult period of adjustment for
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Engineering, during which attitudes towards engineering quality and relationships with
Production changed significantly. During this period, the relationship between
Production Engineering and Engineering/Design was often strained. Numerous changes
were identified which were ilnplemented through a variety of means, very often "forced"
through significant "politicking" and "championing". This approach may well have been
the only means available then to rapidly introduce required changes due to the culture that
existed at the time. As will be discussed later with respect to implementation strategies,
coercive methods are often necessary when an organization is in poor shape or key
stakeholders do not support change and there is little time. Such an approach has a
significant cost which must be offset by a compelling need.
The approach had a destabilizing effect in Engineering, which struggled to
maintain schedule while participating in the process. The relationship necessarily
evolved over time in a manner consistent with the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2.0. The
compelling need for change was emphasized and supported by upper management which
permitted Production Engineering to have extraordinary influence over Design early in
the evolution. Successes built momentum and support throughout the organization and
Engineering became more participative. Destabilization and schedule difficulties within
Engineering due to the "assimilation drain" permitted Engineering management to
successfully negotiate a reduction in the number of changes which could be "forced
through the system" at any given time in recognition of the limited "assimilation point
budget" which the organization has. In addition, the need to focus has resulted in an
emphasis on prioritization, planning and Concurrent Engineering as evidenced by recent
training in Hoshin Planning. More recently, the emphasis has shifted from value analysis
as the principal mechanism for identifying design improvement towards a rigorous Build
Strategy process coupled with a lessons learned program. An Industrial Engineering
department has been added which is more closely aligned with production for the
purposes of facilitating improvelnent of production processes. A dedicated Standards
group interacts closely with Production Engineering, but reports to a different Vice-
President. This shipyard makes good use ofjob rotation and close relationships are often
achieved in that way. For example, the supervisor of the Standards group had previously
been in the Production Engineering group. Other examples of designers transferred to
Production Engineering and production ~ngineers transferred to Engineering and nlade
supervisors responsible for inlplementing proposals exist.
Errors are often reported to the designated points of contact in
EngineeringlDesign using Hliaison engineering disposition" sheets or "problem
identification reports." Engineering changes during design and production are identified
through the use of Engineering Change Notices and revised drawings. This shipyard has
recent!y revised its processes and procedures in pursuit of ISO 900 I. There are nunlerous
fomlalized processes associated with change management. Until recently the mechanisnl
for identifying and acting upon lessons learned was ad hoc. A formal process for lessons
learned has recently been introduced. Among the processes and procedures identified
are:
• Shipyard originated configuration change analysis
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• Engineering change notices
• Contract drawing and document maintenance
• Ship specification generation and maintenance
• Deviation and waiver processing
• Engineering change order implementation
• Standards issue and change procedure
• Lessons learned
Of these, the shipyard-originated configuration change analysis procedure, the standards
issue and change procedure, and the lessons learned procedure are directly associated
with elective change. The remaining processes and procedures constitute a traditional
configuration management process which may be referenced and utilized by these
procedures.
The configuration change analysis procedure was developed to cover changes
including requests by Production, design improvements from within Engineering,
equipment or material changes suggested by Materials/Purchasing, proposals from
planning and manufacturing improvements from Production Engineering. It is primarily
concerned with the mechanism for communicating desired changes to Engineering and
the means for evaluation of those changes by Engineering in situations when additional
engineering effort will be required. If less than 200 additional hours are required,
negotiation with 5tupervisors and division managers suffice. This procedure often applies
to changes identified by Production Engineering, working in concert with Production and
Planning, to address production targets and goals in anticipation of performance gaps or
improved methods. It is often the result of proactive thinking and improved processes
rather than production experience, which is addressed by the lessons learned procedure
discussed shortly.
Suggested design changes are submitted to Engineering supervisors using a
design improvement subrrJission fonn. The procedure is prinlarily intended for
suggestions prior to drawing issue for the ilnpacted hulls (more than three months in
advance). Design Engineering is responsible for conducting a preliminary evaluation to
Qetennine feasibility, followed by a more detailed investigation to detennine if they
concur that "if the initiative met expectations, it would result in a clear reduction in cycle
time and/or overall costs across the remaining ships in the class." The Design
supervisor(s) responsible for the impacted drawings are responsible for this evaluation,
which they forward and discuss with the division manager. The division manager is
responsible for further discussing the proposal with the primary point of contact, typically
the originator of the proposal. If the division manager concurs that the proposal is
feasible, and more than 200 engineering mth are required, the Design Engineering
Change Group conducts a detailed analysis. The resu}ts of the analysis are a
recommendation by the change group to the contract Program Manager, who nlakes a
final decision regarding the change. If the program manager cllooses to approve the
change, the program manager is responsible for distributing budget to the impacted
engineering division. The analysis by the change group includes consideration of
positive and negative impacts \vithin Engineering in the following areas:
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• Identification of Engineering disciplines impacted
• Extent of product model modifications required
• Modifications to manufacturing plans, fabrication plans, vent sketches and pipe spool
sketches required
• Bill of material chal1ges
• Recommendation for tilning of implementation (unit, block, zone or hull)
• Impact upon existing standards and new standards required
• Changes to specification or other contract documents
• Changes to basic (system) design required which may require approval, including
piping and ventilation calculations
• Impacts to purchasing schedules/costs
• With the assistance of Production and Production Engineering, detennine cycle time
and labor cost reductions
• DeteImine expectations for cost recovery
A significant [eattlre of the process is the authority of the PrograrTI Manager to
authorize an engineering change, and responsibility for providing budget residing with
the program. If no budget is available to distribute, the Program Manager must either
defer the change or negotiate with production or senior management to transfer budget
from another area of the yard or management reserve. Another significant feature of the
procedure is the establishment of a time fence of three months lead-time to drawing issue
for any proposed changes. Thus, this process is not intended for drawing changes, but for
changes in the sense of the word used in Chapter 2.0. A "change" in this process is
anything contrary to Engineering's expectations regarding how they would proceed.
Note also that this process concentrates on impact to Engineering, and makes no effort to
prioritize changes or test their agreement with strategic intent or specified goals and
objectives. This process is continually evolving" and these shortcorrtings are currently the
focus of inlprovement.
4.6.1.2 Standardization at Shipyard A
There is a dedicated Standards group at this shipyard with a supervisor assigned to
manage and coordinate all activities. The supervisor reports to the director of Design and
the Engineering Vice-President. New standards are developed via requests from
Engineering departments, Production departments, Production Engineering, managernent
or customer requests. The group is primarily tasked with coordinating activities" \vhile
content is solicited largely from the appropriate groups. A leader is assigned within this
group to coordinate activities associated with a particular standard. It is the supervisor's
responsibility to keep standards current and "ensure that it supports any processes
associated with its subject." This is accomplished through delegation to leaders \vithin
the group. The procedure recognizes that ~'as external standards, regulations and internal
processes develop and improve, it becomes necessary to nl0dify standards.'" This
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supports the conclusion of Chapters 2.0 and 3.0 that standards are an effective means for
focusing and communicating design improvement.
The supervisor establishes priorities for development and revision of standards
and determines the scope of activity for each, ranging from correcting known errors
identified by internal customers to total revision or development of new standards. The
prioritization process has evolved over time from a "squeaky wheel gets the grease"
approach to, more recently, an effort to integrate prioritization with shipyard strategic
planning and the needs of foreseen product types. The Standards group interacts with
Marketing, Advanced Programs and upper management on an ongoing basis. This is
entirely consistent with the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2.0. The leader coordinates
activities for a particular standard as assigned by the supelVisor. The procedure lists a
number of sources of input which the leader is tasked to consider. This shipyard's
emphasis of standards development as a mechanism for design improvement is clear from
this list \vhich includes Design for Manufacture and Assembly (DFMA) as a
consideration. Proposals are issued to stakeholder groups for review through a standard
review board process. The leader is responsible for coordinating at least one meeting to
discuss the standard and obtain feedback. Conflicts are resolved through consensus,
although the Standards group de\'elops the final proposal based upon feedback. Approval
is through signature by the Standards Supervisor, the Director of Design and/or Vice-
President of Engineering and any stakeholder groups which the supervisor identifies.
4.6.1.3 Lessons Learned Program at Shipyard A
The lessons learned procedure is broader in perspective than the change procedure
discussed earlier, and nlay involve coordination with nlultiple departments. While the
previollsly discussed procedure is concenled with the process of Engineering evaluation
and approval, this procedure is concerned with the entire organization. Another
difference is that this procedure is established for proposals which are identified as a
result of actual experiences in production rather than value analysis or other motivations
such as identification of perceiv"ed performance gaps or new technology and production
processes. It is concerned with the process required to submit~ evaluate, plan and
implement a lesson learned. A lesson learned is defined in this procedure "as an
opportunity to make an improvement based upon discovery of a product, process or
condition that did not support efficient design, fabrication, assembly, or erection." This
may be the result of the identification in the field of a better approach, or the realization
that targets are not being met even though the design "works".
A ~essons learned recommendation is one that is motivated by a desire to do hcttci
and will result in a change to the design or bill of nlaterial, or to the Build Strategy and
schedule. The lessons learned procedure does not apply for error correction, where work
in the field cannot proceed or requires re-\vork due to the existing design. In those cases,
the Engineering Change and Liaison Engineering Disposition processes app!y. This
procedure mak~~s use of a "l~essons Learned Form" for use by originators to identify and
communicate a lesson learned to Production Engineering. This form includes any
sketches or photographs and as detailed a description as is appropriate. The appropriate
122
liaison engineer is often involved in the process of developing the information associated
with a lesson learned and can establish with a design supervisor that a lesson learned
recommendation can be accomplished through the Engineering Change Notice and
Liaison Engineering Disposition she~t process without further evaluation. This \vould be
the case if the change does not require significant effort and consensus regarding
appropriate action is quickly reached. Production Engineering is responsible for
maintaining a data base of submitted proposals for each hull (and cross referenced
between hulls). Production Engineering personnel vlill review the proposal with the
originator to refine the proposal and screen it against any current established criteria. At
the time of this research, the Production Engineering department was working to
determine how best to set criteria and screen proposals. After the screening process,
Production Engineering will conduct a detailed benefit analysis followed by a
cost/schedule analysis for each impacted department. At the time of this research, the
benefit analysis was conducted using a combination of engineering economy and goal
oriented benefits which were not rigorously quantified. Dissatisfaction was expressed
regarding the evaluation process. One respondent in Design commented that they "tend
to be 'gut driven'. Even decisions with ~analytical' backup tend to have their basis in
conjectural estimates rather than long tenn statistical data." The shipyard was
researching ways to improve the evaluation process and to integrate this analysis with the
strategic planning and goal setting process that it was beginning to implement (involving
Hoshin planning). The cost/schedule analysis is conducted with the assistance of the
departments, and in the case of Engineering would involve the review process described
for the previous "shipyard-originated configuration change analysis." At this point a
decision is made as to whether to proceed, or to defer (but maintain the proposal) or to
drop it. A decision to proceed enters into the planning phase. A decision to defer may
result in additional infonnation gathering or a notation to review the proposal again after
some condition is met (in which case it is maintained in the database). A decision may be
made to drop the proposal, in which case it remains in the data base but is noted as having
failed the evaluation with no conditions for re-evaluation.
The planning process for proposals is coordinated by Production Engineering and
involves all of the stakeholder departments. An implementation plan is developed
intended to address all aspects of the proposal including tasking, responsibilities,
schedules, budgets, priorities, monitoring and control functions. The implementation
plan will describe the irrlplementation strategy aJ.ld organization design to be used to take
action (traditional line organization vs. a highly projectized approach). Often a hybrid
approach is utilized, with a Production Engineer monitoring activities. One Design
Engineering respondent commented that "implementation is perfonned by a hybrid of the
teams that do base work, plus the participation of a "tiger team" dedicated to
change.. .Irnplementation of some changes can vary from (a) little participation (or none)
by the "tiger team" to (b) formation of a separate additional "tiger team" dedicated to a
specific change." They also commented that the strategy would depend on if the change
was sweeping across base teams or focused with a high impact on budget and schedule.
Approvals are obtained by stakeholder department management. Budget is nlade
available through budget transfer from the departments being positively impacted or from
management reserve as negotiated by the Labor Budgeting department, Progranl
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Management and the involved department managers. Budget was not seen as the
significant roadblock. One respondent commented that "budget mayor may not be
available. If not, the proposal may be implemented via an expected overrun. Resource
availability is the problem." This was echoed by other respondents within Design. Thus,
manpower and "assinlilation drain" as discussed in Chapter 2.0 were greater roadblocks
to success suggesting the need to carefully prioritize proposals.
4.6.1.4 Roadblocks and Recommendations at Shipyard A
It was apparent that a method for prioritizing proposals was required, as the
number of proposals was giowing significantly. The shipyard was beginning to review
alternative approaches to prioritize proposals relative to a strategic policy, both for
lessons learned and proactive proposals. For example, when asked what roadblocks exist
which hamper the process, one senior level Production Engineer responded "Volume of
required changes, conflicting priorities, and resource availability." A senior level
indi\ridual in Design commented that there has been " ... too much initiative for change
and constant turmoil." These comments further validate the conclusions drawn in
Chapter 2.0 and the attention given ~n this research to developing a decision analysis tool
for evaluating and prioritizing proposals. In addition, while proposals are beginning to be
captured for later use in a database, one respondent commented that they were " ... not
always effectively [captured]. Process needs to be improved." Another commented that
they were " ... rarely if ever, formally. However, informally, the champion will continue
to promote the change in the face of detennined opposition." Thus, improvement is
necessary and the process remains highly politicized. One respondent commented about
past experiences that " ... proposals are made to all levels of management to search for
approval. ..carefullobbying for support is guaranteeing success." In the absence of strong
upper management participation 'Nith strong correlation required between proposals and
strategic objectives, it is Tlot clear that this tendency could ever b~ deterred. These
comments are consistent with the conclusions of Chapter 2.0 regarding champions and
sponso!"s, but improvements to the process are necessary to prevent a drawn out
decisionmaking process. The shipyard W8.S just beginning to implement a database for
tracking and maintaining proposals and develop a more rigorous strategic planning
process to address these issues.
It was also evident at this yard that the problems regarding organization design
discussed in Chapter 3.0 were experienced. Initially the Production Engineering function
was independent of Engineering and Planning and a less structured process was used to
"drive~n proposals. Curr~ntly, the function reports to the Vice-President of Planning and
is colJocated with Detailed Plarming and Design. Feedback suggests that the new
approach is superior, in that it results in closer cooperation among the groups and greater
alignment with strategic objectives. In addition, changing attitudes and success have
fostered an improved relationship. When asked about incentives to participate, the
responses at this shipyard ranged from H none''1 to "corresponding budget increase" to
"profit sharing and performance criteria". The in:roduction of the "production walk
throughs", additional upper management attention, and closer cooperation appear to have
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had a positive impact upon attitudes towards design irf:rrovement. Evaluation criteria for
personnel include support of the shipyard mission and improvement efforts, but there is
no formal reward system in place specifically for design improvement.
4.6.2 Procedures at U.S. Sl~ipyard B
Shipyard B provided a different perspective. At this shipyard, design changes arc
perceived in the context of cOllfiguration management. There is a configuration
management process in place which closely resembles Mil-Std-973 and has evolved from
government regulations. These changes are generally in response to customer requests or
to correct errors. For example, they responded that often " ... for commercial work, design
changes are handled by the Program Manager or his staff. Changes to commercial
contracts are usually of a minor nature and their number is usually very small. ..No special
procedure is followed because the Program Manager is working closely with the
customer." Changes for the purpose of irrlproving production performance or quality are
handled by the Engineering department. At this yard, concerns regarding risk and cost
are more important than potential benefit as illustrated in Figure 4.12.
it is interesting to note that the average SfI index for this yard is 0.78 while
that of the previous yard is 0.71, suggesting that the explanation for the differing attitudes
is not differing perceptions of their strength with respect to important capabilities. The
difference also cannot be explained as being a function of shipyard size. Both of these
yards employ roughly the same number of people. The difference appears to be cultural
and a function of different attitudes regarding the relative importarce of benefit, cost and
risk. While shipyard A has invested heavily in recognizable "quality programs" and
training in the Deming management method and quality tools, shipyard B never instituted
a similar quality program or extensive training. It can also be explained by different
iJerceptions of a compelling need. Those interviewed at shipyard A clearly believed that
there was a compelling need to improve performance on existing contracts and in
preparation for future contracts. Shipyard B, on the other hand, appeared more satisfied
v.'ith their present situation and ability to obtain commercial 'work despite similar
perceptions of their strength with respect to abilities. Shipyard B'5 emphasis was clearly
on basic design processes, customer relationship, and major production
processes/organization rather than design improvement based upon lessons learned or
new/revised interim products and standards. The focus was on shortening the basic
design cycle and introducing major new production and design technolagies including
upgraded steel fabrication areas and new product modeling systems. Shipyard A, on the
other hand, was involved in all avenues of improvement activity. At shipyard B there did
not appear to be any evidence of a formal lessons learned program or Production
Engineering effo11. Because access at this yard was more limited, it \vas not possible to
determine if a majority of Detail Design and Production personnel shared these vie\vs.
125
u.s. Shipyard B
10' -
tJ,J 9·- _m -. - -.- ------
u 8 -.-- -- --- --- ---
Z< 7T-"'-' -~--.~._. -.-.----------
f-4 6 >- ---- ---------------... -
0:::o 5~-
:E 4,-
3 -~
2-·'
1 .--
O·
"'0 tI'I U tI'I VI
U CJ 0lJ E ~>- co ~ en~ ~ .L:-0 .c E ~>- .c u ::3
.: U .... U U
en r:: ~ 0 ·c0.. co "'0 ...c::
:::J .jj; IJ'l "'0 utI'I 0 .CJ0 CJ OJL- "'C r:::: U r-~ e-
.t; ~en 0 0-
~ co:
.5OJ) 2::!:::J 0
"'0 ~ en e-
.s: U ..c: 0
~ coo .Q ]
.=
.c ~e- E E
0 ~ ·c :::J
L- L- ~ ;Z
~ ::J 0.0U 0E
:::J
Z
VI en U C QJ ~ en E ~~ :oJ
.§ co V'J .... V'JCI') ~ 0 ~ .~ ~ ':J Ie::
·C
::::I E Vi "0 E I:Jc:a 0 0 CJ c: C' "'0 I:J -;CI') u c.. 0 0..
·u ~ 00 -a c: "'0
"
.§ ·Vi .§a u :i uu 0 C .cc: :0 .= 9 "'0 ClJ 9 u'=J (/)Li: ~ ~ C f:.J c:"'0 0=:
·Cd 0 ~ ~ cr.0 L- 0;.. c:
·5 .... u< ~ ::J ~c:r Uu E:-§ L-~ CJc: E 00' f.= c....(5
0..
FIGURE 4.12 - u.s. SHIPYARD B CRITERIA RATINGS
This shipyard is undergoing a dramatic shift towards a Concurrent Engineering
environment and stresses identifying improvements at the start of a contract with strict
control during detail design and production. While shipyard A was seen to be very active
in Build Strategy development and had begun to make ~ignificant strides in developing a
Concurrent Engineering approach to new design development, shipyard B was much
more focused on Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD). Recent contracts
at this yard required their adoption of IPPD and an Integr3ted Product Data Environment
(IPDE). It was commented that "a proper design would eliminate changes that would
disrupt the production [& engineering] process. It is important to realize that we are
transitioning towards an IPPD culture where many [design inlprovement] situations are
dealt with before design compietion." There did not appear to be significant interest in
ongoing design improvement efforts throughout the design cycle.
Errors and omissions are identified by the functional departnlents. Custonler
requests are the responsibility of Program Management. Changes nl0ti"ated by
regulatory requirements are the responsibility of the functional departnlents.
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Responsibility for cost and time saving technoiogies is shared by all. LeSSllns learned
during production are identified through production engineers who operate within the
Engineering department (there is no separate Production Engineering department).
Identification utilizes a variety of feedback systems in place at the shipyard. Evaluation
is perfonned through consensus rather than a rigorous procedure. Prioritization is
through consensus of management. Decisionmaking is also through management
consensus and negotiation. Planning is through the traditional data management and
planning system. Implementation relies upon functional department resources and
negotiation between department~.
4.6.2.1 Change Management Procedure at Shipyard B
This shipyard made two of their procedures available for revic\v. The first is that
for engineering support of contract changes and the second is for the standards system.
The change procedure is intended to establish a uniform processing system for review
and incorporation of changes and covers all types of changes including error correction"
shipyard proposals and customer requests. The procedure relates to how these proposals
are handled by Engineering and does not discuss how improvement proposals are
identified. The procedure makes limited reference to shipyard-initiated changes and is
clearly intended for government contracts. It has evolved from government contracts,
and as was mentioned earlier, on commercial contracts this shipyard often streamlines the
process or eliminates it. It was suggested that the few changes which may be proposed
are settled through a more ad hoc process of consensus of the program management and
stakeholder groups.
This procedure assigns responsibility to the Project /\dministrator (similar to the
Project Engineer at other organizations) for oversight of a Configuration Control Group.
The group has a supervisor who reports directly to the Project Administrator. l"he Project
Administrator is responsible for routing the proposal and coordinating its review. Each
engineering section has a member on the change control board who is responsible for
coordinating the analysis and evaluation of proposals within his/her functional area.
Ultimately section managers approve the evaluation made by their section. Change
proposals are documented with a narrative and any applicable sketches/photographs
together with an evaluation of positive and negative impacts. The change control board
approves changes through consensus. Budget is assigned through a transfer negotiated by
program management in the case of shipyard proposals. The Project Administrator or
staff is responsible for maintaining tracking and monitoring of all changes. Impacts
considered during evaluation are aimed primarily at assessing the potential disruption of a
change and include positive and negative impacts upon:
• Health and Human Engineering Factors
• System Safety
• ILSlLCC Considerations
• Test procedures
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• Operation
• Performance
• Weight/Moment
• Dimension/Size
• Appearance
• Cost
• Number of drawings impacted
• Manhours to iu\.:orporate in each section
• Number of engineering s~ctions impacted
• Number of concurrent changes
• Density/Complexity of changes
• l~llmber of affected systems
• Impact to manuals
• Impact to material and lead-times
• Schedule impact
• Reworking of accomplished tasks
• Transfer of personItel
• Acceleration required to meet schedules
• Dependencies on analysis and tests
The evaluation forms used by this yard admitted both quantitative and qualitative
data. Quantitative ranges for each evaluation criteria were assigned qualitative labels
(none, low, average, major and high). Each of these were in tum assigned percentage
factors which were utilized in a "disruption formula". This demonstrates a recognition of
the difficulty to compare proposals using quantitative data alone and the need to be able
to synthesize a judgment where multiple criteria and scales exist.
4.6.2.2 Standardization at Shipyard B
The standards procedure appears to be more conducive to the introduction of
productivity-motivated changes, and is similar in several respects to that of shipyard A.
The request for a ne\'l standard may come from either internal or external sources.
Internal requests are made using a request Conn which is submitted by an employee to
his/her supervisor. If the supervisor concurs, the proposal is submitted to the appropriate
Engineering section manager. While shipyard A maintained a dedicated Standards group,
shipyard B assigned responsibility to engineering sections for nlaintcnance of their
standards. These alternative approaches have pros and cons as discussed in Chapter 3.0.
This has the benefit of closer comnlunication and utilization of standards \vilhin the
sections. A potential problem is that cross section standards will be poorly coordinated
and utilized.
The Engineering section nlanager is responsible for approving and prioritizing
requests associated with a particular section's standards. Research and analysis is
conducted by an assigned individual (cognizant engineer) \vithin each section \vha is
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responsible for coordination and assuring that all applicable regulatory body requirements
are met. Revised or new standards go through a ten working day review cycle by all
identified yard stakeholders, coordinated by the cognizant engineer. Comments are
reviewed by the cognizant engineer and meetings are conducted as necessary to resolve
conflicts through consensus. All standards must receive final approval by the section
manager and the cognizant Production group Vice-President and Engineering Vice-
President.
4.6.3 Procedures at U.S. Shipyard C
Shipyard C appears to be an opportunity seeker based upon the survey response
they provided. Unlike shipyards A and B, this yard is predominantly involved in
combatant work. Like shipyard A, there is an active Production Engineering function.
This is reflected in their prioritization of benefits, costs and risks as evaluation criteria.
Figure 4.13 illustrates their response.
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FIGURE 4.13 - U.S. SHIPYARD C CRITERIA RATINGS
Access to processes and procedures was not avai lable, but the following was
learned through survey comments and interview. This shipyard facilitates design
improvement in a number of ways. They make extensive use of a revie\v process, both
pre and post construction, that involves Design, Planning and Production. '-[his review
129
process is similar to value engineering. Design is also involved in production
walkthroughs which often result in the identification of proposals. Documenting and
communicating proposals is somewhat ad hoc, ranging from immediate consensus
through discussions between affected parties to corporate level presentations when
significant expenditures are required. They make an effort to encourage decisions to Le
made at the lowest possible level. A cost/benefit analysis is generally done but can be
"extremely infonnal and between a designer and a mechanic or very high level. The
fo(;us is on a company based best answer." Budget is made available from Production
funds or Design budget underruns. Upper manag~ment is involved "extensively. CEO
has weekly rneetings." It was commented that responsiveness to production requests "is
the expectation of their [engineering] job function and therefore linked to perfonnance
reviews."
They commented that '''resources in Planning, Design and Engineering are the
ITIOst significant roadblocks. Management attention is a distant second." I'his comment
reinforces the feedback from the other shipyards and the conclusions drawn so far.
Prioritization is important to assure that only those proposals which are most aligned with
strategic objectives are acted upon. A sensitivity to the state of the organizations
involved, or their current "assimilation drain" and overall "assimilation budget" is
required.
4.6.4 Procedures at U.S. Shipyard D
This shipyard did not provide a detailed survey response, but a site visit and
interviews were conducted. The results of this interview reinforce the lessons learned at
the other shipyards and also reinforce the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2.0. This
shipyard is involved in both military and commercial work. Like shipyard A, this yard
has been involved in the quality improvement movement for quite some time, at least ten
years. They developed a Quality Improvement training program in 1989, and a revised
program again in 1993. In January of 1996 they implemented an initiative aimed at
reducing their costs and cycle time by 500/0. This shipyard's most recent efforts have
been to re-engineer their processes and products. Their recent initiative was motivated by
the downsizing of the US Navy and their subsequent desire to enter the international
commercial market. Some problems with their previous quality improvement programs
which they hoped to avoid and differences between the new program and the previous
ones included:
• Previous programs did not result in an integrated effort which \vas traceable to an
overall strategy.
• Pre\'ious programs resulted in a flurry of disconnected projects and initiatives.
• Previous programs were aimed at incremental, continuous improvement. Ne\v
program was aimed at breakthrough, discontinuous or completely -~re-engineered'l'
improvement.
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• The new program followed the business process re-engineering model of
improvement.
• The new program focused the application of prior TQM training within an improved
strategic and organizational framework.
• The new program emphasized stabilization of processes and re-organization prior to
re-engineering of processes and products.
The shipyard has followed a multi-pronged approach which attempted to balance:
- Process ilnprovement
- Product improvement
- Capital investment and facilities
- Technology transfer
- Organizational change
Examples would include investment in a new steel factory, robotic process lanes and new
CAD/CAM systems.
In support of their initiative, they organized to facilitate process and product re-
engineering. They created a new executive position, VP of Strategy and Process
Innovation. Reporting to this VP were seven directors of process innovation in the
following areas.
• Engineering/Design
• Steel
• Outfitting
• Manufacturing Engineering
• Planning/Scheduling
• Infonnation Systems
• Production Engineering
Full-time employees (37) \vere distributed throughout these groups. These would
fonn the core team. In addition, for each initiative identified, employees from throughout
the yard were brought on board to participate. The full time individuals reporting to the
directors were in tum team leaders for the initiatives. Each group initially focused on
processes. Each group was assigned a hired consultant (the consultants were from the
same organization) whose sole purpose was to educate the group regarding process re-
engineering and benchmarking. Each group followed the same basic steps, which are
consistent with the change management framework introduced in this research:
• Identify core processes \vhich are cost or cycle time drivers (Engineering focused on 8
major processes)
• Document the existing process
• Make sure that they were following a standard and predictable process (Stabilization)
• Benchmark best practices
• Identify the desired process and/or objectives (Gap analysis)
] 3]
• Re-engineer processes or products to support objectives
They began their recent efforts with what they called the hquick wins" team. The
objective was to identify foIol ow hanging fruit", and achieve early savings that would build
commitment and momentum. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn in Chapter
2.0. The VP of Process Innovation was responsible for insuring that each group (i.e. all
the directors) were wCtrking in concert against an overall strategy which was a flowdo\vn
from a corporate strategy. The groups worked together and jointly visited best practices
and technology transfer. They did not have the same processes across product lines.
They recognized that a lack of standardization had become a significant problem. A big
driver of differences was their specialized military work. They worked to standardize
their processes and products concurrently with their other efforts.
This shipyard has historically had a Production Engineering department. In the
past this group was largely responsible for detail planning. They worked closely with the
engineers after the design was underway to determine how to plan the construction or
installation. Their work historically included responsibility for setting up process lanes,
and they would work with the engineers if they had suggestions for improving the design.
There was a general sense that the group was not working as an integrated part of the
overall improvement process, and that the group was not focused strategically. The new
Production Engineering group is responsible for developing the Build Strategy and
identifying features which are desirable for new contracts, or features that are desirable to
be introduced into existing contracts. They are now a more focused group, obtaining
input and suggestions from the re-engineering groups discussed above and providing the
required support. They evaluate changes based upon positive and negative impacts upon
cost, schedule, and risk.
4.6.5 Procedures at a Japanese Shipyard
A Japanese shipyard participated by responding to the survey and providing sonlC
detailed infonnation regarding their processes and procedures. This shipyard is
representative of "best in class" among the shipyards reviewed in this research. It is
involved in commercial shipbuilding including tankers, ro/ro's/passenger/pure car carrier..
Containerships and LNG. While having a much higher production rate than the u.s.
yards, employment at this yard was less than half that of the u.s. yards. The survey
response indicates that this shipyard considers costs and risks to be Inore significant
evaluation criteria than potential benefit.
This shipyard responded that they prinlarily utilize !hree nlcans for facilitating
design improvement. They provide a mechanism for incorporating improvement at the
concept design stage through quality function deployment (Concurrent Engineering and
Build Strategy development), during detail design through value analysis" and during all
stages of design and production through a lessons learned feedback system.
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The lessons learned feedback system in use at this shipyard is coordinated by their
quality control department. Their quality control cycle utilizes a database to capture
lessons learned and track action. This database catalogs all lessons learned throughout all
stages of design and construction. The database includes all types of lessons learned
ranging from errors that required correction to suggestions for improvements. Thus a
single system is used for all types of nlotivations. At the initial design phase, the QC
department utilizes the database to compile a list of lessons from similar previou~ hulls.
This becomes a starting point for Build Strategy development and Quality Function
Deployment activities at concept design. It is also used to develop a checklist for the
engineeri:lg sections. The QC department also manages activities associated with
collecting and disseminating comments during design and construction. A standard fonn
is used to communicate lessons learned regardless of the motivation. Errors and
improvements are both considered to be lessons learned proposals. If ne\v technology is
identified, construction budget is occasionally transferred to fund its research. The
Design department commented that they are always looking for innovations, and that they
form committees of employees tasked with benchmarking. A portion of the Design
Department's overhead budget is allocated for this purpose. Design and Production
management meet frequently to discuss desired improvements and to negotiate
appropriate transfers of budget.
Japanese Shipyard
10 ,....----------------------_
9+------------------------
8+--------------------
UJ 7 +------
Uz 6 -+------------
«f- 5 -t----------
0:::
o 4 -+--------
0.
~ 3 +------
2+-----_
1
o
~ u ~ u !1 ~ ~ ~ ~ .:Ii. ~ E 0 E.§ c.o VI .~ VI coC2 co r::::: c:: ~ ~ 'C 'C QJ a CJc:: 0 ~ 5u
.2 .2 E (5 "0 C :J £3 ~c::; u U :3 ""C > 0 ~ :i "'E. ~ c:.'0 u g ,5 .: 'c ]G ... E .§ '~ .§c Q t!2t'3 ""C ~ VI ~ CJ ..r:.a. ~c .E .~ ~ ~ :::J ::0 u ~ ""C Bu: u u l- t/)t:= ""C U ] e ~ ~ ~ E Vi_clJ 'C; CJU l- ~ C'j t: c] 0 c.. u1 < '5 1.JCl) ~ ,§ ~~ n :30 E ~ E l.,~ ::::;: tn '0 u ""CU t: .~ uE
.B .2 ~ 0 ~ EC,) C-
"0 E ~ E ,5 ~c.. ~ ,c: ::J
"'0t: Z
::::I a ]LJ 0 E
:3
z
FIGURE 4. 14 - JAPANESE SUIPYARD DECISION CRITERIA
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Prior to implementation, all departments conduct a costlbenefit analysis. The QC
department synthesizes and summarizes the results. QC will coordinate communication
between departments to refine the proposal and develop consensus regarding the costs
and benefits. Monthly meetings chaired by the President are held to review the status of
lessons learned submitted to the various departments. The support of the process by the
President insures that all involved follow through on agreements. It also (,trengthens the
process of deploying strategic goals throughout the organization and evaluation of
proposals with respect to these goals. All Engineering and Production sections are
represented. Decisions as to whether or not to conduct additional research are made at
these meetings. Decisionmaking authority is in the hands of the section manager in
charge of the impacted design section with respect to prioritizing which ideas should be
implemented. In cases \vhere the change is broad.. the department manager may make a
decision instead. Authorization from upper management is required before
implementation can proceed. Implementation usually occurs prior to the construction of
a follow or similar hull.
4.7 CASE STUDIES
In this section of the questionnaire, participants were asked to identify examples
of design changes which represent both successes and failures in the hopes of identifying
factors that contribute to success. Responses to this section of the survey \vere limited,
but several factors were identifiable. A participatory implementation strategy \vas
indicated to be generally more successful than one \vhich was not inclusive of all
impacted departments. The following were identified by one or more respondents as
factors which are associated with success.
• Proposals are initially identified by Production rather than other departments
• Proposals are aligned with an understood strategy
• Proposals have highly visible support in Production and departments other than the
originating department
• Rigorous planning is used to implement the proposal, including consideration of
necessary training and inclusion of all impacted departments
4.8 LESSONS FROM AN AEROSPACE COMPANY
In addition to the data gathered regarding shipbuilders, a visit was made to a
major U.S. aerospace manufacturer. The similarities bet\veen the issues faced by the
aerospace firm and shipbuilders were striking, and common issues and concerns exist
with respect to:
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• Manufacturing/Production Engineering
• Change Management
• Scheduling
• Standards
• Quality Assurance
• Accuracy Control
The company found its market share dwindling in recent years, and it was a high
cost producer relative to its competition. They recognized that they would go out of
business unless significant measures were taken. Deming trainillg was abandoned due to
problems \vith implementation. They found it difficult to implement this training at the
same time as significant downsizing. They also found training in less "soft" approaches
such as Design For Manufacture and Assembly (DFMA) to be more successful. Upper
management initiated a program similar to that discussed earlier tor u.s. Shipyard D.
Their efforts were aimed almost exclusively at DFMA. They had an existing product line
which had evolved over time and felt that they needed to completely re-engineer their
production processes and subsequently their products. Both Engineering and Production
personnel have been trained in DFMA and work together on teams to re-engineer specific
areas of products. The approach taken utilized a rigorous strategic planning process as
described in Chapter 2.0. Marketing set goals for cost reductions based upon market
prices, which they had already obligated themselves to. Department budgets were
slashed according to an allocation down through the company of those targets. These
targets and budget reductions were sumnlarized along with strategic objectives in an
overall Aircraft Design and Manufacturing Strategy developed by upper management and
department heads. The objective of this strategy was to "develop a teaming approach that
identifies cost effective initiatives which significantly reduce assembly, design and
supplier costs, decrease spans [cycle times] and improve quality." A significant element
of the overall strategy was to establish a policy regarding attitudes towards potential
benefits and risk. Senior management made a decision to insist that general managers
demonstrate that they are identifying and implementing a majority of higher benefit,
higher risk proposals than lower risk, lower benefit proposals. The approach taken was
stated to be:
• Divide the product into manageable, yet distinctive elements for which product teams
will be assigned
• Assign cross functional product teams starting at the GM level and involve all levels
(i.e. mechanics, designers etc.)
• Cross functional teams to be coached at the VP level
• Establish cost, span and quality top level goals
• Develop initiatives \vhich are nlutually beneficial to assembly, design and technclogy,
supplier management, and the "customer", and that tie directly to the goals
established for each product team
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• Perfonn costlbenefit analysis on each initiative and review with GM product team
prior to VP level approval
• Identify 20% of the initiatives that drive 80% of the costs
• Identify NO MORE than five low risk initiatives per product team
• Implement and monitor those initiatives approved and funded
• Rewards and evaluations tied to perfonnance with respect to improvement targets
A significant feature of the approach is the active participation of upper
management and the rigorous use of strategic planning. General managers were held
accountable for targets which were allocated to particular sections of particular planes
that were deemed to be in support of higher level objectives. OM's were tasked with
flowing dO\\TI program level goals and strategies to cross functional product teams to
which they were assigned leadership. The cross functional teams collect proposals from
ali levels of the workforce, including those developed by Industrial Engineering to
support ne\v processes. A large sum was budgeted for improvement initiatives. The
previously mentioned strategy suggested the total savings which was to be achived
throughout the organization. The ratio of the two represented the hurdle rate against
which improvenlent proposals were compared.
All changes to an aircraft design which require significant engineering effort
above a standardized cut-off level must be reviewed and approved by a "change board."
Prior to reaching the change board, a concept will have been sketched out with an rough
costlbenefit analysis and estimates for actions required. A change management
organization within the Industrial Engineering department reviews the proposal and
develops a change board package based upon input they solicit from the originators and
identified stakeholders. Industrial Engineering serves as a support organization. They
also identify proposals for which they elicit support from general managers. They assist
cross functional teams in prioritizing approved proposals based upon the guidelines of the
overall strategy.
The change board package is similar to a typical shipbuilding change order and
includes:
• A description of the change
• A costlbenefit analysis
• Sketches and photos
• A completed checklist demonstrating consideration of all impacts
• A request for engineering effort with an estimate of this effort
• A list of impacted documents
Once the package has been prepared, the change board will review the package and
prioritize it among other changes and either approve it, request additional infornlation,
defer it, or determine it to be unfeasible. The change board meets three times a week and
is co-chaired by general managers within Engineering and Production. It therefore
represents a consensus based participative approach. If the change management
organization in industrial engineering deems a proposal to be urgent, it can request that it
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go through a more streamlined "rapid change board process." General managers mee·
monthly with the change management organization and Vice-Presidents to discuss
progress and cross team issues.
Once a decision is made, an implementation control group within Industrial
Engineering tracks the project, aids the involved parties in identifying all the steps
necessary to implement the project, and provides project management as necessary.
Progress is tracked in the same database used by the change board.
4.9 LESSONS FROM THE CONSTRUCTiON INDUSTRV
The construction industry shares many characteristics with the shipbuilding
industry. Among these are a wide variety of similar trades, and long design and
construction cycles. They are also facing similar pressures which result in an increased
pace of change. "The engineering and construction contracting environment is
increasingly competitive and litigious, project schedules and financial parameters are
aggressive, and project scopes are complex...Projects thus are more likely to require
changes in order to meet business needs or objectives." [ell, 1994, p. 1] The
Construction Industry Institute (ell) serves a similar purpose for the construction industry
as the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) does for shipbuilding. The ell
has recently published a series of reports and conducted a series of symposia relat,ng the
results of research into change management in the construction industry. At the project
change management session of the 1996 ell conference it was suggested that ell initiated
this effort in response to the following conditions among ell member organizations:
• there was a lack of quantitative data on the impacts of change on project results
• there was a great deal of divergence of opinion about what constitutes a change, how
to deal with change, assessment of the effect of change and what happens when
change occurs
• infonnation on the effects of change was mostly anecdotal and based on personal
experiences - leading to the mind set that change is a deviation, is bad, is to be
avoided and should be dealt with o~ly as necessary
• current business environment requires project execution which is faster and with
lower costs but with higher expectations for quality and results - all of which require
that change be anticipated and systematically managed into the project execution
work process
"ell established the Project Change Management Res~arch Team to find solutions
to or, preferably, the means of avoiding such problems [of managing change] ...The
team's research focused on determining the nature and origin of problems related to
changes...As a result of its investigation, the research team concluded that it would
provide three primary deliverables to industry: (1) a comprehensive view of agreements
and changes; (2) a set of recommended best practices for the effective managenlcnt of
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change; and (3) a prototype change management systel&' .. reflecting the means of
implementing the research team findings" [ell, 1994, p. v] The results of their efforts are
reviewed here and placed in the context of this research.
A principal finding of their research was verification of the common belief that
reduction in productivity is correlated to increased change. The data shows a correlation,
particularly with excessive change, but the amount of scatter in the data suggests that
many organizations do better at managing change than others. Productivity in their study
was measured as a productivity index equal to the ratio of eamed work hours (i.e.
budgeted) to expended work hours. Statistical fitting of their data indicated that project
productivity declined in engineering and construction with the introduction of an
increased number of changes. A close examination of the data shows significant scatter,
particularly below levels on the order of 25% of scope. This indicates that if change is
managed well and is not excessive, productivity need not decline but that there is an
increasing risk that it will do so.
CII made 27 specific recommendations regarding project change management
best practices. These recommendations reinforce conclusions drawn earlier regarding the
importance of Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy development,
evaluation/prioritization methods and capture of proposals for later use. The
recommendations are summarized in five principals of effective change management
which correlate well to the design change framework introduced earlier in this research:
• Promote a balanced change culture
• Recognize change
• Evaluate change
• Implement change
• Continuously improve from lessons learned
Promoting a balanced change culture requires that "first, a commitment by all parties
must be reached to recognize changes and to increase sensitivity to changes as the project
progresses from concept to construction. Second, planning for potential changes should
be initiated as early in the project as possible. Third~ all parties to the project should
agree that changes are to be evaluated and agreed upon as quickly as possible." [ell,
1994, p.l] A balanced change culture is one which encourages beneficial change, and
prevents detrimental change. ell recommended that:
• Critical project success factors must be documented and communicated to all parties
• Timely and accurate predictions of the cumulative impact of a change are particularly
important
• Anticipate change when allocating time and resources to a project (as a contingency
budget)
• Recognize and reward those who initiate beneficial change
• A fonnal value engineering system be utilized
• Require justification for all elective changes
• Maintain accountability for any change being introduced
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The importance of the conclusions of Chapters 2.0 and 3.0 are reinforced by CII's
research. Earlier in this research it was suggested that change must be associated with
expectations, because resistance to change occurs as a result of a deviation from a
stakeholder's expectations. ell concluded that change is best defined as "a modification
to an agreement between project participants...Because change can be best understood in
the context of agreements, a critical skill for project managers is the ability to discern
whether an agreement actually exists. By having a change management process in place,
a project manager 'will be able to better understand the complexity of the project and to
better communicate with all project participants." [ell, 1994, p.2] Since resistance to
change is associated with expectations, but change is best managed in the context of
explicit agreements rather than easily misunderstood or hidden expectations, it is critical
to convert as many expectations as possible into explicit agreements. As was discussed
earlier, Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy development and standardization provide
a mechanism for making these expectations explicit, thereby facilitating the process of
change management in do\vnstream phases.
ell concluded that "project .organizations should include a balance of innovators
and impleinentors, should promote teamwork and collaboration, and have a disciplined
approach to executing projects. Effective change management should be establisllcd as a
project success factor for organizational, team and individual performance...Effective
management of change requires the use of work execution methods that include specific,
integrated and systematic steps to recognize, evaluate and implement change." [ell,
1994, p.9] CII concluded that evaluation of changes was of particular importance. Their
reconlmendations arc consistent with the conciusions drawn in Chapter 2.0:
• I\.fter an elective change is evaluated, the immediate focus should be on the decision
()f whether to implement. This will require a reasonable order of magnitude estimate
()f the impact of the change and a similar measure of the benefit of the change.
• ]n order to detennine if an elective change should be implemented, economic
!~uidelines should be pre-established to guide the decision makers.
• l~he decision to proceed should be made as soon as the decisionmaker is assured it
will meet the ~riteria established for elective change.
• Caution must be exercised in making quick judgments in favor of implementing
elective change, as secondary effects of making a change in one area can often impact
another area.
• Guidelines for change implementation must be clear and consistent with the projects
critical success factors.
• Changes should be evaluated against the business drivers and success criteria for the
project
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4.10 SYNOPSIS
The importance and focus of this research is supported by the survey results
which reinforce and validate many of the conclusions drawn in earlier Chapters.
Additional insight has also been gained into which aspects of the change management
problem are most important and require improved approaches or processes. Among some
of the most significant conclusions to be drawn from the industry survey are:
• Change management and design improvement capabilities are considered to be
strategically important, but industry strength in this area is low.
• The industry is actively seeking to improve its capabilities in the area of Design
Change Management.
• U.S. shipyards exhibit a broad imbalance between the importance of capabilities and
their strength relative to those capabilities. A Japanese shipyard representative of best
in class exhibits a significant])'" greater balance (SfI = 1.0).
• U.S. shipyards exhibit a more diverse improvement program while the Japanese yard
exhibited more focused improvement efforts.
• The existence of a visible corporate strategy which identifies performance gaps to be
addressed with goals and objectives appears to be important to success.
• Activities associated with maintaining stability, prioritizing~ planning, and
decisionmaking are considered to be most critical to successful change management.
• A mechanism for quickly and effectively evaluating and prioritizing proposals and
linking them to business strategy is essential. Decision criteria must be explicit.
• All of the change management goals introduced in Chapter 1.0 are considered to be
equally important. These include extending the timeframe of effectivity, allowing
changes to be made faster, minimizing the number of design changes, selecting
potential design changes, evaluating potential design changes, prioritizing potential
changes, allowing decisions to be made faster, insuring changes are effective,
maximizing benefit potential, minimizing delays and disruption due to changes and
identifying potential changes to reduce costs.
• Most organizations believe their procedures are effective for dealing \vith mandatory
changes, but weak with respect to elective cllanges.
• Different shipyards have varying perspectives regarding decision criteria and the
relative importance of maximizing benefits, minimizing costs, and nlinimizing risks
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associated with change proposals. A shipyard policy and strategy must make
guidelines clear.
• An active Production Engineering group appears to be present in those yards which
reflect a preference for maximizing benefits over minilnizing costs and risks.
• Close relationships and collocation of Production Engineering with Engineering and
Planning appear important to success.
• The most significant roadblock to implernenting elective change is manpower rather
than budget. Change should be anticipated when allocating time and resources to a
program.
• Participation and consensus are commonly used and appear correlated to success.
• Conclusions regarding the importance of Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy
development and standardization to change management success are reinforced by
industry experience.
In the remaining chapters of this research, each stage of the Design Change
Management framework are reviewed. The conclusions drawn so far are addressed in
each stage with existing theory or the development of new processes. Based upon the
conclusions above and those of the preceding Chapters, particular emphasis will be given
to the development of a decision model for evaluating and prioritizing changes within the
context of a shipyard strategy or policy.
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5.0 IDENTIFYING DESIGN IMPROVEMEN1" PROPOSALS
In this chapter the identification stage of the framework is explored in greater
detail. As was discussed in previous chapters, a clear linkage between design
improvement proposals and shipyard strategy has been lacking in actual practice. The
means of identifying design improvement proposals which support strategic goals are
explored here. The recommended approach is consistent with what Keeney refers to as
"value-focused thinking."
\ralues come before alternatives in value-focused thinking. Hence, after a
decision problem is recognized, the full specification of values is the next
activity. For many decisions, these values should first be qualitatively
explored at length and then possibly quantified. The qualit.atively
articulated values, and any quantitative embellishments, are then directly
used in the third activity, the creation of alternatives. The intent is to
broaden the range of alternatives considered by eliminating any anl~horing
on already identified alternatives. [Keeney, 1992, p.50]
The objective is to utilize competitiveness-based improvements. Shipyards
should regularly exanline the environment to anticipate changes rather than react to them.
"Not all decision situations have to be created by outside forces. It is worthwhile to seek
out decision situations, situations I refer to as decision opportunities rather than decision
problems. Such decision situations do not occur outside your control; they occur because
of your control." [Keeney, 1992, p. I7] A proactive approach can exert pressure on the
market allowing a shipyard to lead rather than follow. Being proactive means examining
not only todays gap, but the trends for you and your competition. The identification stage
of the design change framework should be aligned with this philosophy and nlust
necessarily start with the target market.
The identification stage of the framework can be considered to be broken into a
number of sub-elements consistent with the managed improvement process presented at
the conclusion of Chapter 2.0. These sub-elements include:
• Understanding of current and future product mix
• Understanding of competitive environment and pressures
• Analysis of gross perfonnance gap
• Product analysis of product mix
• Competency mapping
• Technology surveys and benchmarking
• Analysis of performance gaps associated with critical capabilities
• Development of objectives and goals
• Identification of improvements to address strategic response (objectives and goals)
• Characterization of proposals and preparation for evaluation phase
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FIGURE 5.1 - MANAGED IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
5.1 PRODUCT MIX AND THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
The product mix identifies the competitive environment. As was discussed in
Chapter 2.0 and illustrated in Figure 5.1, a significant component of the competitive
environment is defined by the product market value proposition. In turn, labor,
regulatory and material markets are also a function of the products being considered.
Financial markets and potential product volumes are key elements to be considered.
Shipyards do not operate in isolation. They are subject to forces imposed
by the external environment to which they must react. The external
environment provides both opportunities and threats, and the nature of the
external environment must be understood to enable these to be identified
and addressed.
In general, external forces are outside the control of a shipyard. In
particular this comment is directed at price, which fluctuates on a
commodity basis. It is one of the characteristics of the shipbuilding
industry, that very large fluctuations in price have been experienced in the
past and it is largely due to this variation that shipbuilding is seen as a
difficult and lligh risk industry.
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In order to survive in this difficult environment a shipyard must adopt a
inherent strategy to match the facilities and organization to a targeted
market sector. This strategy must be considered very carefully, with
decisions made on a rational and scientific basis, and not on intuition.
[Stott, 1995, p.13]
Therefore, the first step for making values (goals and objectives) explicit is
identifying the products which constitute a particular shipyard's market. The product rnix
defines the competitive requirements. The conclusions regarding strategic planning in
Chapters 2.0 and 4.0 would suggest that goals must be linked to these requirements
through the realization of perfonnance gaps. Subsequently, the design/Build Strategy and
change management process must SUppOlt these goals.
There are two possible activities associated with this identification sub-element.
The first of these defines an optimal product mix to take advantage of a yard's present
distinctive and core competencies. This is closely aligned with the seller of products
strategy. The second is to define the distinctive and core competencies which are
required to take advantage of future available product mix. This is closely aligned with
the seller of capacity strategy. A thorough review of the product mix should result in a
better understanding of what has been produced in the recent past and what is being
produced today~ and what skills associated with these contracts are still strong today. A
review of the market will result in an understanding of core opportunities, stretch goal
oppofLunities and those opportunities that are not credible today. Core opportunities are
those for which the shipyard has distinctive and core capabilities. Stretch goal
opportunities are those for which the shipyard has core capabilities but not many
particularly distinctive capabilities. Those opportunities that are not credible are those for
which the yard is missing core competencies necessary to compete. The first step is to
examine this portfolio and begin to develop a strategy for maximizing the set of core
opportunities. What strategic responses are necessary to convert stretch goal
opportunities into core opportunities, thus maximizing the potential to win orders?
The main point, as illustrated in figure 5.1, is that different product mixes will
likely require different capability mixes. While a broad skill base will be shared anlong
different product mixes, those capabilities which must be distinctive rather than core or
routine will differ. Examples include the relative complexity of different ship types, the
materials used, the level of outfit vs. steelwork, cycle time pressures, and so on. rro
establish goals and objectives without first understanding the product market and its
pressures is not effective, because it is not likely that the goals and objectives \\'ill support
any particular set of products well. It may help to improve the shipyard, but not in a
focused way which supports competitively winning orders. Market requirenlents can first
be examined at a high level to detennine gross performance gaps. This can be followed
by a more detailed exploration of the needs of an anticipated product mix.
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5.2 ANALYSIS OF THE GROSS PERFORMANCE GAP
Use of the "compensated gross ton" (COT) as a Inetric for establishing market
requirements and relative shipyard perfonnance has been popularized recently. This
serves as a mechanism for establishing lligh level or gross perfonnance gaps. The history
of the metric is provided in NSRP 0434 "Requirements and Assessments for Global
Shipbuilding Competitiveness." [Storch et. aI., 1995, p.23] The concept of the
compensated gross ton has its roots in an agreement between the Association of West
European Shipbuilders (AWES) and the Shipbuilders' Association of ~apan (SAJ) in
1968. The present concept and mechanics of calculating the COT were established and
adopted in 1984 by the OECD, AWES and SAl. The compensated gross ton is
equivalent to the gross tonnage multiplied by a coefficient established by consensus of
the GECD, AWES and SAJ for a variety of ship types. A list of such coefficients has
been published. Recently, efforts have been made to develop coefficients for military
ships as reported in NSRP 0434. This coefficient is intended to adjust the gross tonnage
for complexity. The intent is to allow CGT to be used as a proxy for shipyard output
regardless of the ship types. "fhe concept is that this allows a shipyard to be defined in
tenns of its costs per CGT. Constant cost curves for dollars per CGT can be established
by disaggregating the metric into two components, namely cost per employee year and
employee years per CGT. [Binningham, Hall, Kattan, 1997, p.3] A standard practice for
calculating costs per employee year has been developed.
The costs should exclude those for the direct raw materials attributed to
specific contracts and concentrate on the added value (i.e. the remainder
making up the total operating costs for the company.) This is calculated
by summing the following totals:
• y/ages paid to all employees, including overtime and bonuses,
• costs for all subcontractors,
• social costs of employing workers,
• costs of materials and services to run the business (not chargeable to
specific contracts),
• overhead costs, and
• cost of supply-and-fit type subcontracted items [Binningham et. aI., 1997,
p.2]
The product of these terms is $/CGT and a plot utilizing each tenn for an axis
results in curves of constant $/CGT. Particular shipyards can identify \vhere they lie on
such a plot. They can also use this tool to estimate where their competition is located
relative to their performance_ Finally, different product types will generally have an
estimated market $/CGT associated with them. Thus a shipyard can identify, at a \rery
high level, where it is relative to its anticipated products as well as its conlpetition. Many
consultancies are busy assisting shipyards with this activity at this time.
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Figure 5.2 illustrates how gross perfonnance can be tracked against the $/CGT
isolines. In this example, two competing shipyards are shown to exist on the same
isoline. One of these is a low cost, low productivity producer able to compete at a given
$/CGT level and the other is a high cost, high productivity producer competing at the
same $/CGT level. The first relies on its lower costs and would tend to have a higher
manning level and/or longer cycle times as exhibited by its emp. yr./CGT and $/emp. yr.
The second would be representative of a yard with fewer personnel and a higher degree of
automation. The dashed isoline might be considered to represent the $/CGT the market
will bear for a given product type. The second solid line might be representative of a
third shipyard's $/CGT perfonnance. The positions on this plot relative to the market
$/CGT and competition reflect a perfonnance gap at a high level. The tangent to an
isoline at the position of a particular shipyard upon it is representative of the break-even
strategy or perfonnance gradient, the minimum ratio of ~mp. yr./CGT to $/emp. yr
reduction that must be maintained to move to a lower $/CGT perfonnance. Thus this tool
provides a mechanism for exploring high level strategy and perfonnance gaps. A
shipyard should have some reservations regarding the results. The first of these is that the
coefficients used to convert GT to CG1" are based upon consensus and do not necessarily
represent the true complexity of a given ship. The second is that this model only
addresses the product value proposition, and therefore the competitive environment, in a
limited way. The model addresses cost and indirectly time, measures performance as cost
and deliberately discounts the materials market.
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F:aURE 5.2 - $/CGT
Having established at a high level what shipyard performance is relative to
competitors and market expectations, and having established the anticipated product nlix,
a product analysis can provide additional insight into the required strategic responses to
address the identified market. A product analysis seeks to identify families of interim
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products for each of the types of vessels in the product mix and associate processes and
capabilities with them. The approach explores hoy, each product type relat.es to the
competitive environment and provides the foundation for developing a competency map.
The analysis groups interim products by production stages and processes. The result is a:
• coding of families of interim product types
• hierarchical interim part tree for each interim product family
• identification of processes associated with each interim product type
• additional refinement of the target product mix and identification of commonality
5.3 COMPETENCY MAPPING AND BENCHMARKING
The previous steps identified performance gaps at a detailed level, and
subsequently identified interim products and processes associated with a target product
mix. The next step is to develop a competency map (as defined by Vollmann, 1996) as
described in Chapter 2.0. The competency map links competencies, capabilities,
processes and resources back to strategic response~ to the competitive environment. The
approach is consistent with the utilization of the Analytic Hierarchy Process, to be
described in the next chapter. It is also consistent with Keeney's observations regarding
"value focused thinking", Ackoffs methods, and Hoshin planning. The competency map
will ultimately fonn the benefits component of the decision model de"veloped in this
research.
Having identified the product mix and competitive environment, one needs to
examine the elements of that environment and establish what the pressures are, existing
or anticipated, to which the organization must respond to compete. The steps taken so far
in the identification stage of the framework are all ainled at facilitating this. The answers
to that question constitute the high level strategic response of the shipyard. The
competency m.ap provides a means of structuring the deployment of that response
throughout the organization. Figure 5.3 provides an example of ho\v the competency
map is structured with respect to one of the elements of the competitive environment.
Product analysis, and benchmarking (both internal and external) as discussed in Chapter
4.0 and several recently published technology surveys, contribute to the identification of
capabilities, processes, and resources required to support a given set of strategic
responses associated with an ~nvironment defined by a particular product mix. In the
language of Keeney, the competency map forms a "fundamental objectives hierarchy",
while the subsequent identification of alternative proposals forms the associated "means-
ends hierarchy." [Keeney, 1992] ../\ shipyard can use the concept of the competency map
and go as low in the map as required to set meaningful and measurable targets and goals
which can then be acted upon.
A shipyard could develop a single competency map if there is sufficient
commonality between ships in the product mix. Multiple connected hierarchies could be
developed in cases where the ships require different responses. The hierarchical
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representation structures the problem in such a way as to visibly link proposals to the
shipyard's competitive strategy. It also pelmits structured decision analysis to be
perfcnned through pair-wise comparisons of elements of the hierarchy, including
prioritization of the products in the mix at the top of the hierarchy. The analytic
hierarchy process, described in Chapter 6.0, can be used to prioritize and s}'nthesize the
ship type hierarchies based upon marketing priorities. Competencies, capabilities,
processes and resources can be pair-wise compared and prioritized hased on internal and
external benchmarking and the definition of performance gaps. Metrics such a£ the SfI
index discussed in Chapter 4.0 could be used fo.. this prioritization. Finally, the hierarchy
permits lower level maps to be developed from higher level ones facilitating discussions
related to specific departments and groups, and the targets and goals required to support
elements of the map.
After developing an initial competency map, technology surveys or benchmarking
can be used to refine the hierarchy and establish specific objectives and goals. Surveys
serve to identify performance gaps. These gaps can be internal with respect to
expectations and can be based upon expert judgment and actuals with respect to
importance and strength of capabilities as was the case in the survey conducted as part of
this research. Surveys can also be external with respect to the competition, seeking to
establish relative strength for the elements of the competency map. This activity helps to
classify capabilities and processes as distinct, core or routine as described in Chapter 2.0.
A flurry of recent activity by a number of consultancies and shipyards has resulted in a
standard template for a technology survey (discussed in NSRP 0453) which can serve as a
starting point. Ultimately the objective is to obtain information that relates directly to
elements of the competency map_
When analyzing perfonnance gaps it is critical to look at not only the intensity of
the gap, but the anticipated trend and the importance of the parameter. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.3. One could prioritize based upon the ratio of strength, or intensity of the
gap, to importance to the competitive environment. By examining the trends, it should be
obvious that improvement will be required continllously since the competition is also
. .Improving.
No\v Hull I Hull 2
Time
FIGURE 5.3 - PERFORMANCE GAP TREND
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150
To set goals, targets and ~easures one must define a set of attributes or metrics.
Keeney defines three types of attributes. These include natural, constru.cted and proxy
attributes. Natural attributes &re in general use with common interpretation, such as man-
hours for a given process. Constructed attributes are developed specifically for a given
context and may combine multiple natural attributes. Constructed attributes generally
associate a verbal descriptor \vith a quantitative scale. An example would be the five
technology levels of the technology survey ofNSRP 0453 or the organizational readiness
scale of McCarthy presented in Chapter 2.0. A proxy attribute is used when a parameter
of interest cannot easily be measured. An example might be man-hours of production
rework as a proxy for engineering quality. Shiba suggests that stretch goals should be
challenging but persuasive. They should be associated with dates or hulls and a
measurement schedule and plan should be developed to enable tracking and corrective
action. As will be discussed in Chapter 6.0, it is also important to set thresholds or a
shipyard policy regarding what constitutes reasonable or feasible proposals to be
considered. This is required to set up a screening process for limiting detailed and time
consuming evaluation to only those proposals that are feasible and non-inferior.
Consideration of measurable goals, objectives and thresholds will also help to
refine and improve the competency map. A multitude of brainstonning and creativity-
enhancing techniques exist for expanding and improving the hierarchy in a group setting
that may include division managers or department supervisors for example. Keeney
suggests that fundamental objectives, and therefore their associated goals, should be:
• Essential
• Controllable
• Complete
• Measurable
• Operational
• Decomposable
• Nonredundant
• Concise
• Understandable
Having established elerrlents of the hierarchy and goals, one can finally begin
identifying or creating design improvement proposals which support success within a
given competitive environment. As was discussed in Chapter 3.0, at the concept design
stage the identified fundamental objectives and goals should be made integral to the
design/Build Strategy. In follo\v on design/production phases proposals should be
reviewed to contribute to the goals specified in the design/Build Strategy according to a
schedule also made explicit in the design/Build Strategy. This is necessary to nlanage
expectations, a key component to managing change as discussed in Chapter 2.0.
The process of actually creating alternatives is associated with the Production
Engineering function as described in Chapter 3.0. In Chapter 4.0 the existence of a
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Production Engineering function was suggested to be best practice. Sources for proposals
i!1clude lessons learned during design such as through value analysis, lessons learned
during production, and ongoing research associated with time/cost saving technologies.
gomg unction
of Production Engineering
coordinared wilh Producrion
and Engineering
Lessons Learned
During Construction
SOURCES
Compelency Map and
Goals trigger identification
of additional alternatives
FIGURE 5.5 - CREATION OF ALTERNATIVES
The structure of the hierarchy assists in counteracting cogrlitive biases, anchoring,
and constrained thinking. Keeney recommends a number of ways that cognitive
roadblocks can be mitigated so that existing alternative proposals can be reviewed and
improved. These recommendations support the conclusions of Chapter 2.0 and the
industry survey that a participative approach is preferable and that facilitators with core
competencies in creative thinking and problem solving who are outside the "daily grind"
are valuable.
• Brainstorm supporting proposals for each goal
• Brainstonn proposals for pairs of goals (and so on)
• Examine how alternatives might change if attributes/metrics used change
• Examine how alternatives might change if goals/thresholds were varied
• Explore common properties of good alternatives
• Use generic categories for alternatives (such as "structural details" and "pipe joints")
• Renlove constraints on resources, timelines, or risk
" Encourage long tenn thinking - what learning opportunities are important
• Examine consequences and improve perfonnance for all stakeholders
• Obtain participation of stakeholders associated with elements of the hierarchy
• Avoid tendency to anchor in past practices
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5.4 SYNOPSIS
The identification procedure described in this chapter has been developed based
upon lessons learned from the industry survey and the literature. In Chapter 2.0 the
history of the quality movement was reviewed and it was demonstrated that recent
attention has been focused on mechanisms to align improvement activities with strategic
objectives. The industry survey presented in Chapter 4.0 supported that conclusion. The
proposed identification approach described in this chapter addresses this issue.
The input to the identification stage is competitive pressure manifested as
perceived or actual performance gaps. The output is a set of design improvement
proposals focused upon strategic responses to the competitive pressures. The
identification stage of the design change framework consists of a number of sub-elements
aimed at first making the competitive environment explicit, followed by establishing
objectives and goals, followed by identifying alternative proposals that support those
goals. The theory and practice of value focused thinking and other methods aimed at
eliminating or reducing cognitive biases are used to insure that a broad range of proposals
is considered and to improve their performance relative to the identified goals. The
output of the identification stage signals entry to the evaluation stage, which is the topic
of the next chapter.
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6.0 ALTERN~~TIVEMETHODS FOR EVALUATING AND
PRIORITIZING PROPOSALS
It was previously illustrated in this research that initiatives to reduce production
costs and cycle time by implernenting design changes have had notoriously mixed results.
Clearly, change proposals have not been managed well. "To manage well, you need both
to make good decisions and to implement them efficiently. You are not managing well if
you make bad decisions that you implement well or if you make good decisions that you
implement badly." [Adizes, 1992, p.7] In this chapter and the next, the focus is on
quality decision-making and the development of appropriate decisionmaking tools. A
1989 Ship Design for Producibility Workshop concluded that" ... in most of the past
Navy efforts, there was no systematic approach to review, no means of judging
cost/effectiveness, and no decision criteria as a basis for selecting producibility concepts.
The approach of treating producibility in an unstructured, subjective manner is
inefficient, and less than fully effective." [Keane, Fireman, 1992]
The quality of management is a function of the quality of decisionmaking and the
efficiency of implementation. Quality decisionmaking is in tum a function of its
effectivity and its efficiency. The effectivity of a decision is reflected by the degree to
which it furthers the goals of the organization. "The quality of a decision should be
evaluated in light of the impact it has on the system for which it was made." [Adizes,
1992, p.14] Equal emphasis must be placed on the decision alternatives and the values or
objectives which will be used to evaluate these alternatives. "The relative desirability of
consequences is a concept based on values. Hence, the fundamental notion in
decisionmaking should be values, not alternatives." [Keeney, 1992, p.3] In this chapter
we are concerned with the means by which quality deci~ions can be made with respect to
design change proposals, and how these proposals can most efficiently and effectively be
evaluated with respect to their impact on the multiple values and objectives of the
organization as a whole. Values, or strategic objectives, must be reflected through the
evaluation criteria and the weights associated with these criteria. An effective decision
analysis tool is one which recognizes that "what is missing in most decisionmaking
methodologies is a philosophical approach and methodological help to understand and
articulate values" and to align decisions with these core strategic values. [Keeney, 1992,
p.8] It would be desirable for the decision model to structure the problem such as to
facilitate the identification of core values and objectives, and therefore suggest additional
alternatives which may not have been obvious. In Chapter 5.0 the identification of
proposals utilizing value focused thinking was discussed. A competency map and
hierarchical representation was used to develop strategic goals and objectives. In this
chapter these goals and objectives form the basis for a decision analysis model for
evaluating and prioritizing the proposals.
With respect to decisionmaking, efficiency refers to the ease of use of the
decisionmaking methodology and the speed \vith which decisions can be nlade. It is
hoped that the model developed in this chapter will recognize and address the fact that
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"there is a considerable gap between Operations Researchers and managers. The OR
people provide management with sophisticated but difficult to use instruments, managers
expect streamlined and easy to use tools to support their project selection process."
[Fahrni & Spatig, 1990, p. I55]
6.1 CONTEXT
In this chapter a decision model is developed as a tool for the evaluation,
prioritization, and decisionmaking phases of the design change framework that was
presented earlier in this research (see Figure 6.0). This model is developed through an
extensive review of the literature regarding evaluation techniques, an analysis of feedback
obtained through the industry survey and lessons learned from supporting theory in the
literature. This material forms the basis for identifying an appropriate model form and its
associated evaluation criteria and parameters.
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The results of the industry survey demonstrated that evaluation and prioritization
of proposals are key elements of concern when managing change. For this reason, any
study of Design Change Management must necessarily examine alternative evaluation
approaches and decision model forms. Research conducted as part of this study at a
number of shipyards suggests that the evaluation techniques used in practice are generally
limited to traditional engineering economy and simple checklists or scoring models.
These findings are similar to the results of empirical studies conducted by numerous
researchers in the fields of decision science and operations research. "Their findings
suggest that conceptually simple models such as checklists and scoring approaches are
widely used, while more sophisticated modeling techniques, e.g. mathematical
programming, have so far had little impact." [Fahrni, Spatig; 1990, p.156] Interviews of
personnel at a number of shipyards also suggested that the evaluations were often
considered suspect and that there was a general sense that the results did n.ot always
reflect a high level, integrative shipyard strategy. In this chapter, a broad range of tools
available for evaluating proposals are presented along with their axioms and assumptions.
These tools 1re subsequently critiqued for the purpose of pointing out the strengths and
weaknesses inherent in each.
Evel)' approach presented will be shown to have a number of shortcomings, some
more numerous than others, and for this reason it is necessary in any decision modeling
problem to identify the best approach for the problem at hand. After the tools are
presented, the special needs of prioritizing change proposals are discussed and these tools
are placed in the context of these needs to determine which (lpproach or approaches are
best suited for this problem. Finally, a decision model for evaluating and prioritizing
design change proposals is suggested.
6.2 ALTERNATIVE EVALUATION TECHNIQUES AND DECISIONMAKING MODELS
Decision making nl0dels can be categorized as either continuous 01 discrete.
Discrete models are those which seek to evaluate a number of specific identifiable
alternatives. Continuous models optimize a solution subject to constraints when there are
an infinite number of feasible solutions. In managing design change proposals, we are
interested in discrete models used to evaluate a set of discrete proposals.
The tools presented will fall into two broad categories, those that evaluate over a
single attribute and those that evaluate over multiple attribut~s. Single attribute
evaluation techniques include the general classes of Engineering Economy, so-called
"Primitive" Models, Formal Decision Analysis, and Decision Analysis with Utility
Theory. Multiple attribute evaluation techniques include the so-called "Elementary"
Methods, Multi-Attribute Utility Theory, and Priority Theory tor the Analytic I-licrarchy
Process). Of particular interest are the multi-attribute models, as any evaluation of design
changes nlust consider a variety of parameters. In the discussion of the 111ultiple attribute
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tools will be issues associated with independence and dependence among the model
para~eters.
6.2.1 Single Attribute Analysis
6.2.1.1 Engineering Economy Criteria
Traditionally, the techniques used to evaluate change proposals fall into a class of
analysis lc'1own as Engineering Economy. Engineering Economy is concerned with
evaluating the economic merit of projects by examining projected cash flows.
Application of engineering economy criteria is conceptually simple, but very difficult in
practice. A principal problem with evaluating alternatives using traditional Engineering
Economy is that these approaches ignore issues associated with uncertainty and risk.
They also fail to adequately account for intangible costs, intangible benefits, and
differences in the scales of the alternatives themselves, their benefits or their costs.
As mentioned, they fail to address more than one criterion, or attribute, in a single
evaluation. The data collected through the benchmarking questionnaire demonstrates that
a variety of criteria are important to shipbuilders when evaluating design change
proposals as was illustrated in Chapter 4.0.
Decisionmaking Criteria
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FIGURE 6.1 - MULTIPLE CRITERIA
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Economic evaluations are difficult to perform ill practice for a number of reasons.
One of the significant difficulties with economic evaluation is that evaluating and
projecting true costs and benefits can be very difficult for anything but the simplest of
real world problems. The more uncertainty that is associated with a scenario and
industry, or the longer the project life cycle, the greater this difficulty. Even if the project
life is brief, assessing benefits and costs in detail can be difficult if the environment is
complex and those perfonning the evaluation cannot realistically assess factors across the
entire organization within a decision-maker's window of opportunity. The traditional
techniques of Engineering Economy assume that all costs and benefits can be quantified
in a tangible way, that they are quantified to the same scale (dollars), and that this scale is
also a directly linear measure of value. It should be noted that all of the engineering
economy criteria will generally result in different rankings for the same alternatives. For
all these reasons, decisions presented as based on purely economic evaluations of
alternatives are often suspect. This is why they are rarely relied on in practice. A
decision-maker will use the infonnation provided by those perfomling an economic
evaluation, and then couple that information with numerous other internalized criteria to
make a go/no-go decision. These single attribute techniques are presented here first
because they are common, and second because they are utilized as part of more rigorous
approaches.
Traditional engineering economic approaches to evaluating proposals include Net
Present Value, Benefit/Cost ratio, Internal Rate of Return, Cost-Effectiveness Ratio and
Payback Period. All of these are concerned with evaluating discounted cash flows and
providing a basis of comparison between alternative projects and some minimum
standard. Cash flows are discounted for the time value of money using an appropriate
discount rate. Determining what discount rate is appropriate is one of the diffic.ulties
associated with these types of analysis. It is not a trivial problem, as the choice of
discount rate will have a dramatic impact on the evaluation. The twin facts that the
choice of discount rate is a matter of judgment and can have rather enormous econolnic
and technical implications make this selection highly controversial. [de Neufville, 1990,
p.223] It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the selection of discount rates in
detail. For the sake of continued discussion, the discount rate that is appropriate is the
one which represents the rate of return that would be exceeded by all the investments that
the company would make before it ran out of budget to invest. It is a rate higher than the
interest it would receive by lending its money. The minimum standard to which
alternatives are compared utiiiLing various criteria is established by making assumptions
regarding all the alternatives that have previously been available for investnlent, and the
alternatives that are expected to exist in the future, and \vhat their measures of nlerit
would be on average with any particular criteria.
The Net Present Value (NPV) of a project is the difference bet\\'een the
discounted benefits and costs assigned to the project by the evaluator. Anything with an
NPV greater than zero represents an alternative which has a higher return than the
discount rate. A project with an NPV equal to zero \vould still be profitable, but not as
profitable as those projects which formed the basis for establishing the discount rate. As
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a lone criteria for go/no-go decisions for proposed projects, the NPY does not provide
sufficient practical information to make decisions. For example, the NPV criteria does
not indicate the amount of effort (or investment) required to achieve the NP\r. Two
projects may have identical NPV's while one of them requires significantly less
investment (project A), making it more attractive. This is because investing in the more
expensive alternative (project B) has a hidden opportunity cost. This opportunity cost
exists because by investing in project B, one is losing the benefits that could be achieved
by investing in project A instead and then further investing the difference in their "real"
costs. In order to make the NPV criteria effective, one needs to count these opportunity
costs as part of the cost assigned in the NPV calculation. Opportunity costs are even
more elusive to the evaluator in industry than the "real'" costs are, which themselves are
difficult to identify. In addition, NPV provides no information to the evaluator regarding
the life of the project, and the timing of the returns. Thus NPV is typically a good
evaluation criterion only when alternatives are similar in levels of investment, difficulty,
and timing.
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) analysis utilizes the ratio of the discounted benefits to
the discounted costs as a criterion to establish that an alternative is attractive and also to
provide an indication of the relative levels of investment required on a normalized basis.
Alternatives with a benefit-cost ratio greater than one are attractive because the benefits
exceed the costs, and the ratio provides an indication of the benefits achieved per unit of
investment. As a lone criterion for decision-making, the BCR provides a greater range of
information than the NPV in a single unit of measure and is therefore more easily applied
to ranking of alternatives. Even so, the BCR is still problematic. The ACR does not
provide an indication of the total expected profit, nor the total required investment. Thus,
while it provides more infonnation than the NPY, it is still not appropriate as a lone
criterion. Given two projects with the same initial investment, BCR shows bias towards
projects with low recurring costs even in situations where the total NPV is higher for the
project with recurring costs and the net each year is higher for the project with recurring
costs. BCR has been manipulated through semantics to address this problem. For
example, there is controversy regarding the assignment of "dis-benefits" instead of costs.
The strict definition of BCR would require the total discounted benefits to be
divided by total discounted costs. It has been argued that the recurring costs should be
counted as "dis-benefits", since they are immediately covered by the benefits in the same
period, and subtracted from the benefits rather than added to the costs. There is
ambiguity in this type of assessment, neither approach necessarily resulting in an optinlal
solution. Once again, unless alternatives require similar investments over similar
timelines, BCR does not offer clear direction. A criterion related to BeR is the Cost-
Effectiveness Ratio (CER). This is a similar criterion which assesses benefits in units
other than dollars, typically physical units of nlcasurc. It is intended to sinlplify analyses
which involve units that are difficult to quantify as dollars. It still requires that atl
benefits be measured according to the sanle unijts. If. represents a very different type of
analysis, since the benefits and costs are not convertible. Thus, there is no way to tell if
the costs were "worthwhile". The costs cannot be conlpared directly to the benefits.
--rypical applications would be to safety, cycle time reduction, and quality inlprOVCI11cnt
where a single Ineasure of merit other than dollars is of interest, and it has already been
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decided that a certain level of investment is to be made in one or several alternatives.
CER will suggest the best alternative provided one is committed to investing. It cannot
tell you if investing is appropriate in the first place.
A fourth criterion which is often employed is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR).
The IRR is the discount rate for which the NPV of a particular investment would be zero.
The IRR represents the "return on investment", and is a readily understandable measure
of merit. The IRR also has the significant advantage that it does not require the
detennination of a discount rate. Recall from the earlier discussion that determination of
the appropriate discount rate is a matter ofjudgment often plagued \vith controversy, and
the results of NPV and BeR are very sensitive to the discount rate chosen. A Inajor
problem with the IRR is that it can be ambiguous. A single alternative can easily have
more than one IRR! This often happens when a project has significant "closure costs".
In these cases, some low IRR results in an NPV of zero since the closure costs are not
discounted greatly and tend to balance the benefits. At some high IRR, there will exist an
NPV of zero since the closure costs are discounted greatly, but so are the benefits over
time ar.d therefore balanced by the initial investment.
The final traditional engineering economy criterion to be discussed here is the
Payback Period (PP). The payback period represents the time it takes for the
undiscounted annual benefits to equal the initial investment assuming that the benefits are
in equal yearly installments. Thus, this criterion seeks to compare alternatives with
respect to the time dimension while the o~her criteria were interested in overall benefits.
The PP can be considered to be a criterion that is related to risk. In general the further
into the future one needs to project to obtain benefits, the greater the risk. The PP is
related to the BeR ill that it is inversely proportional to the BCR. Thus a high BeR
implies a short PP. While of interest as a criterion, it does not serve well as a lone
criterion since it implies nothing regarding total net benefits or optimal solutions. A
ranking of alternatives by payback period does not provide a decision-maker with the
infonnation required to decide what to invest in, but can be used to eliminate altenlatives
which may be undesirably risky because it takes tGO long to recover the investment.
As was mentioned earlier, all the criteria discussed so far result in different
rankings. All can be easily manipulated as they are sensitive to matters of judgment such
as the discount rate and semantics regarding costs and benefits. Thus, while emphasizing
quantitative analysis, they can still be quite subjective. Each is concerned with a different
aspect of evaluating the alternatives. All are of interest to the evaluator, and so no single
criterion can be relied on in isolation. Only one of the criteria discussed, the CER, can
handle intangibles, and it has limited application. Typically, more than one type of
evaluation must be done tcgcLiJ~r with sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis is
required because the real world is uncertain. Engineering Economy criteria are
detenninistic and depend on the assumptions made. Sensit!vity analysis is required to
evaluate these assumptions and address risk. A decision-nlaker utilizes that infornlation
and processes it based on internalized criteria in conjunction with other criteria that are
not addressed above. Early efforts to address risk and uncertainty resulted in a group of
techniques collectively referred to as Hprimitive" decision analysis methods.
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6.2.1.2 "Prilnitive" Models
There are a number of approaches to evaluation that are often referred to as
"primitive" models. [de Neufville, 1990, p.298] They are referred to as "primitive"
because they are generally considered to be inferior to fonnal decision analysis involving
decision trees and probability assessment by practitioner~ of Utility Theory. These
decision tools include the Laplace criterion, the Maximin/Maximax criteria, and the
Regret criterion. These tools seek to inlprove upon engineering economy criteria by
utilizing engineering economy criteria within an additional structure known as a "pay-off
matrix". This helps to structure the problem and evaluate alternatives under uncertain
conditions, or various "states of nature" that might exist. The problem becomes one of
evaluating the alternatives based on an engineering economy criteria assuming that each
state of nature exists.
In the Laplace approach, a pay-off matrix is constructed consisting of one axis
defining the aiternatives to be evaluated and another axis defining the "states of nature"
or u.ncertain conditions that may exist that alter the value of the alternatives. This model
assumes that each state of nature is equally likely, and that the best alternative is the one
with the highest expected value. The Laplace model is often criticized by the decision
analysis community as being arbitrary because the rankings are altered by the
introduction of "trivial" or "irrelevant" alternative states of nature. This criticism is
unfortunate, because while the Laplace criterion is problematic in a number of ways, each
example cited by texts and papers regarding this particular flaw has not appeared fair to
the author of this research. Typically, the additional states of nature are not really trivial.
They provide additional infonnation about the problem which should rightly alter the
rank. For example, the addition of duplicate states of nature with different titles (in other
words, different states of nature which result in payoffs for each alternative identical to
those of another state of nature) will alter the rankings. This appears reasonable rather
than a flaw, as the presence of an additional state of nature should alter the expected value
of each alternative if it really is a different state of nature. Its addition represents new
infonnation about the environment and means that the original structure of the problem
was wrong. The update to the rankings is analogous to the revision of probabilities using
Bayes Theorem or likelihood ratios when new infonnation about a problem exists. If it is
actually a duplicate state of nature, it should not be listed in the problem twice. A related
decision making approach is referred to as the "Hurwicz's Principal." [Carter, 1992, p.61]
This approach defines two states of nature, one representing the best outcome and a
second representing the worst. The decision-maker weights the two states of nature to
reflect a level of aversion to risk. For example, the outconle of the best state of nature
may be assigned a weight of 800/0, with the \\'orst a \veight of 20%. The score is then the
sum of the weighted outcomes of the states of nature. The drawbacks of the Laplace and
Hurwicz criteria are that they assume each state of nature to be equally likely (\vhich is
rarely true), and that they only evaluate a single attribute of the alternatives (rarely useful
in practice).
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The Maximin and Maximax criteria are related. The fanner seeks to maximize
minimum benefit, the latter seeks to maximize the maximum benefit. One appeals to
those who are risk adverse, the other appeals to those who are more optimistic. These
criteria utilize the same pay-off matrix as the Laplace criterion, but evaluate only against
a single entry for each alternative. These criteria make no assumptions about
probabilities and seek out alternatives based solely on the minima or maxima of the
outcomes. The Regret criterion is related to the maximin and maximax. This criterion
seeks to minimize the maximum delta between the benefit attributed to any alternative at
any state of nature and the "best" alternative for that particular state of nature. Thjs
criterion is particularly criticized in the decision analysis literature. One source of this
criticism is that the evaluation of any particular alternative is dependent on the other
alternatives. This is not a fair criticism since the approach is defined as seeking to
lninimize a value which is dependent on the altenlatives. While it might be argued that
this is not a rational way to make a decision, the model is consistent with its objectives
when it alters the rank based on changes to the alternatives. In addition, it is criticized
because the evaluation can be made to look intransitive. For example when pairs are
evaluated by themselves, A can be preferred to B, B to C and C to A. This criticism is
not valid because it is never appropriate under this model to evaluate pairs alone. One
ITJust perfonn the evaluation across the entire set since regret is defined across the entire
set, and under these circumstances there is no intransitivity. As long as the entire set is
considered in the evaluation, transitivity will hold. As was the case with the Laplace
criterion, the problem with this criterion is not that the rankings are arbitrary (within the
context of the assumptions made) but instead that they are not of particular interest or
believed to express the preferences of "logical" people. Like the Laplace criterion, these
approaches would not appear to be particularly useful since they evaluate against a single
attribute of the alternatives and ignore the actual likelihood of the outcomes.
6.2.1.3 Formal Decision Analysis
While the primitive models structure a problem as a pay-off matrix, [onnal
decision analysis structures a problem as a decision tree. A key distinction between the
decision tree and the pay-off matrix is that the decision tree can identify the outcomes of
situations over multiple periods. Another distinction between fonnal decision analysis
and the primitive models is that probabilities are assigned to alternative outcomes and
utilized in assessing optimal chcices (in the case of a single period of a decision tree) and
an overall optimal strategy (in the case of multiple periods of a decision tree). The
primitive models do not utilize probabilities, instead assuming that all of the outcomes
are equally likely.
The decision tree is made up of decision nodes and chance nodes. Chance nodes
are followed by branches which represent possible states of nature or outeolnes. Decision
nodes are followed by branches representing alternative decisions. Generally, one starts
\vith a decision node, follo\ved by alternative branches, followed by a series of chance
nodes at the end of each branch, followed by branches representing the possible
outcomes, which subsequently might be followed by additional periods of decisions or
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chances and outcomes. The outcomes are rreasured quantitatively, often in ternlS of
engineering economy criteria. The objective of the fannal decision analysis routine is to
identify all the possible choices that can be made and the probabilities of all the potential
outcolnes of each. By doing so, one can calculate the expected value of each decision
based on the possible outcomes of the decision and the probability of those outcomes.
When more than one independent probabilistic parameter influences the outcome, joint
probabilities rnay be used as long as outcomes for combinations of the parameters of
interest can be determined. By calculating the expected values using integration rather
than summation, probability distributions can be utilized.
The difficulty with formal decision analysis is that in addition to economic
evaluation, one must assess the probabilities of events. It is this which makes the
"primitive" models attractive to so many people, who wish to address risk without the
added complexity of assessing probabilities. Identifying alternative states and assigning
probabilities to these states is not a trivial problem. One must first identify the periods
that are to be considered, then the alternative decisions to be made in each period, and
finally the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive alternative states of nature that
lead to outcomes from each decision. Probabilities of each outcome must be assessed.
The outcomes themselves must be assessed under a common scale and used in the
calculation, together with the probabilities, to determine the exp.ected value of each
possible decision.
In theory, if the probabilities can be readily and reasonably estimated, fonnal
decision analysis should offer a ranking of alternative courses of action which is superior
to that offered by the primitive models in a number of ways. First, the approach forces
the analyst to structure the problem in such a way as to demand careful consideration of
all the alternatives. Second, the choice is based on the most likely outcome rather than
merely "hedging one's bets". This approach presumes that a decision-maker values the
most likely outconle and is not just interested in minimizing the risk, which may not
always be true. In reality, decisionmakers exhibit varying preferences for benefit, cost
and risk as \vas discussed in Chapter 2.0 and demonstrated in Chapter 4.0. Formal
decision analysis allows a number of influential parameters to be considered through the
use ofjoint probabilities. Finally, this approach is well suited to problems which involve
multiple decision opportunities and the fonnation of a strategy rather than a single
decision point.
6.2.1.4 Utility Theory
So far, all the models presented require criteria to be measurable on a single
common tangible scale, such as dollars. This is not always desirable, since not all
important attributes can be measured on the same scale or easily converted from one scale
to another. Examples would be cost and comfort in the evaluation of an automobile.
Both have value, but comfort is not easily converted to a scale of dollars. The tools
presented also assume that this tangible scale is directly and linearly related to the value
of the alternative as perceived by the decision-maker. It is well known that non-linear
relationships often exist which alter the 'l.value" of a physical or tangible unit. One dollar
does not always have the same value to a decision-maker. Diminishing marginal utility is
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one example of a situation in which there is a non-linear relationship. Value is a function
of the circumstances. Utility theory seeks to establish a common scale which measures
value in "utiles" for all attributes that are of interest. Utility theory also allows one scale,
such as dollars, to be mapped into this scale of utiles with nOll-linear relationships
accounted for through the creation of a Utility Function. This scale is then used in
conjunction with probabilities through formal decision analysis to determine the expected
utility of decisions.
In detennining the utility function, several key axioms must be satisfied. The first
simply states that for every possible pair of consequences of interest, the decision-maker
will prefer one to the other or be indifferent between them. The second axiom insists on
transitivity of preferences. That is to say that for three alternatives A, Band C if A is
preferred to B and B to C then A must be preferred to C. This axiom is one of the more
difficult ones to satisfy, as it requires consistency of preferences which is not always true
in real life. The third axiom assumes monotonicity of the utility function. This implies
that more of a good thing is better, 1Nhich is also not always true in practice. For some
situations more of a good thing can become bad. A fourth related axiom suggests that a
higher probability of a benefit is better than a lower probability. A fifth axiom related to
utility theory is that probabilities exist and can be quantified for each alternative outcome.
The substitution or independence axiom of utility theory states that if a fJ~·t 30n places
equal value on two possible outcomes, then these can be substituted for each other in any
choice involving uncertain outcomes without changing that choice. This assumes that a
person's preferences are linear with probability. Research has shown that this is
generally not the case and that people exhibit non-linear preferences with respect to
probability, especially in situations where an additional small unit of probability can be
"purchased" to provide a "sure thing". This is known as .he "certainty effect." These
axioms, which appear rational and reasonable but do not always describe the real
behavior of decision-makers, are "normative." They seek to describe how the best
decision should be selected even though people do not always operate that way. In
deciding to use utility theory, one is expressing a belief that rational people should
behave as the axioms describe, and that the fact that they don't is a function of the
idiosynchracies ofdecision-makers rather than shortcomings of the axioms.
The essential practical questions raised by the controversy are: do we
assume that the substitution axiom is so obviously rational that any
behavior contrary to it is a mistake, however well informed and
intelligent the person may be? If so we should sonlehow disregard
some of the person's stated preferences, and substitute ones we deem
correct. (This can be taken as being presumptuous, if not arrogant.) Or
do we suppose that the axiom is sometimes deficient for some subtle
reason and reject it - and consequently the utility function which
depends upon this axiom - when people express contrary preferences?
Logic by itself does not resolve this question. [d~ Neufville, 1990,
p.366]
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No matter how intransitivities exist, we must recognize that they exist,
and we can take only little comfort in the thought that they are an
anathema to most of what constitutes ttleory in the behavioral sciences
today...We may say that we are only concerned with behavior which is
transitive, adding hopefully that we believe this need not always be a
vacuous study. Or we may contend that the transitive description is
often a 'close' approximation to reality. Or we may limit our interest
to 'nonnative' or 'idealized' behavior in the hope that such studies will
have a metatheoretic impact on nlore realistic studies. In order to get
on, we shall be flexible and accept all of these as possible defenses,
and add to them the traditional mathematician's hedge: transitive
relations are far more mathematically tractable than intransitive ones.
[Luce, Raiffa, 1957, p.25]
III many circumstances, the axioms appear to produce reasonable results. There
are also many circumstances under which this is not the case, and the discussion of these
is reserved for later when the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is introduced. As \vas
mentioned early on, the choice of a decision making model is by no means ob·vious or
trivial which is why this excursus has been undertaken in the first place.
The axioms allow the utility of an uncertain outcome to be stated as the product of
the utility of the outcome if it were certain and the probability of the real outcome. The
value of a risky scenario is then the expected value, or sum of the products of all the
outcomes utilities and their associated probabilities. Therefore utility can be directly
substituted within the structure of fonnal decision analysis.
The remaining question is how to measure utility and what such measurements
mean. Utility is measured on a cardinal scale known as the ordered metric. Utility is a
number on an ordered metric scale measuring the attractiveness of a consequence, or the
state of satisfaction of a consequence. Zero on the scale is simply a reference point which
could easily be some other number. This is analogous to temperature scales. Ordered
metric scales and ratios of ordered metric scales have no inherent meaning. This is in
contrast tc the ratio scale which is discussed later as it relates to the Analytic Hierarchy
Process. The ordered metric, and therefore utility, scale is defined by t.wo arbitrary
points. These are generally defined as zero representing the worst outcome (geneially
expressed as U(X.) = 0) and one representing the best outcome ('J(X·) = 1).
Utility functions are developed b}" questioning decision-makers about their
preferences for lotteries. The approach to this questioning could take two fonns. One
approach is related to certainty equivalents, the other to lottery equivalents. The certainty
equivalent approach relates the utility of the certainty of obtaining an outcome with a
lottery of obtaining the best and worst outcomes with some probability. This approach,
\-vhile popular, has been shown to be faulty. Empirical evidence shows that
measurements determined using different probabilities provide different results. This has
been associated with the certainty effect described earlier. [de Neufville, 1990, p.381]
The method also has been shown to propagate errors, since the results of one iteration of
questioning are used to establish the next iteration. The lottery equivalent approach was
developed to avoid these problems and is now recognized as the preferred method. This
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approach makes no reference to a sure thing, therefore avoiding distortions related to
certainty effects. It also makes a series of independent assessments, none of which rely
on the results of the first. In this approach, two lotteries are compared rather than a
lottery and a certainty. A lottery consisting of a 50/50 probability of some outcome Xi
and the best outcome X· is set equivalent to another lottery of the best and worst
outcomes with probability Pc. This is generally expressed as
Xi is increased incrementally and the decision-maker is questioned regardi~lg the
appropriate probability Pc by gradually bracketing Pc until it is agreed to. Pairs of XI and
Pc will then define the utility function.
Construction of a utility function j,s not easy in practice. The psychometric
considerations are often overwhelming. Numerous case studies have been reported with
generally the same results. Professor Jonathan Bard of the University of Texas reported
in the November 1992 lIE Transactions that "none of the respondents could make sense
of the relationship between the posed lotteries and the overall evaluation process.
Repeated coaxing was necessary to get them to concentrate on the gambles and to give a
deliberate response. Experience seems to show that regardless of an indi vidual's
background, unle~~ il includes extensive training in statistics, some amount of frustration
is inevitable wh~n trying to deal with low probability events." [Bard, 1992, p.119]
While [onnal decision analysis with utility theory is of interest and represents a greater
level of analytical rigor than the other methods described, it may be difficult to use in all
situations for the reasons described.
6.2.2 Multi-Attribute Analysis
Multi-attribute analysis tools include the "primitive" or "el~nlentary" Weighted
Index criterion, Additive Utility model, Additive Preference Model, Extended Utility
Model, Lexicographic Ordering, and Conjunctive/Disjunctive methods. These are
labeled "primitive" and "elementary" by practitioners of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
(MAUT), another popular multi-attribute approach. In addition to the 111ethods
mentioned so far is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP, sometimes called Priority
"fheory). The discussion regarding these type of analyses is of key importance, as the
ultimate objective of this Chapter is to develop a tool for evaluating change proposals
which incorporates a variety of parameters.
6.2.2.1 Elementary Mouels
L~exicographic Ordering is a simplistic approach that inlplies that all but the nl0st
important attribute (nl0st heavily weighted) of a decision-nlaking prohlclll arc
insignificant except for the case of breaking ties bet\veen alternatives. In esscncc~ it
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converts a multi-attribute problem into a single attribute problem. In this approach, the
attributes are ranked in tenns of importance. Next the alternatives are ranked based on
th~ most important attribute. Only in the case of ties are lesser attributes used. This
approach does not appear to have a defensibly rational basis unless there are order of
magnitude differences in the importance of the most important attribute and the lesser
attributes. This approach would also share all the problems associated with the primitive
single-attribute evaluation techniques discussed earlier.
Conjunctive and Disjuncti ve methods seek to eliminate alternatives from
consiGeration based upon minimum standards set agaillst. each of the criteria. First one
sets a minimum standard against each criterion, or attribute. Second, one culls the list of
alternatives based on these criteria. In the disjuncti\'e case, the objective is to keep all
alternatives that meet at least one criterion's minimum standard. In the conjunctive case,
only those alternatives that meet all the minimum standards are kept. These approaches
do not rank alternatives, nor do they define the value or preference for any alternative.
They merely quickly reduce a list to those that meet minimuril standards, or in other
words produce a list of feasible solutions. In addition, there are a number of approaches
known as outranking methods and multi-objective optimization methods. The goal of
outranking methods is to find all alternatives that dominate other alternatives while they
cannot be dominated by any other alternative. [Vargas, 1994, p.19] These are also known
as non-inferior solutions (a shorter list than the list of feasible solutions) Alone, these
approaches would appear to be of little value. As a screening prior to conducting MAUT
or AHP, these approaches are useful as they reduce the list of alternatives to those worth
considering based on some set of agreed to standards. Both MAUT and AHP \vere
developed to evaluate and rank a small set of alternatives. With each approach, the
amount of effort and data required grows with the complexity of the problem and the
number of alternatives. In some cases, the utility function or preference with respect to
an attribute is binary, meaning that either the attribute meets a standard or does not and
there is no value for intermediary or excessive quantities. By using an elinlination
routine first, the number of alternatives addressed later by MAUT or .AHP can be
reduced, and the number of attributes in the model can be reduced by considering only
those which do not behave in a binary manner. It also allows the questions posed to be
more defined, as the range within which the decision is being made is clear. A preference
can be given assuming that all the other attributes meet some minimum standard.
The general concept of the weighted index criterion is that the optimum choice is
the one that provides the best weighted average of all the attributes of the problem. [de
Neufville, 1990, p.304] These attributes need not be measured on the same scale, but
they must each be quantifiable on some scale. One difficulty with this approach is that it
does not offer a clear and rational means of establishing the weights for the criteria. This
is left to the analyst and may be determined in a variety of ways. In addition, all the
components of the weighted index must be normalized to avoid the donlinance of
characteristics that are evaluated in small units. The 111cans by \vhich these cOlnponcnts
are nornlalized alters the ranking of the alternatives. For exanlple, the results could be
nornlalized relative to one of the alternatives, maxinlunl values, nlininlulll values,
averages or some other convenient nornlalizing constant. Thus, the ranking can be easily
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nlanipulated and could be considered arbitrary. l-'he AHP is conceptually related, but will
be shown to avoid these shortcomings.
The additive utility model is similar to the weighted index model, but evaluates in
terms of the weighted sum of the individual utilities as measured by utility functions for
different attributes of an alternative. Since utility is measured on an ordered metric scale,
that in and of itself has no meaning outside the context of its low point and high point, all
the attribute's utility functions can easily be placed on the same scale through a linear
transfonnation whicll sets the high point and low point at any convenient values.
Therefore, dominance of attributes measured in small scales is not an issue and
nonnalization is not required as was the case for the weighted average index. The tack of
normalization mitigates the concerns raised earlier regarding arbitrary results. The best
alternative would be the one with the highest overall score. This approach assumes that
the differellt attributes can be weighted independently, and leaves the weighting approach
to the analyst. A variety of methods for establishing the weights can be found in the
literature. Among these are multiple linear and non-linear regression analysis of holistic
assessments, direct decomposed tradeoffs (as in the determination of scaling factors for
MAUT described later), eigenvector pairwise comparisons as in the AHP, and
distribution of 100 importance points among the criteria. Research in the 1980's
indicated that on average the methods predicted about equally well. [Schoemaker, Waid,
1982, p.182] Similarly, while it is traditional to use Utility Theory to establish the utility
functions for each parameter, the AHP could also be used to develop utility-like
functions, known as preference functions. In this case an Additive Preference Model may
be considered to exist. The AHP is described in more detail later. A drawback of this
approach is that the additive model cannot express the value of any interaction between
the different attributes. [de Neufville, 1990, p.397] This is often acceptable, bUl in many
cases the attributes of interest interact in a way which can alter the decision-nlakers
preferences, or utility functions.
One can extend utility theory to cover multiple attributes through the use of an
extended utility model in an effort to capture these interactions. "In Principal, the utility
over many attributes incorporating all relevant interactions, U(X), can be measured just as
the utility for any single characteristic, U(X i). One could define the utility of two
arbitrary reference points and then estimate the utility of all others with respect to them."
[de Neufville, 1990, p.399] The basic problem with the extended utility model is that it
would require so much data as to make it useless for practical problems. For exanlple, if
each of N attributes serving as criteria can be described by a utility function with M data
poin:s, then the multi-dimensional utility function will be described by ~1N points. The
additive model described earlier would have added N curves of M points each for a total
of only MxN points by comparison. It is also conceptually difficult for people to
understand and provide consistent responses to nlulli-dinlcnsional conlparisons of 1110re
than two attributes. An alternative approach is the use of the Keeny-Raiffa Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory model.
169
6.2.2.2 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT)
~1ulti-Attribute Utility Theory, or MAUT, seeks to reduce the number of
calculations required to address several attributes as compared to the extended utility
model, while at the same time permitting some degree of interaction between the
attributes. It will be shown that MAUT is more an extension of the additive utility model
than a reduction of the extended utility model. The nunlber of points to be measured in
MAUT is linearly related to the number of attributes rather than exponentially related as
was the case for the extended utility model. Two assumptions regarding the way a person
values the interaction between attributes allow a considerable reduction in the number of
calculations that are necessary. [de Neufville, 1990, p.402] These are the assumptions of
preferential independence alld utility independence. Preferential independence states that
the ordinal ranking of preferences over any pair of attributes is independent of the other
attributes. Utility independence states that the indifference between a lottery and a
certainty equiv2!ent for any attribute does not depend on the levels of the other attributes.
[de Neufville, 1990, p.405] While the additive utilit}, model allowed for no interaction
between attributes, and the extended utility model allowed for any interaction between
attributes at a high computational cost, MAUT allows for interaction of pairs of attributes
so long as this interaction is not further preferentially influenced .by a third attribute.
Note also that the discussion centers on independence of preferences, rather than on
functional dependencies. Utility independence is generally satisfied when preferential
independence exists. [de Neufville, 1990, p.407] "Situations in which preferential
independence does not hold can often be circumvented once detected. This can be done
either by eliminating all alternatives with levels of an attribute that fall below a
threshold...or by refonnatting the problem." [de Neufville, 1990, p.405]
The mechanics of MAUT are described in detail in many texts. The key points
are reviewed here for the purposes of making comparisons to the AHP and to provide the
required background for the development of a model for evaluating design change
proposals. Of particular interest is illustrating the way in which interaction between
parameters is addressed.
The multi-attribute utility function U(X) is defined as
KU(X) + I = fl(KkjU(X) + 1)
where
• U(X) is scaled from 0 to 1 when all x are at their worst and best levels
• U(XJ are one-dimensional utility functions, similarly scaled for each attribute
• k, are scaling factors for each attribute
• K is a normalizing parameter
In essence, MAUT is similar to the additive nl0del being the weighted SUI11 of" the
one-dimensional utilities nl0dified by additional terms to account for the interaction
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between attributes. For the two attribute case, the multi-attribute utility function can be
expressed as
which clearly illustrates that the interaction of Xl and X2 is reflected through the product
in the last term. The individual U(X i ) are measured through the use of lottery equivalents
as was described earlier keeping U(X j.) = 0 and U(X j ') = 1. The nonnalizing factor K is
solved for by setting all the U(X i) to 1, at which time U(X) must also be 1;
K + I = O(Kk j +1)
For the two dimensional case;
As was mentioned previously, the MAUT is the additive model with factors to account
for interactions. This is seen in the above, as when the sum of the ki is equal to 1, K is
eliminated and the formula for U(X) is identical to the additive model.
A key question is what is represented by t!1e scaling factors ki, and how are they
obtained. "Each ki is the multi-attribute utility of the best level of its attribute i, when all
the other attributes Xj , 'j "* i', are at their worst levels." [de Neufville, 1990, p.410] This
is a direct interpre~ation of the MAUT function, since when U(X i) == 1.0, its contribution
to U(X) is ki - The scaling factors are solved for through the use of additional indifference
statements such that
(Xi" Xj .) -- (X', Pj; X.) represents a "corner point"
Having established the scaling factors k!, one calculates the normalizing paranleter K as
discussed earlier. Once this has been accomplished, they are combined with the
individuak U(X j ) through the MAUT function to determine the multi-attribute utilities.
These multi-attribute utilities can be used in conjunction with formal decision analysis as
previously discussed, or used alone as an evaluation tool.
6.2.2.3 The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)
While MAUl is highly normative through its axioms, the Analytic l-lierarchy
Process is a more descriptive approach to decision modeling \vhich is not as restrictive
and in practice is found to be nlore intuitive and representative of the \vay decision-
makers tackle problems. It provides a structured approach, which utilizes fanliliar
concepts, for dealing with problems \vhich are too large for a decision-1l1akcr to address.
The Analytic Hierarchy Process, developed by Saaty, lo'reflects people's tendency toward
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relative judgments, and the inclination to organize complex goal structures in hierarchical
clusters. The method's comparative advantage hence lies in areas too fuzzy, too
unstructured, or too political for traditional techniques which require that measurement
scales be made explicit." [Schoemaker, Waid, 1982, p.183] "l'he AHP is based on the
innate human ability to use information and experience to estimate relative magnitudes
through paired comparisons. These comparisons are used to construct ratio scales on a
variety of dimensions both tangible and intangible. Arranging these dimensions in a
hierarchic structure or network structure allows a systematic procedure to organize our
basic reasoning and intuition by breaking down a problem into its smaller constituent
parts." [Saaty, 1994, p.5] While MAUT utilizes ordered metric scales, the AHP is based
on ranking alternatives in tenns of relative ratio scales.
Utility theory and MAUT assess preferences through the use of statements related
to certainty and lottery equivalents, seeking to determine decision-makers indifference
between outcomes of certain probabilities. The AHP utilizes three basic Principals to
model a decision-making problem nlaking use of a ratio scale rather than probabilistic
indifference statements. "The decomposition Principal calls for structuring the hierarchy
to capture the basic clements of the problem. The Principal of comparative judgment
calls for setting up a Inatrix to carry out pairwise comparisons of the relative importance
of the elements in a level with respect to the elements in the level immediately above it.
This matrix is used to generate a ratio scale. Finally the Principal of synthesis of
priorities is used to generate the global or composite priority of the elements at the lowest
level of the hierarchy." [Harker, Vargas, 1987, p.1384]
The Analytic Hierarchy Process is based on a set of primitive notions and axioms.
The first primitive notion relates to the existence of attributes and states that for a finite
set A of n elements called alternatives, there is another finite set C of c properties,
attributes or criteria with which the elements of A are compared. The second primitive
notion is known as the "binary relation." This primitive notion calls the comparison of
two objects according to a property a "binary comparison." A set of binary relations are
established to describe the outcomes of binary comparisons. These relations are >c
representing "rnore preferred than with respect to property c" and --c representing
"indifferent to according to property c." The third primitive notion is at the heart of the
AHP. It assumes the existence of a fundamental scale that all properties can be mapped
into. Simply stated, for every pair of alternatives in the set A, a positive real nunlber can
be assigned that represents the relative intensity with which an individual perceives a
property to be in one element in relation to another element. This pritnitive notion
assumes the existence of the ratio scale, which represents a perception that one elenlcnt
has a greater intensity of an attribute than another. It is this ratio scale and the
measurement of intensity of preference that allows intangibles to be i11casured. 'loIn the
paired comparison approach of the AHP one estilnates ratios by using a fundanlcnlal
scale of absolute numbers. In comparing two alternatives with respect to an attribute, one
uses the smaller or lesser as the unit for that attribute." [Saaty, 1994, p.69]
Saaty defined four axioms based on these primitive notions. The first is the
reciprocal condition. Given any two alternatives, the intensity of preference of Ai over Aj
is inversely related to the intensity of preference of Aj over AI. l~hus a 111atrix of
preferences of all AI,Aj would be reciprocal about the diagonal. l~hc second axionl deals
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with homogeneity. Paraphrased it states that given a hierarchy 1-1 where x is a member of
that hierarchy and also a member of a particular level Lk within that hierarchy, all the
elements y on the level below, Lk+ l , which are being compared against x are of a
comparable order of magnitude which can be compared using a bounded scale. The third
axiom deals with dependency and requires two definitions. Set A is defined as being
"outer dependent" on a set C if a fundamental scale (ratio scale) can be defined on A with
respect to every ceC. Given that A is outer dependent on C, the elements of A are
defined as "inner dependent" with respect to ceC jf for some aeA, A is outer dependent
on a. Outer dependence is the dependence of an alternative on an attribute. It is the
degree or intensity to which that attribute is present in the alternative. [Saaty, ]991, p.5]
Inner dependence, or the dependence of an alternative on another alternative, is the
influence, contribution or impact of the second alternative on the first 'Nith respect to an
attribute they have in common. [Saaty, 1991, p.6] The third axiom states that given a
hierarchy H with levels L1, L2, ... Lh; Lk+] is outer dependent on Lk; Lk+ 1 is not inner
dependent with respect to all x that are elements of Lk; and Lk is not outer dependent on
Lk+ l • Simply stated, this axiom says that comparisons in a hierarchy structure are possible
when a set of elements Lk+ 1 is to be compared in terms of an element in the next highest
level. [Harker, Vargas, 1987, p.1386] In other words, paired comparisons of the relative
intensity of preference of two alternatives are made with respect to elements of the level
above, and the intensity of this preference should not be dependent on another element.
The basic problem with a hierarchy is to seek understanding at the highest levels from
interactions of the various levels of the hierarchy rather than directly from the elements of
the levels. [Saaty, 1996 (1), p.I3] Two properties of a hierarchy levei which have strong
overlap should be grouped together as a single more general property for the comparison.
[Saaty, ]996 (1), p.29]
A hierarchy is a particular type of system, which is based on the
assumption that the entities...can be grouped into disjoint sets, with the
entities of one group influencing the entities of only one other group... ,
and being influenced by the entities of only one other group. The
elements in each group (also called level, cluster, stratum) of the
hierarchy are assumed to be independent. If there is dependence
among them we study independence and dependence separately and
combine the two... [Saaty, 1996 (1), p.] 1]
When this axiom is violated, hierarchical composition is not appropriate and a
"super matrix" network approach is required. This is described in more detail later. It
should be noted that while the axiom implies certain types of dependence nlust be
avoided in a hierarchical composition, there is a degre.e of dependence between
alternatives that is inherent to the AHP due to the nature of pairwise comparisons and the
nonnalization that is used in some of the AHP calculations. This is discussed later as it
relates to the distributive mode of the AHP. It is often difficult to know \vhen the
Principal of hierarchic composition is violated. In practice., one must ensure that the
criteria represented are independent or at least sufficiently different, and that these
differences can be captured as independent properties in the level. [Saaty, 1996 (1), p.30]
]t should be noted that inner dependence in the AHP is defined as being relative to an
attribute. Two elements are inner dependent relative to an attribute that is part of a higher
level.
The fourth axiom is called the axiom of expectations. "Assume that a decision
maker has a ranking, arrived at intuitively, of a finite set of alternatives A with respect to
prior knowledge of criteria C. He may have expectations about rank order." [Saaty, 1996
(I), p.A-9] The fourth axiom of expectations states that all criteria and alternatives are
represented in the hierarchy and assigned priorities compatible with expectations.
Essentially it states that the hierarchy must be representative of the problem, and that the
criteria used must be appropriate for the alternatives in the hierarchy. This axiom simply
states that the hierarchy must be constructed carefully to reflect the behavior one wishes
to model.
Pairwise cOlnparisons of all Ai and Aj with respect to a criterion c are symbolized
by Pc(A i, Aj ) and result in a reciprocal matrix
all al1 ... a1n
A = a21 a:n ··· a2n
Psychometric research has detennined a 9 point scale useful in converting semantic
expressions of relative magnitude to quantities used ill a ratio scale. For example, it has
been established that people can only respond meaningfully to comparisons involving 7
+/- 2 items in a simultaneous comparison. [Miller, 1956 frorn Saaty, 1996 (1), p.57]
When intangibles are being considered, the scale recomnlended by Saaty is as shown in
Table 6.0.
In a simple hierarchy, a set of criteria C is pairwise compared with respect to
contribution to a goal. Alternatives are then pairwise compared with respect to their
intensity of preference with respect to the criteria C. This forms a number of matrices as
above. The local priorities of alternatives with respect to a criteiion are determined
through the principal eigenvector of the matrix. Methods for calculating this eigenvector
are available in mathematical texts and most spreadsheet programs can perform those
operations. Once the elements of each level have been pairwise compared to the elements
of the preceding level, with the subsequent matrices and eigenvectors established, it is
necessary to synthesize the infonnation to go from local priorities to global priorities and
preferences which will rank the alternatives against the goal. This generally involves
normalizing the eigenvectors to unity to establish what is known as the priority vector.
A variety of methods exist for synthesizing the judgments depending on whether
rank reversal is pennissible. Rank reversal occurs under sonle approaches because the
addition or change to an alternative changes the overall prioritization by altering the
distribution of weights. In some circumstances this is appropriate and in others it is not.
A great debate has raged in the literature for years regarding this subject and it is not the
purpose of this research to bring that debate to conclusion. Alternative approaches will
be discussed here with some thoughts as to what is appropriate for the problenl at hand.
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INTENSITY
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
DEFINITION
Equal Importance
Weak
Moderate
~Aoderate Plus
Strong
Strong Plus
Very Strong
Very, Very Strong
Extreme Imponance
EXPLANATION
T\vo activities contribute equally to the objective
Experience and judgment sl ightly favor one
Experit:nce and judgment strongly favor one
An activity is favored very strongly over another
The evidence favoring one activity over another is
of the highest possible order of affirmation
TABLE 6.0 - AHP 9 POINT SCALE
One approach is known as the rank preserving absolute mode. In this approach,
alternatives are not pair-wise compared relative to criteria, but are instead directly
assigned a value relative to criteria based on a predetennined standard scale. Thus
alternatives can be assessed one at a time and the addition or deletion of alternatives does
not alter the rank. These scales are referred to as intensity scales that assign relative
weights to semantic or objective measures of the attribute relative to each alternative. No
pair-wise comparis0ns are made, and no ratio scales are used except in the determination
of the ranking of the criteria themselves. In this case, the overall weight of the i1h
alternative is supplied by
m
w· = ~ V/.. X·I £..J IJ J
j = 1
where xj is the weight of the jlh criterion as deternlined by the eigenvector of the matrix of
pairwise comparisons between criteria, and w ij is the rating of the ill' alternative for the jlh
criteria as detennined through assignment of a value on the intensity scale. Thus the
absolute mode is a simple weighted additive model whicn establishes the weights of the
criteria tluough the pairwise comparison eigenvector approach. This approach requires
that the decision-maker be able to establish the intensity scales and directly score the
alternatives relative to each criterion. The AHP was developed based on the idea of pair-
wise conlparisons and the ratio scale as a means of comparing alternatives and evaluating
them relative to criteria without necessarily being able to establish a unit of measure for
the criteria. In essence the alternatives thenlselves become the units by \vhich
measurements are made. This is illustrated through the distributive and ideal nl0des. The
ideal mode allows rank preservation to be guaranteed while still utilizing relative
measurement which does not require the development of an intensity scale.
In standard relative measurement \vhere the alternatives are pair\vise conlpared as
discussed earlier, the weight of the ilh alternative after nornlalization is given by the
distributive mode calculation as follows.
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m n
Wi = L wij(xj/L W ij)
j = 1 i=l
where the overall \veight of an alternative is subject to change if the number of
alternatives changes. "The distributive mode produces preference scores by nonnalizing
tlle performance scores; it takes the performance score re{;eived by each alternative and
divides it by the sum of the performarlce scores of all alternatives under that criterion.
This means that with the distributed mode the preference for any given altenlative would
go up if we reduced the performance score of any other alternative or if we removed other
alternatives." [Millet, Saaty, 1996, p.186] Under the distributed mode, one must be
careful that the addition of an alternative does not change the decision-maker's attitudes
about the problem and reveal additional criteria. Often this is the case, and the addition
of these criteria will prevent rank changes. This is the crux of the axiom related to
expectations that was discussed earlier.
In addition, when relative measurement is desired but rank reversal is not, the
ideal mode of the AHP can he used. Under this mode, "adding a new alternative requires
only that it be compared with the highest ranking one. Adding an alternative that ranks
lowest on all the criteria would not affect the ranks of the other alternatives. Adding a
higher ranking alternative on some criterion would become the ideal and could cause
change in the other ranks. However, such an occurrence is admissible." [Saaty, 1994,
p.141] The ideal mode detennines the preference for an alternative under each criterion
by comparing its performance to a fixed benchmark, generally the best available
alternative under each criterion. The final weight reflects how close an alternative is to
performing "best" on a given criterion. This is represented by
m n n
w· = " w..(x./" w..)/(max w..//" w ..)1 L.... IJ J ~ IJ IJ L.... IJ
j=1 i=l i i=1
which simplifies to the un-normalized
m
Wi = L wijxj/max W ij
j ~ 1 i
The most recent and reasonable guidelines were published in a paper presented at
the 1996 International Symposium for the AHP. It is suggested that the distributive
mode should be used when the decision-maker is concerned with the extent to \vhich each
alternative dominates all other alternatives under the criterion while the ideal nlode
should be used when the decision-maker is concerned \vith the extent to which each
alternative performs \vell relative to a fixed benchmark. [Millet, Saaty ~ 1996, p.186]
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These are testable conditions. If the decision-maker indicates that the preference for a top
ranked alternative under a given criterion would improve if the perfonnance of any lower
ranked alternative was adjusted downward, then the distributive mode is prescribed.
Some have suggested that the ideal mode is nonnative while the distributive mode is
descriptive. The absolute mode is not often used in practice any longer since the
introduction of the ideal mode. In evaluating alternatives it may often be interesting to
explore both the ideal and distributive results.
Since the AHP is more descripiive than normative, it allows for inconstancy in the
judgments of the decision-maker. Saaty suggests that an inconsistency of 10% or less is
reasonable. The consistency ratio is used to determine if one is below this threshold 10%.
The consistency index is defined as (Amax-n)/(n-l) where n is the number of activities
(columns or rows in a square matrix) and Ama.'( is the principal eigenvalue (calculable as
described in numerous texts). The random index is the consistency index of a randomly
generated reciprocal matrix from the scale 1 to 9 (or the scale used in the AHP model if
different) for the same n. A table of average R.I for a large sample of runs for various n
is available in AI-IP books. The consistency ratio is then the ratio of the two indices and
compares the consistency index with what the index would be on average for a consistent
(i.e. p~rfectly reciprocal) matrix.
The steps to apply the AHP presented so far can be summarized as follows.
• Describe the problem, its key characteristics, and define an objective or goal
• Define and focus the goal as clearly as possible
• Define criteria that influence the behavior of the problem and contribute to the goal
• Brainstonn criteria or attributes
• Group like criteria and combine to avoid overlaps where necessary
• Structure a hierarchy avoiding dependency between elements
• Criteria
• Sub-Criteria
• Alternatives
• If alternatives are of widely disparate nlagnitudes, group into more homogeneous
components
• Carefully define the meaning of each criterion
• determine which can be measured directly and quantifiably
• detennine which must be measured subjectively
• establish the appropriate metrics
• Test for dependencies (discussed later)
• Develop questions to elicit pair\vise comparisons for criteria
• Perform pairwise comparisons for the contribution of the criteria to the goal
• Establish the correct evaluation mode
• Develop questions to elicit pairwise comparisons bet\vcen sub-elements and
alternatives
• Perfonn the pairwise comparisons
• Use the appropriate calculation mode (ideal or distributive)
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• Test for constancy and redefine ifnecessary
• Perfonn sensitivity analysis
In developing questions regarding criteria and performing pairwise comparisons,
some have found it useful to establish ranges over which alternatives can vary on a given
criteria. This provides context for the questirJns and generally makes it easier for the
decision-maker to perform the comparisons. If two "dummy" alternatives are added to
the model representing the top of the ra.tlge for each criteria and the bottom of the range
for each criteria, then rank reversal can also be avoided as long as the criteria are
difference independent as was described in the discussion regarding utility theory. [Dyer
1990, p.256]
An interesting dynamic extension of the AHP involves mapping a preference
trajectory with respect to a variable such as time. This can prove useful in establishing an
implementation strategy. An AHP model is developed where the criteria and preferences
are dependent on a parameter such as time that is not included in the hierarchy itself. One
repeats the AHP analysis for several iterations representing a change in the control
variable. An example provided by Saaty illustrates the changing priorities of a person
throughout life with regard to socializing, career and family. This extension would be
useful in establishing and exploring preferred alternatives where timing is a key variable.
Such an approach should also be applicable to utility theory.
It should also be noted that the AHP allows for multiple decision makers. This is
critical to a decision model f\>f use in managing change proposals, as it has previously
been demonstrated in this research that COllsensus and participation are features of the
process. Multiple decision makers can be admitted in a variety of ways, ranging from
detenninistic to stochastic. Statistically based approaches may be appropriate when
decisionmakers are scattered and represent different interests, the group is large, and
unable to discuss the problem at hand. In such situations each decisionmaker may be
operating under differellt assumptions with incomplete information. It may be desirable
to examine the results and correlate them to parameters associated \vith the individuals.
On the other hand, "when a small group of individuals work closely together - interacting
and influencing each other, the deterministic approach is appropriate. We synthesize the
judgments mathematically." [Saaty; 1994, p.201] Synthesis can be made at the level of
the judgments themselves, the eigenvectors (priority vectors) associated with each
criteria, or the overall synthesized priorities (proposal ranking and weighting). One
detenninistjc approach utilizes multiple decisionmakers as part of the hierarchical
structure itself, thereby synt.hesizing at the level of the judgments. One adds a level to the
hierarchy representing the decision-nlakers and weights them as any other element. Thus,
one can distribute "power" among the decision makers disproportionately or equally.
This ability to synthesize judgments of multiple decision-makers directly within the
model structure sets the AHP apart from MAUl or other approaches. The AHP is
descriptive and allows some inconsistency, which is virtually guaranteed in group
decision-making. Because MAUT is normative and does not permit inconsistency, it
cannot synthesize group decisions. It is simply not possible to construct a valid group
utility function that we can apply to collective decision rnaking. [de l\leufville., 1990,
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p.431] The procedure recommended for group decision-making by MAUT practitiollers
is to model the system, define the non-inferior options, determine individual preferences,
explore trade-offs and negotiate to\vard a collectively satisfactory solution. [de Neufville,
1990, p.446] AHP is well suited for such exploration. When equal significance is given
to members of a decisionmaking or survey group, the individual results can be combined
using the geometric mean at either the eigenvector or global synthesis level. "When
equal importance is given to voters in a group, Aczel and Saaty published a result which
incorporated and extended Saaty's derivation of the geometric mean as the proper way for
synthesizing the judgments." [Saaty, 1994, p.203] The geometric mean was shown to be
superior to the simple average or otller aggregation methods because:
• It tended to result in aggregations which more closely modeled known quantities
when synthesizing estimates
• ft is an identical result to including decisionmakers in a hierarchy with equal
weighting
• It satisfies the reciprocal property such that the synthesis of the reciprocal of
individual judgments is the same as the reciprocal of the synthesis of the individual
judgments
• It satisfies a seperability condition such that the influences of the individual
judgments can be isolated
• It satisfies a unanimity, or consensus, condition such that if all individuals give the
same judgment X, the synthesized result is also X
• It satisfies a homogeneity condition such that if all individuals weight one alternative
X greater than another, the synthesized result will also weight the same alternatives
by the same ratio
• It satisfies power conditions such that the synthesis of powers of individual judgments
will be identical to the power of the synthesis of the individual judgments. This
distinguishes the geometric mean from the simple average and is important to
preserve the integrity of the capability to perform operations on a ratio scale.
As rnpntioned earlier, when there is significant dependency between elements of
interest, the supermatrix approach must be used. This approach is described in detail in a
number of Saaty's books. In sonle instances, the supennatrix can be avoided by carefully
structuring the problem such that all dependency is between elements of different levels.
When this is not the case, the supermatrix approach should be used to capture influence
among elements. In this case, a network could be considered to be more representative
than an hierarchy.
When the criteria weights depend on the alternatives, and the alternative weights
depend on the criteria, we have an example of a hierarchy with feedback. The
supennatrix approach could be used in this case since the 3xiom of independence is
violated. It has been shown that this feedback can also be acconlmodated by perfOri11ing
the AHP analysis twice, once from the bottom up and then fronl the top down, thereby
giving the decision-maker an opportunity to undersland what the alternatives are before
setting the criteria weights. [Foreman, 1991]
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The supermatrix approach is more useful when there is inner dependence between
the elements of a level rather than depe.ndence between the levels themselves. '''Inner
dependence needs common attributes or criteria to determine \vhere there is dependence.
The attributes must belong to another component.'~ [Saaty, Takizawa, 1986, p.233] In
other words, inner dependence in the AHP is defined as being relative to an attribute. If
two elements are suspected of being dependent, but that dependency is not relative to
another attribute, it is not significant to the problem as it will not influence the evaluation.
To evaluate inner dependencies for a given level relative to an attribute of a higher level,
one creates a matrix with activities for each element and identifies within it which
elements influence others with respect to an attribute (with an 'x' for example). Such a
matrix is created with respect to each attribute in the higher levels.
The general framework for assessing inner dependence is as follows.
Alternatives are dependent according to where there is an 'x'. In that
case we can fill out reciprocal pairwise comparison matrices only with
respect to those alternatives on which a given alternative depends with
respect to a given attribute. Zeros are assigned to the eigenvector
weights of the alternatives from which a given alternative is
independent. ..Each eigenvector is then weighted by the independence
priorities A)(C),...,An(C) without regard to its dependence on others.
Tile results are composed over the alternatives yielding the final
interdependence. [Saaty, Takizawa, 1986, p.233]
The steps in summary are as presented in the paper by Saaty and Takiwaza;
"'Dependence and Independence: From Linear Hierarchies to Nonlinear Networks":
• determine the criteria weights assuming no dependence (WI)
• detennine the column eigenvectors with respect to each criterion
comparing the alternatives as usual assuming no dependence
• Analyze the interdependence of the criteria with respect to the goal using
pairwise comparisons fonning the Inatrix W3
• Deal with dependt:;i1ce among the alternatives or next lower level sin1ilarly
relative to each criterion or element of the level above
• Synthesize the interdependence priorities oflhe criteria as We = ,,"'] X WI
• The priorities of the alternatives, Wa ,with respect to each of th~ criteria
are given by synthesizing the column eigenvectors with respect to each
criterion with the matrices representing the interdependence of the
alternatives with respect to each criterion. Each synthesis (cross product)
forms a column of the matrix Wa•
• The overall priorities of the alternatives are yielded through Wa X We
In practice, independence is often assumed to avoid all the additional
computational effort. In general, assuming independence provides a reasonable facsinlile
model of which decision-makers are typically happy with. This is evidenced by the
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numerous case studies in the literature which ignore any dependency. It is not always the
case that such a model is close enough; dependency should always be checked, and the
model 'arefully formed accordingly.
6.3 SVNOPSIS AND C·OI\IPARJSON OF ME"fHODS
The next concern is to establish which approaches are most appropiiate for
evaluating alternative change proposals, keeping in mind the problems which operations
research and decision science have faced in practice as describerl at the beginning of the
Chapter. Several decision science researchers have reviewed alternative methods to
detennine which are appropriate under given conditions, particularly for the justification
of R&D type projects. For example, Fahrni and Spatig have suggested that all the
available decision and operations research models are useful to some degree and that
what is important is that "one takes into account successively ho\v far the selection
paraITleters can be quantified, how far one project interferes with or depends on
completion of a.nother, whether a project has one or more than one objective, and the
degree of::.;ceptable risk." [Fahrni, Spatig, 1990, p.155]
A set of key quality characteristics is necessary which describe the needs of
decision modeling tools for evaluating design change proposals. The bcnchnlarking
questionnaire results and shipyard interviews undertakell suggest that key quality
ch~racteristics of a decision system for the purpose at h~nd include (in no particular
order):
• Speed of evaluation
=> Of great concern in practical applications.
• Flexibility
=:> New information or "what if' type questions should be readily and quickly
dealt with.
• Ability to structure the problem and fac!litate identifying core values and objectives
=> The quality of the decision requires alignnlent with a strategic purpose.
• Ability to structure the problem and facilitate identifying additional alternatives
=> The evaluation process should serve not only to choose anl0ng given
alternatives, but also to spark creativity and innovation which nlay lead to
even better altematiYes.
• Intuitive appeal to decision-makers
=> The approach must be understandable. The underlying details need not be
completely understood as long as the input~ output, and relationships are clear.
The model should represent as closely as possible the \vay in \vhich people
think about the problem and should seenl "'nat~ral." The 1l10rC '~natural''l the
approach, the easier it \vill be to inlplcI11cnt and integrate into the C0l11pany
processes, procedures, and organization.
• Ahility to elinlanatc inferior solutions quickly
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=> Valuable effort should not be expended collecting data related to an inferior
a'temative. The decision system must be able to identify alternatives \vhich
fail to meet threshold criteria and shoulci no longer be considered or must be
modified to eliminate the failure.
• Ability to rank (order) non-inferior solutions
• Ability to weight non-inferior solutions
=::) In addition to priority ranking alternatives, the model should weight their
relative importance or contribution to the company's overall strategy or goal.
Tllis allovls alternatives to be compared. WithcJut such a weighting, it
becomes difficult to make decisions assr :iated with CJllocating resources.
• Ability to address multiple criteria and objectives
• Ability to address dependency between elements
• Ability to consider quantitative data
• Ability to consider qualitative data
• Ability to synthesize group decisions
=> The model needs to be able to incorporate data from a variety of sources. It
should also provide a means for allowing a number of people to evaluate the
alternatives and then synthesize their judgments.
The AHP performs better against many of these characteristics than other
alternative evaluation techniques. The AHP results in a faster and more intuitive analysis
which is useful ifl building consensus. The management of change is largely about
managing expectations and perceptions, and involves numerous stakeholders with
differing perspectives. The AHP is uniquely suited to that type of problem. The
hierarchical structure of the AHP is entirely consistent with the concepts of conlpetency
m~pping and strategic planning discussed in Chapters 2.0 and 5.0. The opportunity for
near seamless integration of the AHP with the strategic planning process lIsed to establish
goals and identify alternatives suggests that the AHP is \vell suited for developing a
decision model for managing design change.
Earlier research perfonned through the NSRP supports the AI-IP as an
advantageous approach. The 1992 SP-4 project "Developnlent of Producibility
Evaluation Criteria" concluded
There are several very important advantages to the use of the AHP
method. One is that this technique has a rigorous methodological
basis...Another advantage of the AHP is that this process can make use of
"hard" numerical data when it is available...But if hard data is not
available or the different attributes that must be considered cannot be
measured in common units, this technique is still effective...The validation
tests have yielded results that arc consistent \vith the findings of the
shipyards from \\'hie11 the design alternatives \vere obtained. [Wilkens~
Kraine, Thonlpson, 1992]
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This conclusion is also supported in the literature regarding evaluation of R&D proposals.
As managers tend to accept only methods which they can basically
understand, difficult and sophisticated selection models are hardly
considered valuable in R&D project selection. Therefore we emphasize
deterministic rather than stochastic modeling, and strongly favour decision
processes where both risk and uncertainty are assessed in qualitative
tenns. [Fahrni, Spatig, 1990, p.159]
Skibniewski and Chao came to a similar conclusion regarding the relative
complexity of AHP and MAU'f which they summarized well in their research regarding
alternative approaches to the evaluation of adaptation of advanced technology in the
construction industry. They wrote
Since a decision maker bases judgments on knowledge and experience,
then mak~s most decisions accordingly, the AI-IP approach agrees well
with the behavior of a decision maker. The strength of this approach is
that it organizes tangible and intangible factors in a systcmRtic manner,
and provides a structured yet relatively simple solution...The use of utility
theory in evaluation problems to help decision making is already a weJl-
known fonnal appr0ach. However, [he decision-making models based on
utility theory necessitate the establishment of utility functions representing
the decision maker's value scales for different criteria or goals. Often in a
given decision-making situation, the utility functions are difficult to
fonnulate and develop precisely enough to represent a particular decision
maker's perception of the impact and value of a certain outcome. Further,
the use of these models requires extensive effort to collect information for
estimating possible outcomes on each nlultidinlensional criterion. This is
often a costly, time-consuming process. Also, the inflexibility of this
approach causes difficulty in adapting to changes in either the attributes or
the utilities of the model. [Skibniewski, Chao, 1992, p.578]
In the next Chapter the Analytic Hierarchy Process is used to develop a decision
model for evaluating and prioritizing proposals.
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7.0 DEVELOPING AND TESTING THE MODEL
In the previous discussion the AHP was established as the methodology of choice
for the problem of evaluating and ranking alternative change proposals. In this sect;on an
AHP application to evaluating alternative design change proposals is developed within
the context of an overall decision system. W. Sauder of the University of Pittsburgh
illustrates the range of project selection activities which can occur when faced with
project proposals. [Sauder, 1980, p.138] His approach is illustrated in figure 7.0.
Terminated
Projects
Completed
Pr<. jects
FIGURE 7.0 - f'ROJECT SELECTION DECISION PROCESS
The approach de~cribed by Sauder is representative of tlte evaluation and
prioritization stages of the design change franle\Vork, as the selection of productivity
enhancing design change proposals is a specific case of project selection. In this section.
first the IliOdcl parameters are defined and the AHP 111odel's hierarchy is established.
Next the general fornl of the AHP nlodel is discussed. Issues associated \vith screening
':.,. ."'f.:~. .
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are discussed followed by evaluation and prioritization. Finally, utilizing one of the
shipyards as an industrial lab, the applicability and results of the model are tested.
7.1 MODEL PARAMETERS AND HIERARCHY
The objective of the model is [0 ra'lL and weight feasible alternatives with respect
to their capacity to contribute to the goal "enhance shipyard competitiveness."
Throughout the previous discussions in this Chapter, reference was made to benefits,
costs and risks. Benefits, costs and risks represent the highest level of criteria which a
decision model must consider. These three high level parameters can be further described
in tenns of lower level criteria. 'These three high level criteria are well recognized within
the decision analysis community as an effective means to describe the contribution of a
proposal to the success of a business as a whole. The use of these three parameters
allows the decision model to structure the problem in a nleaningful way which is
conceptually simple and intuitively understood by n1anagement. It is also consistent \vith
the conclusions and methods of Chapters 2.0 and 5.0 rer,arding the development of
parameters based upon strategic responses to the competitive environment.
The Construction Industry Institute (ell) concluded in their publication "Project
Change Management" that "the engineering and construction industry in general does a
poor job of measuring and analyzing the impact of changes on project costs and other
project outcomes," and that "changes should be evaluated against the business drivers and
success criteria for the project in order to minimize the negative impacts on critical
objectives." Business drivers and success criteria are associated with benefit, cost and
risk. "Each alternative must be analyzed and evaluated in terlns of its value [benefit],
cost and risk characteristics." [Souder, 1980, p.20]
A variety of sources were utilized to identify the appropriate paranleters to use in
the nlodel. As was discussed in Chapter 4.0, several sllipyards participated in this
research by filling out a number of questionnaires and made their process and procedure
manuals available for review. In the course of this review, a nunlber of metrics were
identified. Although not all the shipyards used the same language or identified all of the
same metrics, they all relate in some way to costs, benefits and risks. Some shipyards'
procedures seek to quantify metries at a detailed level. Others, in an effort to speed the
process and in recognition of the subjective and imprecise nature of nlany inlportant
metrics, utilize scales to quantify subjective measures. In addition to the process and
procedure manuals, MIL-STD-973 (Configuration Managenlent) was reviewed. This
standard calls out a number of metrics which are also to be considered when eva]uating
change proposals in navy contracts. Many of these also appear in the shipyard process
and procedure manuals which have often been developed based upon this standard. In
addition, the Construction Industry Institute (ell) identifies change 111anagenlcnt 111ctrics
in a number of their recent reports, [CI, 1994] Prior work reported by the NSRP and in
the shipbuilding literature also served as a foundation for establishing 1110del paranlclcrs.
The 1992 project "Developlnent of Producibility Evaluation Criteria'" resulted in an
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example of an AHP application for evaluating the producibility of design alternatives.
Their research was different in focus and more limited in scope, but is directly applicable
here and was used as a reference for identifying additional appropriate parameters as well
as AHP model structure. The work of Bosworth and Graham, reported in 4-Producibility
as a Design Factor in Naval Ships", also identified metrics useful in evaluating proposals.
As discussed earlier, attention to organizational risks and needs is important in
predicting the success of proposal implementation. The Ship Design for Producibility
Workshop referenced earlier concluded that any proposed methodology must consider
issues associated with people, methods, processes and products in order to be successful.
Similarly, Souder suggests that some of the factors which must be considered in
evaluating alternatives include "the acceptability of the alternative to those who will
implement and use it" and "the changes in behavior patterns required if the alternative is
chosen". [Souder, 1980, p.21] For these reasons, the lessons learned from supporting
theory in the area of organizational change discussed in Chapter 3.0 were used to develop
additional model parameters, especially with respect to risks.
Three types of attributes, or parameters, are generally used in the development of
a decision model. [Keeney, 1992, p.l 01] These include natural, constructed and proxy
attributes. Natural attributes are in general use with common interpretation to everyone.
An example is man-hours for a given process. Constructed attributes are developed
specifically for a given context and may combine multiple natural attributes. Such
parameters utilize verbal descriptors \vhich are associated with a numerical value. An
example would be the five technology levels of the shipyard technology survey
popularized by Appledore as well as Storch et. al. Proxy attributes are used when a
parameter of interest cannot easily directly be measured. An example would be the use of
man-hours of production rework as a proxy for engineering quality. The proposed model
parameters are associated with the entire spectrum of attribute types. The mechanism of
the AHP, which utilizes direct pairwise comparisons, makes the underlying scales and
parameter types less significant than they would be if absolute measures were being used.
Later tIle use of constructed attributes for the development of a screening model \vill be
discussed.
The AHP model parameters are presented next follo\ved by an illustration of the
resulting model hierarchy. Ultimately, the hierarchy developed here evolved fronl the
synthesis of a variety of sources within the context of close participation with the
shipyard that acted as the industrial lab.
7.1.1 Benefits
The word benefit is defined in Webster's Dictionary as "son1cthing that is
advantageous or good; an advantage". The benefit of a particular proposal is defined as
the extent to vvhich it provides the organization competitive advantage. The I1leans to
achieving competitive advantage should be reflected in the goals and strategy of the
organization. l\S was discussed earlier, the first step to\vards quality 111anagen1cnt and
decisionnlaking is the clear definition of these goals. Thus the C0l11pctency 111ap
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discussed in Chapters 2.0 and 4.0 is used directly in the construction of the benefits
branch of the model hierarchy, linking it directly to the model of competitive advantage
discussed earlier in the research. hThe value of an alternative is measured in terms of its
contributions to the achievement of each of the goals [of the organization]. The value of
each alternative should be assessed in tenns of the benefits that can be expected to result
if it is chosen, and in terms of the regrets that can be suffered if it is not chosen." [Souder,
1980, p.20] The research described earlier in Chapter 4.0 regarding strategic planning
and the identification of alternatives, together with discussions with shipyard experts at
the "industrial lab", revealed that a proposed project would be considered to be
supportive of this shipyard's strategic objectives and therefore beneficial:
• If it reduced the cycle time or duration required to design and construct a ship
• If it reduced the total cost to produce a ship
• If it improved the perfonnance or quality of the ship in the eyes of the customer
These benefits are associated with sub-criteria model parameters and their relative
weights reflect shipyard strategic objectives.
Reduction of cycle time is a strategic objective which has value independent of
cost or quality. Cycle ~Ime refers to the total duration of a stage of construction
regardless of the number of man-hours actually worked or the costs incurred. It is
associated with labor hours, material handling time and any waiting or lost tinle
associated with tasks. Cycle time ultimately impacts market share and impacts on the
amount and type of work the shipyard can bid on. It is of keen interest to a custonler, and
the market demands increasingly shorter program durations.
P_~duced cycle time is generally believed to lead to lower costs, but also has value
independent of costs. For example while reducing labor content, and therefore manhours,
will always result in reduced cost it does not necessarily result in reduced cycle time.
The reduction of cycle time is dependent on whether the tasks being nlade easier are
actually on the critical path. If they are, a reduction in cycle time will occur in addition to
a reduction in costs. A shipyard ma)J choose a strategy which focuses heavily on
reducing cycle time without emphasizing reduced costs. A yard 1l1ay even be willing to
increase CO~lS (in the short run) to reduce cycle time (believed to have profit ilnplications
in the long run). It is all a matter of their conlpetitive position and the denlands of their
markets, made explicit through strategic planning.
Ship production can be described as taking place in a variety of stages. These
fann sub-criteria to reduced cycle time, as a shipyard may determine that reductions in a
particular stage are of greater strategic importance due to facility constraints or product
mix. It would not be necessary to utilize sub-criteria if a yard could readily evaluate the
impact on overall project cycle time, but experience has shown this to be difficult and that
breaking the problem down into stages of construction has proven useful for prioritizing
projects. It also allows shipyard strategy to be reflected more readily in the nl0dcl. As
the strategy changes the paranleter \veights can also be changed. For cxanlplc, a yard
may find that steel throughput is its critical path and may choose to focus nlore heavily
on projects that reduce durations in steel stages of construction. Eventually, outfitting
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may become a bottleneck, at which point a reassessment of the criteria weights would be
appropriate to reflect a changing shipyard strategy. The AHP approach facilitates this
continual reflection and accommodates changes in strategy readily.
For the purposes of developing the model, these stages are defined as:
• Engineering
• SOC I - Fabrication, Steel
• SOC 1 - Fabrication, Outfit
• SOC 2 - Sub Assembly (Steel)
• SOC 3 - Assembly, Steel
• SOC 3 - Assembly, Outfit
• SOC 4 - On - Unit Outfitting
• SOC 5 - On - Block Outfitting
• SOC 6 - On - Board
• SOC 7 - Test and Trials
Engineering here is synonymous \vith "'development" and could be further broken
into stages. For the purposes of this model it is included as a composite.
Dollar savings as a parameter represents the dollars associated with labor or
material content which the proposal will save. It is the intensity of preference for one
proposal over another with respect to the total dollar value of man-hour reduction,
substitution or reduction of material, and other proposal characteristics. It is independent
of dollars which are not due to labor or material content. Those that are associated \vith
reduced cycle time (such as incentives for meeting or beating schedule or costs associated
with time in the yard that are not directly linked to labor content or design features) are
considered when evaluating alternatives with respect to cycle time and the weight
allocated to that parameter.
Performance or Quality Improvement as a parameter is associated \vith a nU111ber
of sub-criteria which reflect perfonnance or quality features of importance to the o\vner.
The weights of these sub-criteria should reflect the "voice of the custonlcr" as it relates to
their desires. 'fhe weight of performance improvement in conlparison to cycle tinlC
reduction or dollar savings is a function of shipyard strategy and objectives. The
parameter reflects the intensity of preference for one proposal over another with respect
to improving performance.
7.1.2 Costs
Webster's Dictionary defines a cost as ''"the price paid to acquire, produce,
acconlplish, or maintain anything" and a ··sacrifice, loss or penalty~'. This basic definition
implies that the initial costs, follo\v on costs, and opportunity costs nll1st all be
considered. The following parameters \vere identified and used in this 1110del.
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Dol!ars Invested:
This parameter represen~s the intensity of the decisionmaker's aversion to the total cost,
in dollars, that is estimated to be required to impJement one proposal relative to another.
This should include consideration of non-recurring and recurring costs, labor, and
material.
Schedule Delay:
This parameter represents the intensity with '.vhich one alternative negalively impacts
schedule with respect to other alternatives. The dollar value of schedule delay is
generally very difficult if not impossible to predict. The interest here is the intensity of
the aversion to projects which impact schedule regardless of the estimated dollar
investment in the project. This parameter has also been associated with sub-criteria to
allow the strategic importance of certain stages to be accounted for.
Additional Manning Required:
The requirement for additional manpower by those involved in the implementation effort
represents a cost which is distinct frum budget and schedule. Ma.npower is a resource
which contributes to dollar costs, but is also an independent co~sideration of importance
to decisionmakers. Forcing an overtime situation, or addition of people to the team,
represents a destabilizing force which management would prefer to avoid but is difficult
to evaluate strictly in terms of dollars or schedule. The commitment of manpower nleans
that this resource is now unavailable to handle current workload or unforeseen
requirements. The necessity to consider manpower as a separate parameter was o1ade
clear during the industry surveys, as reported in Chapter 4.0. The weight associated with
this ~drameter represents an aversion to increased manpower requirements.
Additional Information Systems Resources Required:
The requirenlent for additional computer equipment or software represents a cost which
has significance :adependent of dollars invested. As v"as the case with manpower, this
requirement contributes to dollars invested, but is generally considered as an additional
parameter by management. The parameter represents the intensity with which one
proposal ties up (or requires acquisition of additional) information system resources as
compared to another resource.
Product Perforlnance or Quality:
This parameter represents the intensity with \vhich one proposal negatively itnpacts
product perfornlance or quality as conlpared to another proposal. As \vas the case in the
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discussion of benefits, it is a function of sub-criteria which are of importance to the
customer.
7.1.3 Risks
Webster's Dictionary defines a risk as "exposure to the chance of injury or loss."
Risk must be assessed both in tenns of the potential Inagnitude of the loss as well as the
likelihood of the loss. Risk can be described as a probability distribution which
associates possible magnitudes of loss with their likelihoods, if these probabilities are
known or can be estimated. A number of risk parameters were identified.
Cost Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity with which the costs estimated for a proposal nlay
have been underestimated. It is a measure of cost uncertainty with respect to the
cOlnbined impact of magnitude and likelihood. It is a representation of the intensity of
preference for one proposal over another with respect to their cost uncertainty.
Benefit Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity with which the benefits estimated for a proposal
may lJave been underestimated. It is a measure of benefit uncertainty with respect to the
combined impact of magnitude and likelihood. It is a representation of the ii1tensity of
preference for one proposal over another with respect to their benefit uncertainty.
Technical Risk:
Tllis parameter represents the intensity \vith which one proposal is preferable over
another with respect to the likelihood that the proposal may fail for technical reasons.
Organizational Support Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity of preference for one proposal over another with
respect to the likelihood that one may fail due to a lack of organizational support, despite
all other measures of merit being promising. This parameter is a function of a nunlber of
sub-criteria as follows.
The ~~Cultural" parameter represents the intensity with w~ich one proposal requires
changes in people's attitudes or daily work-habits as conlpared to another proposal. It
represents the itnpact that the change \vill have on people personally in the \vay they
conduct their daily work.
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The ""Visible Rapid Benefits'~ parameter represents the intensity with which a proposal is
believed to have highly visible short-term benefits as compared to anothe: proposal.
The ""Resource A vailability" parameter represenis the intensity of the uncertainty
associated with the availability of resources to implement one proposal as compared to
another.
HBreadth of Rework Required" represents the intensity of preference for one proposal
over another with respect to the number of documents and product models which will
require rework to implement the proposal.
HBreadth of Cooperation Required" represents the intensity of preference for one proposal
over another with respect to the degree of cooperation required by numerous people or
groups. It is a measure of the risks associated with the degree of communication and
cooperation which is required for a proposal to be successful.
"'Visible Support" represents the intensity of preference for one rroposal over another
with respect to the amount and quality ofvi:;ible management s~pport for the proposal.
The "Urgency, Strategy, Need" parameter measures the intensity of preference for
proposals which clearly are aligned with a communicated and understood strategy or
shipyard objective which the people or organizations tasked with implementation support.
"'Complexity & Capability" refers to the intensity of preference for proposals which do
not require knowledge or \vorkforce capabilities which are scarce or rnissing, and for
which the means and requirements for implementation are readily understood and
achiev:Ible.
"'Stability" refers to the intensity of preference for proposals which require action related
to processes or interim products which are standardized and understood, and by people or
groups which are not presently stressed by a high degree of change.
Regulatory Risk:
l~his parameter represents the intensity of preference for proposals which are less likely to
be delayed or rejected by regulatory bodies (or the customer).
Schedule Risk:
This paraoleter represents the intensity of preference for proposals which exhibit Jess
uncel1ainty \vith respect the both the magnitude and likelihood of schedule delays beyond
those estimated in the consideration of costs.
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7.2 MODEL FORM
Alternatives exist regarding how to model and synthesize judgments associated
with benefits, costs and risks. The approach generally recommended by Saaty is to model
benefits, costs and risks on three separate hierarchies, establish that benefits justify the
costs ~f alternatives via screening, and then prioritize according to the ratio of the
assigned priorities of B/(C*R). An alternative approach is to link the benefit, cost, and
risk hierarchies together into a single hierarchy with a global objective of improving
shipyard competitiveness. This approach strives to model differing preferences for
maximizing benefit, minimizing costs and minimizing risks associated with proposals by
pairwise comparing these high level criteria and synthesizing the results accordingly.
Both approaches have been used by practitioners in prioritizing projects. The principal
argument in favor of the first approach is that respondents often become preoccupied with
benefits, costs or risks and have difficulty providing consistent answers to pairwise
comparisons for all three categories at the same time. It has also been suggested that
answers to pairwise comparisons between the high level criteria of benefit, cost and risk
are not easily answered. The principal argument in favor of the second approach is that
benefit, cost and risk are not equally valued and that aversions to some of these
parameters can only be accounted for by modeling a single hierarchy.
In fact, the single hierarchy approach can be used, but the pairwise comparisons
can be broken into separate sessions to avoid pr~blems associated with preoccupation for
one paralneter or another biasing results. In the course of testing the application of the
model the difficulty in assessing preference for projects that maximize benefits \'s. those
that minimize costs or risks was found to be acute in the absence of any knowledge of the
proposals in question. This problem was found to be less significant if it was suggested
that proposals had first been screened against a set of baseline criteria and that those
under consideration met the criteria. If the AHP model parameters are \veighted equally,
the two approaches appear to result in the same ranking but different \veightings as
illustrated in figure 6.3. The BIeR approuch results in more extreme differences between
the priorities, but the ranks remain unchanged. The results of the industry survey
indicated that relative preference for benefit, cost and risk varied from yard to yard and
\vithin a yard. For this reason, the single hierarchy model \vas used to facilitate exploring
these differences and developing a strategic policy representing a consensus regarding
what types of proposals are necessary for a particular environment. The resulting model
is iilustrated in Figure 7.1.
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7.3 ApPLICATION AND TEST OF THE MODEL
As was mentioned previously, one of the shipyards involved in this research was
used as an "industrial lab" for the purposes of a test application of the model. This test
application consisted of three significant phases:
• Establislunent of criteria weights
• Evaluation of case study proposals
• i\nalysis of results and conclusions regarding the test application
Two additional surveys were used for this purpose. The first of these surveys was
intended to elicit the pairwise comparisons which would result in criteria weights. This
survey presented the hierarchy and parameter definitions to a set of respondents. The
surJey also addressed thresholds and goals, as a means for screening and providing the
necessary context suggested previously. Tllis survey also addressed tests for
dependencies between parameters. The results were used to synthesize group judgments
regarding the parameter weights. The second survey utilized a number of case studies as
alternative proposals to be evaluated by the model. Eight case studies based upon recent
(last t\\/O years) design improvement proposals ffOOl the same shipyard were utilized.
The respondents chosen were personnel knowledgeable of the cases. The proposals \vcrc
pairwise cor ,pared with respect to the parameters based upon the infornlation t.hat was
available some time ago, prior to decisions regarding their inlplementation. Respondents
\vere asked to "travel back in time" and put thenlselves back in that frame of nlind. Later,
the respondents would pairwise C0111pare the sallie set of proposals relative to all that is
194
known about them today. Appendix B provides additional background regarding the case
studies, as well as excerpts from the questionnaires.
The objectives of this excersise were t\vo-fold:
• Determine how applicable this decision modeling approach would be in practice
• Determine if the results of the decision nlodel adequately refiect quality
decisionmaking
7.3.1 Thresholds and Goals
Prior to establishing criteria weights, thresholds and goals \vere examined for
each of the model parameters. Respondents were asked when considering the benefits,
costs or risks of proposals, to describe the threshold level for each sub-criteria. These
threshold levels were intended to represent the minimum level of achievement accepted
to consider implementing a proposal. They were alst) asked to describe the goal level.
This represented a "stretch goal" or the best they \vould expect to see a proposal achieve.
These thresholds and goals would be useful in setting the context for the subsequent pair-
wise comparisons and would also aid in the development of a pre-prioritization screening
model. As will be sho\vn, establishing tight thresholds and goals for each of the nlodel
parameters was not trivial and the results did not yield explicit consensus. One of the
results of this excursus was a realization that thresholds and goals reflect shipyard policy
and consensus. It is the task of upper management to facilitate establishing such a policy.
A second result was the reaJization that thresholds and goals are not independent, and a
more appropriate approach would be to utilize constructed attributes which conlbine
parameters using a descriptive scale as described earlier. An example of such a
constructed attribute scale is the McCarthy preparedness scale presented in Chapter 2.0.
In an effort to establish the thresholds and goals, respondents \vere asked to
assume that the only cycle time reduction a proposal results in is for that particular stage.
~n setting the threshold and goal for "all stages" they were to consider the reduction they
would expect to see for any given proposal with respect to total construction cycle. These
were expressed as % improvement over current perfonnance. The ranges of results are
provided in Table 7.1. The responses ranged from "positive" representing any positive
value to an explicit percentage. With respect to dollar savings, the responses for goals
ranged from positive to $25,000. Goals ranged from $300,000 and higher. Perfornlance
improvement goals were simply viewed as "positive." It \vas clear from the responses
that respondents had varying views, especially with respect to stretch goals.
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With respect to implementation costs, some respondents viewed dollar investment
as a meaningful threshold while others were unable to consider costs independently of
benefits when explaining tllresholds. These respondents preferred to tl1ink in terms of
benefit to cost ratios or payback periods as thresholds. The goal in this case was to spend
zero dollars. Thresholds ranging from $100,000 to $10 M were suggested, with the high
end qualified as representing higll benefit projects for which the "money would be
found." Benefit to cost ratios of 3:1 \\'ere suggested. Figure 7.3 illustrates th~ payback
period relationship that was suggested. These varied responses and difficulty in
separating parameters \vhen considering thresholds strongly suggests the need for an
alternative approach to screening, utilizing constructed attributes, and the need for
shipyard policy.
STAGE THRESHOLD GOAL STAGE Tl-IRESHOLD GOAL
Engineering: + to 10 0/0 + to 50 % SOC 4: + to 100/0 + to 40 %
SOC 1: + to 20 0/0 + to 50 0/0 SOC 5: + to 10 0/0 + to 50 %
SOC 2: + to 20 0/0 + to 50 0/0 SOC 6: + to 5 0/0 + to 25 0/0
SOC 3: + to 10 % + to 50 0/0 SOC 7: + to 10 0/ 0 + to 25 0/0
All Stages: + to 100/0 + to 50 0/0
TABLE 7.1 - CYCLE TI~'E BENEFIT TURESHOLDS AND GOALS
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With respect to schedule delays, the goal was no schedule delay. Thresholds
varied, but to a lesser extent than was the case with benefits. Table 7.2 provides these
results.
STAGE THRESHOLD GOAL STAGE T~~RESHOLD GOAL
Engineering: 2 to 100/0 0 % SOC 4: 5 to 20 0/0 0 0/0
SOC I: 5 to 20 % 0 % SOC 5: 4 to 100/0 0 %
SOC 2: 5 to 20 0/0 0 0/0 SOC 6: oto 5 0/0 0 0;f.
SOC 3: 5 to 100/0 0 0/0 SOC 7: oto 10 % 0 ~~
All Stages: 5 to 10 °Al 0 0/0
TABLE 7.2 - SCHEDULE DELAY THRESHOLDS AND GOALS
With respect to manning costs, the threshold was expressed in a variety of \vays
ranging from 25% increase, 10 to 20 Engineering and 100 to 200 Production and 50
overall. The goal was no manning increase. With respect to infonnation systems,
responses varied including 330/0 increase and 10 to 100 terminals/licenses. Again the goal
was zero. With respect to ship performance/quality impact, the goal was no negative
impact. The threshold was expressed as a level related to the specifications and "good
shipbuilding practice." It is understood that some negotiation with the customer can
modify the specifications.
With respect to a variety of risks, respondents were asked to indicate the threshold
uncertainty which they would accept. The following summarizes tllese results. Once
again, the responses were very broad. Respondents found it very difficult to set
thresholds for schedule risk. Qualitatively, the threshold is that confidence is high that
the thresholds for schedule delay 1I\Vill not be surpassed.
• 50 to 700/0 probability that implenlentation cost is as estinlated
• 5 to 60°;(. probability that implementation cost is 100/0 higher
• 20 to 750/0 maximum increase in cost estimate acceptable
• 2 to 50% probability tllal cost estimate increases by that amount
• 10 to 900/0 probability that implementation benefit is as estimated
• 5 to 60% probability that implementation benefit is 10% lower
• 20 to 30°A» decrease in benefit below estimate acceptable
• 2 to 500/0 probability that implementation benefit is that nluch lower
• 0.25 to 15% probability that technical risks block implementation
• 0.25 to 15% probability that regulatory risks block implenlentation
• 1 to 25% probability that the organization will not be supportive
Thus we can conclude that the setting of thresholds and goals is not triviaL and
that looking at paranleters in isolation is difficult for most people when setting thresholds
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and goals. Respondents found setting goals against specific parameters to be less
difficult then setting thresholds. Goal setting is an outcome of even the most basic
strategic planning process, and is therefore better understood by most personnel. What is
missing in most strategic planning excursuses is policy development with respect to
thresholds. Provided that proposals were deemed "feasible" by respondents, they did not
find it difficult to pairwise compare them with respect to individual parameters as will be
discussed shortly. The real objective is to establish what "feasible" means. This involves
shipyard policy with respect to acceptable costs and risks, as well as desired "hurdle
rates" for benefits. As an alternative to looking at parameters in isolation, constructed
attribute scales can be developed as necessary to describe a feasibility scale for benefit,
cost and risk. This can then be used to screen proposals.
7.3.2 Criteria Weights Assuming Independence
Criteria were first examined ignoring dependencies. Later the in1pact of
dependencies were considered. The results ignoring dependency are presented first,
followed by a discussion of ho\v dependencies were accounted for. P~ior to filling out the
surveys, a session was held with each respondent to discuss ho\v to interpret the pairwise
comparisons and to insure that each of the parameters was clearly understood. A
commercial software package, "Expert Choice", was used to facilitate synthesis of the
pair-wise comparison results. As Figure 7.4 illustrates, both opportunity oriented and
danger oriented preferences were exhibited in the prioritization of the high level criteria.
This reinforces the conclusion that shipyard strategic policy must be established
regarding objectives and attitudes towards benefit, cost and risk. Establishing such a
policy for this shipyard was beyond the scope of this research. It is interesting to note
that the AHP serves not only as a decision analysis tool, but also as a mechanism for
facilitating such policy setting by making differing perceptions explicit and focusing
discussion on critical issues. The differing attitudes \vere largely along position ljnes.
Those in Engineering and Cost Engineering tended to be more risk averse than those is
Production Engineering and Production. Table 7.3 provides a tabular sunlnlary of the
eigenvector results for each respondent and the synthesis of their results using the
normalized geometric mean. Overall, this shipyard's prioritization reflects opportunity
seeking which is consister!t with the results of the industry survey presented in Chapter
4.0.
199
High Level Criteria
0.8 _.u_ ---------- -- --- ----- - n _
~ 0.6-'
....
S 0.4 6-
.....
J-4
~ 0.2 .
o
A B c o
Expert
E F GROUP
• Maximize Net Benefit
• f\1inimize Implementation Cost
o f\1inimizc Risk
FIGURE 7.4 - HIGH LEVEL CRITERIA
N.nn~lIJ.\t
f. f 9 aD~E·\'J Qi.1...P A\lR\Q:
..-------------------+----------------------~----------------
01-l9
QClb
05-17
019
Q:hl
om
000\
Ql9J Q~
GIn)
Oi!7
OIiR
a:In
HIll
05.11
all~
O.l>l
U1U
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With respect to maximizing net benefits, greater consensus is evident in the
results which are illustrated in Figure 7.S and table 7.4. The results also support those
presented in the industry survey, with cycle time reduction considered to be the highest
priority.
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Sub-criteria to cycle time benefits were similarly examined as illustrated belo\\'. The
responses show clear agreement that stage of construction 6 is a high priority. The
majority of respondents also considered stage 7 to be a high priority.
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With respect to minimizing implementation costs, respondents showed a clear preference
for minimizing schedule delay as the most important sub-criteria. Sub-criteria to schedule
delays were similarly examined.
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Responses associated with priorities for averting different types of risks are illustrated in
the following. The results indicate the greatest priority being given to averting risks
associated with schedule.
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7.3.3 Criteria Weights with Dependence
The five respondents agreed that dependencies existed between model parameters,
but all had difficulty exploring and expressing these in isolation. It was necessary to sit
with each to discuss the parameters ar~j ho\v they impacted one another. The supermatrix
extension of the AHP is used to account for these dependencies as discussed in detail
earlier in the previous section.
A hierarchy is a particular type of systenl, \vhich is based on the
assumption that the enlities...can be grouped into disjoint sets, with the
entities of one group influencing the entities of only one other group.. "'
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and being influenced by the entities of only one other group. The
elements in each group (also called level, cluster, stratum) of the hierarchy
are assumed to be independent. If there is dependence among them we
study independence and dependence separately and combine the two...
[Saaty, 1994, p.ll]
The relationships between criteria were explored as in input-output feedback
system analysis. The concern is the degree to which one parameter assists another in its
contribution. Figure 7.11 illustrates such a system with feedback as it would relate to the
high level criteria of benefits, costs and risks. Table 6.10 provides a summary of the
consensus regarding the interaction of these high level criteria. The adjusted priority
vector is the cross product between the dependence relationship matrix and the
independent priority vector. Figure 7.12 illustrates the adjusted priorities. The adjusted
high level criteria weights show an increased weighting associated with minimizing cost,
due to its strong association with minimizing risks. Minimizing risks and minimizing
costs were not believed to contribute to maximizing benefit by the respondents. In
addition to examining relationships between the high level criteria, the relationships
betv/een the lower level criteria were also examined. These adjustments lose significance
as one moves deeper into the hierarchy because the contribution of differences bet\veen
lower level criteria \\J'eights to alternative ranking is diminished as conlpared to the
contribution of differences between the higher level criteria.
FIGURE 7.11 - SYSTLr-.1 \\'ITII FEFDBACK
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Later, after an initial evaluation of case studies had been performed, the validity
of the assumptions made regarding the dependence between paranleters was explored.
This was accomplished by looking for correlation between the benefit, cost and risk
priorities assigned to the case studies. The results arc illustrated in the following figures.
Each data point represents a case study. The figures demonstrate that, at least for the eight
cases studied, minimizing cost appears te be associated w'ith minimizing risk. On the
other hand, maximizing benefit contributes in a positive way to neither minimizing costs
nor risks. These findings suggest that the relationships established above are reasonable
and simply validates what most program managers know, that higher risk and cost
projects are associated with greater potential gains.
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7.3.4 Case Study Evaluation With Independence
Having established criteria weights for the model, the next task was to test an
application of the model utilizing case studies. Eight case proposals were used in this
analysis. The proposals were selected because:
• They were familiar to all the respondents
• They were all representative of the type of productivity enhancing design changes the
participating shipyard was involved with
• They had all been acted upon in some way and some assessment of actual results
could be used to judge the quality of the decision analysis model that had been
developed
The synthesized priorities are based upon the weighting developed as described in
7.3.2. The participants were also asked to pairwise compare the proposals directly with
respect to the degree to which they believed they had actually contributed to shipyard
competitiveness. First the results assuming no dependency were examined. Later
adjustment of the criteria and alternative weights to consider dependency were explored.
Figure 7.16 compares the initial synthesis results with the group judgment (as the
normalized geometric mean). Ffhe synthesis represents the model output considering the
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relative weights assigned to all the parameters including the high level criteria weights for
benefit, cost and risk. Fewer respondents participated in this phase of the research than
had in setting the criteria weights. The criteria weights were based upon five
respondents. The group judgment representing "reality" is based upon four of these
respondents' feedback. Three respondents participated in establishing the proposal
evaluation relative to the criteria. During the first run through the model, inconsistency
was high for a number of the respondents' identified preferences. After the initial
analysis of the results, those evaluations for which the inconsistency ratio was greater
than 0.11 were explored with. the respondents. The Expert Choice software facilitates this
by calculating the inconsistency of the responses and highlighting \vhich responses are
most inconsistent. Through discussion, the consistency was improved such that no
responses exhibited inconsistency above 0.1, which is regarded as the limit for quality
decisions.
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The correlation of the synthesis results, representing the model output considering
the relative weighting of benefit, cost and risk, was not as strong as nlight have been
expected. This is particularly evident for the penetration standard case. The group
judgment regarding how well these proposals contributed to conlpetitivcne~s relative to
others in reality is significantly higher than the model synthesis results. Dependencics
between criteria and alternatives \vill ultimately adjust these results, so it is too early to
dra\v final conclusions.
While dependency has not yet been considered, S0l11C data available at this point
sheds light on factors that are contributing to the discrepancy. During the evaluation
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process, an analysis of the initial results should be perfonned to establish the degree of
consensus that exists among the respondents and other factor3 which may bias results.
With respect to the weighting of the criteria'! it is possible they may not reflect the
actual outcome. It should be pointed out that the comparison made in the above chart is
between an assessment of actual results and a decision priority reflecting considerations
regarding benefit, cost and risk. If the shipyard mitigated risks associated with particular
projects very well during implementation, then the actual results may not reflect what had
been a perfectly reasonable concern regarding risks during the evaluation phase. In fact, a
key elenlent of the evaluation phase and a key benefit of the AHP approach proposed here
is that relative risk, cost and benefit is made explicit; therefore means for improving
proposals can be explored. In addition, the shipyard did not track the actual results of
each proposal in a rigorous way, and so the group judgment represents expert opinion
rather than absolute measures. When a comparison is rrlade between the model output for
benefit only and the group judgment regarding the actual outcome, the correlation is
much improved both with respect to weight and rank as illustrated in Figure 7.17. This
may suggest that the shipyard weighted risk and cost criteria more heavily than their
actual experience would suggest is necessary. It also suggests that the yard was
successful in mitigating what were considered at the time to be considerable risks and
costs. This is illustrated in Figure 7.18.
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FIGURE 7.18 - COST, RISK, AND BENEFIT RESULTS
In addition, the individual respondent's priorities are not representative of a
consensus. l'he more variation between respondents' priorities, the less likely it is that 3
detenninistic synthesis will yield a correlation. This was eluded to earlier during this
discussion of the applicability of deterministic synthesis of group judgments. They are
considered representative when the respondents have equal access to infonnation and
have an opportunity to discuss the problem. The respondents in this case were unable to
spend any significant time discussing the excursus with one another.
One of the contributions which an AHP model such as this can make to the
decisionmaking process is to facilitate developing such consensus by making these
priorities explicit. This is an important step in the evaluation process to insure that the
criteria reflect shipyard policy and that decisionmakers are evaluating proposals based
upon the same infonnation. The follo\ving figures illustrate the point. Note that
consensus between individuals (experts represented as A through D) would be reflected
by all the data points representing their priorities lallding on the diagonal on a scatter plot.
Significant variation exists for several of the case studies, and in a practical application
the reasons for this discrepancy would need to be examined at this point, prior to moving
on to the final phases of the evaluation.
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7.3.5 Case Study Evaluation With Dependency
Next the impact of dependency was accounted for in the model. First the adjusted
criteria weights, discussed and presented earlier, were entered into the model. Figure
7.23 illustrates that the criteria dependencies had little impact on the outcorne.
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FIGURE 7.23 - RESULTS WITH CRITERIA DEPENDENCY
It was also clear that there were dependencies between proposals. "fhese were
explored next in a manner similar to the approach taken for criteria, and accounted for in
the model prior to drawing final conclusions regarding relative rank and weight.
Discussion with respondents indicated that dependencies were judged to exist between
proposals relative to benefits only. The most significant of these was that several of the
proposals depended upon the penetration standard to achieve full impact. This is because
distributive system proposals required larger openin~~ to meet their full potential. In
addition, the proposal to move work content from stage 5 to stage 3 requires these
penetrations and penetration parts to be cut and installed earlier to fully support it.
Figures 7.24 and 7.25 and Tables 7.11 and 7.12 illustrate these adjustments with respect
to cycle time and dollar savings priorities.
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Figure 7.26 illustrates the final adjusted weighting of the alternatives, considering
all dependencies. Dependencies between the alternatives themselves had a significant
impact upon the ranking and weighting of the proposals. The model ranking and
weighting correlates to the group judgment regarding the actual outconle \vith some
exceptions as illustrated in the figure. Of significance is the fact that the model clearly
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predicted which groups of proposals were most important to consider. In reality, early
into the evaluation process, the initiative to implement stud mounted padeyes was
abandoned because it became clear that expectations were unrealistic. This is why the
group judgement regarding actuai contribution is so low as compared to the model
output. When the model priorities are adjusted with the stud mounted padeye proposal
removed, the correlation is improved as illustrated in Figure 7.27. It is likely that the
remaining discrepancies are a result of the lack of consensus discussed earlier. It is
critical that during the evaluation phase, every effort is mad,e to build a common
understanding of the proposals among all the decisionmakers/stakeholders. Equally
critical is that the weighting of the relative preferences for benefits, costs and risks reflect
shipyard policy. It is likely that had either of these been possible during this excersise,
that the results would have been improved. As they are, it is clear that the AHP approach
provides significant data which will be useful during decisionmaking, The ranking and
weighting of the proposals appears to reflect a quality decision regarding the priority of
proposals.
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Of particular interest is a comparison of the model output to the actual
decisionmaking process that occurred at the shipyard when these proposals were under
consideration. The deck cups proposal was implemented without much question.
Initially there was concern regarding risks that regulatory bodies might not approve the
proposal, but these were quickly dealt with via physical tests. These tests demonstrated
that the regulatory body and customer concerns were not issues, and therefore this
proposal was implemented quickly after that. It required little or no training and had no
organizational resistance. It was a clear winner, although it did not have the greatest
benefit potential.
The Vanstone, Round Duct and Penetrations proposals were considered at the
same time. While each could be implemented independently, the impact of each was
improved by the others. The Vanstone proposal would replace numerous welded joints
with mechanical pipe joints. Regulatory bodies had concerns regarding leakage, and so a
pilot project was proposed. Testing was performed to demonstrate that fatigue concerns
would not be an issue. The effectiveness of that proposal would be enhanced if all pipe
sizes could be addressed, but because the Vanstone flange requires a larger opening
through ship structure, the penetrations proposal was required. The round duct proposal
would replace costly rectangular duct with expensive penetration parts with less
expensive and easier to install round duct. Its effectiveness would be enhanced if all the
duct that would have been rectangular could be round. This would necessitate larger
openings. The penetrations proposal had as its goals the establishment of new
penetration standards regarding standard sizes, the need for compensation and the type of
compensation. Implementation of these proposals, using a phased implementation
approach, began at the same time as that for the deck socket cups.
The foundation project was invested in shortly thereafte:. Investment in the Loro
proposal began in concert with that of the Vanstone flange. This was uecause they shared
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common concerns and the regulatory, customer and shipyard stakeholders were the same
for each. In essence, it was a piggybacked proposal.
As will be discussed later regarding decisionmaking, the output of the AHP model
and other considerations are made to see if proposals can be enhanced. One such
enhancement is adding on additional content to proposals with little or no increase in risk
or cost. Moving content from SOC 5 to SOC 3 was impiemented in a phased manner
after the other proposals \\'ere well underway. Research regarding the stud mounted
padeye was begun, but despite favorable testing was discontinued. This was because of
differences regarding expectations between the customer and the yard, as well as doubts
on the part of major stakeholders regarding its benefits. The expectations of the customer
were believed to discount many of these benefits and the decision was made not to
proceed.
7.4 SYNOPSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED
In previous Chapters it was illustrated that a means for evaluating and prioritizing
proposals was necessary for a successful change management process. In this Chapter it
was demonstrated that the Analytic Hierarchy Process can be used for this purpose. The
model results appear to reflect quality decisiorunaking based upon a test application at a
shipyard. While dependency between parameters did not appear significant to this
problem, dependencies between alternatives had a significant impact.
Assumptions regarding the deterministic synthesis of group judgments should be
tested by examining the discrepancy between these judgments. Model perfomlance
might be improved if greater consensus can be reached. The AHP approach facilitates
this.
While intuitively appealing and less time consuming than a utility theory
application, the AHP approach is by no means "fast" when many criteria are being
considered. It is a time consuming process when numerous parameters are being
considered and for this reason, simplicity must be considered important. Every effort
must be made to minimize the number of parameters in the Inodel and focus on key
criteria. Several of the parameters were prioritized low, and could have been eliminated
without a significant impact on the results. This would have reduced the number of pair-
wise comparisons required and subsequently reduced the amount of time required to
complete the evaluation. Some parameters might be combined using constructed or
proxy attributes, for example. It should be remembered that dominance of criteria
diminish as one moves further down the hierarchy. A simple approach to screening
should be used to eliminate inferior proposals. Such a screening method may utilize
constructed attributes. This is necessary to place the evaluation in context. It also acts to
reduce the amount of time the AI-IP evaluation \vill take.
The inconsistency ratio was very useful. It identified when additional thought or
data might be required. Th:s unique feature of the Analytic Hierarchy Process serves to
further facilitate consensus building.
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The model provides a meaningful way to examine alternatives under conditions of
uncertainty using all the available infonnation. Pairwise comparisons and ratio scale
prioritization appear to succe'isfully assess the relative benefits, costs and risks associated
witll proposals. The AHP approach serves well as a decision analysis tool. In the next
Chapter, the means by which the output of the model can be used in the decisionrnaking,
planning and implementing phases will be explored.
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8.0 DECISIONMAKING, PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING AND
.MEASURING
In the previous Chapter, a decision model was developed using the Analytic
Hierarchy Process for evaluating and prioritizing design improvement proposals. In this
Chapter, it is demonstrated that the output from that model can be utilized for much more
than merely ranking proposals. There are a great many aspects which must he addressed
to properly make decisions, plan and im!'Jlement design improvement proposals. These
include traditional program planning and project tnanagement issues as well as
configuration management. While these are critical for success, they are not the focus
here. Many papers and texts have been written about project and configuration
management. Instead, the focus here is on how the output of the AHP model can be used
to improve that process and on aspects which are unique to the problem of managing
design improvement proposals.
The decisionmaking stage consists of two primary sub-elements. These include:
• Post process sensitivity analysis and proposal improvement
• Proposal selection and resource allocation
The output of this stage is a set of proposals which a decisionmaker or group has decided
to move forward with in some way. This is followed by a period of implementation
planning. It will be shown that the AHP output can be utilized to suggest varyi~g
implementation strategies. The measuring stage relates to monitoring of proposals and
development of lessons learned to improve both the proposals underway and the change
management process itself.
8.1 DECISIONMAKING
8.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
This stage begins with a period of reflection, a post process sensitivity analysis, to
insure that all the available information has been reasonably considered. This is
consistent with the conclusions of Keeney regarding "value focused thinking" and
Sauder's model of structured decision making.
It is important to attempt to create desirable alternatives throughout the
decisionnlaking process. After a set of alternatives has been completely
evaluated for the first time, significantly more infornlation is available
than before the evaluation. Any of this infonnation may stimulate creative
thought to generate new or improved alternatives. [Keeney, 1992, p.211]
223
The evaluation and prioritization stages result in an improved understanding of
the proposals. The AHP model output provides infonnation which can be used to suggest
if proposals can be impro\··ed. Sensitivity analysis can be perfonned to demonstrate
whether there would be value to obtaining additional information prior to proceeding.
Sensitiv!ty analysis refers to exploration of how robust the ranking and weighting
of the alternatives are to perturbations of the criteria weights. This analysis might
demonstrate that the ranking is not vel)' sensitive to the adjustment of the weighting of
criteria, in which case the result is robust. On the other hand, the analysis might
demonstrate that the results are very sensitive to changes in the priority of one or several
~riteria. This may suggest that there is value in collecting additional infonnation
regarding the intensity of preference for alternatives with respect to those criteria if there
is any question about the validity of the evaluation. Figure 8.1 illustrates such sensitivity
analysis being perfonned using the "Expert Choice" software. This package provides a
graphical user interface which facilitates adjustment of paranleters with instant feedback
regarding changes to the results. This allows "'what if' scenarios (0 be explored. For
example, one may wish to examine how sensitive results are to risk or cost.
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8.1.2 Improving Proposals
After basic sensitivity analysis has been performed, and the analyst is satisfied
that the results are robust, one can work to improve the proposals. This is a further
application of '''value focused thinking" to the problem. Any new infonnation or
understanding which has surfaced during the evaluatioll might be used to improve the
performance of proposals. With full understanding of the proposals, one should ask
similar questions to those that were asked during the identification stage. Can
alternatives be synergistically combined, for example? This n1ay be the case if they can
share or require the sar.le resource::, or their sum is greater than their parts. One should
look for any add-on opportunities for highly prioritized proposals.
The output of the model, specifically the (:ljocity vectors against benefit, cost, or
risk and any of their subelements, can be used to suggest which proposals might be
improved. Furthennore, as was illustrated in the previous Chapter, the output of the
model can be used to review agreement between stakeholders' perceptions. Any
variation may suggest an opportunity to improve a proposal. Figure 8.2 illustrates how
the output might be used to improve proposals. For each of the proposals, one should ask
what might be done which could improve performance with respect to criteria.
Similarly, one should explore the level of consensus that exists. This can shed
light on misunderstandings which need to be addressed prior to implementation. This is
illustrated in Figure 8.3.
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8.1.3 Selecting Proposals and Allocating Resources
Once there is reasonable certainty that all the necessary information has been
considered, and that proposals represent the best means available for achieving the goals
identified through the strategic planning process, it is necessary to select proposals on
which to initiate activity. This decision must be based upon consideration of the
available resources and the capacity of the organization to support the changes. The
model has considered relative costs and organizational risks when prioritizing the
proposals, resulting in a ranking and a weighting. If the resource requirements for each
proposal were known, and the resource availability were known as well, one could utilize
an optimization algorithm to allocate these resources. Such an approach has been used in
conjunction with Al-IP in the past.
Kuei et. al. (1994) proposed a greedy heuristic algorithm for allocating resources
using the output of the AHP. The approach has also been recommended by Saaty and
Alexander (1981) and Madu (1993). I f the only costs being considered were dollars, and
the resource requirements and constraints were kno\vl1, one would construct a simple
linear progranl using the global priority vector results as the coefficients in the obiective
function. For exanlplc, in a case \\'ith 4 alternatives one \vould have:
I{esourcc requirenlcnts R1, R2, RJ , and R4
Resource Availability (budget) B
Max z == P1W 1 + P2W2 + P.lWJ + P.JW.J ;(P being priorities, W being resource allocations)
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Subject to
O~WI~RIIB
o.:s w2 .:s R2/B
o~ W3 ~ Rl/B
o~ W4 ~ R4/B
'LW= 1
The approach illustrated above really amounts to allocating resources in the order
suggested by the AHP model until resources are expended. The LP function is not
necessary to achieve that result. Extensions to that approach might include consideration
of combinations of rliscrete and continuous investment levels as well as more than one
type of resource constraint. In the case of design improvement proposals, at least dollars
and manning would need to be considered. One might even allocate an "assimilation
budget" to the organization and assign assimilation costs to the proposals based on the
model's priority vector against organiLational risks.
It was beyond the scope of this research to fully explore various mathematical
approaches that might be used for allocating resources. The ranking and weighting
output of the AHP decision model suggests the order in which proposals should be
addressed. This was tested against actual shipyard activity in the previous Chapter, and
the test suggests that the ranking provides a quality assessment of the order in which to
consider proposals. The organization must be sensitive to the resources available when
deciding how many proposals to proceed with, and this sensitivity must include all the
organizational issues discussed in detail in Chapter 2.0. The power of the AHP model is
its ability to suggest which proposals may be most important to achieving strategic
objectives, and if a group of proposals is superior to another group. It also provides a
mechanism for focusing attention and building consensus. Its output, being ratio scale
weights rather than merely interval scale ranks, is well suited to use in conjunction with
other resource allocation techniques including linear programming.
8,,2 PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING AND MEASURING
In this section issues associated with planning for implementation are discussed.
When considering implementation, there are two primary issues associated with the
design change process. ~rhe first of these relates to the implementation of the Design
Change Management process itself. The second relates to tIle implenlentation of
proposals identified and selected as a result of utilizing the process. The first issue is
associated with organizational change. The second is associated with project
management and configuration management as well as organizational change. The
output of the decision model can be used to assist with the second of these concerns.
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8.2.1 Implementing the Design Improvement Process
With respect to the first issue, the lessons learned from the field of organizational
change can be applied to develop an implementation plan for the change management
process. Some of these lessons were reviewed in Chapter 2.0. The strategy employed
will be a function of the degree to which the present stale of the organization is similar to
the desired state (being one Y;hich employs an effective design improvement process). It
is beyond the scope of this work to provide an in depth discussion of the management of
organizational change, but an overview will be provided.
Organizational change strategies tend to range from gradual and participative to
rapid and coercive. There are staunch supporters of each, as was illustrated in Chapter
1.0. Recall the conflicting arguments of Heifetz and Pritchett. Dunphy and Slace provide
the following observation.
On the whole, the 0.0. [Organizational Development] model presents an
ideology of gradualism, for effective change management is seen to
proceed by snlall, incremental adjustments...and the st.rategies for
organizational change advocated typically involve widespread elnployee
participation to ensure emergent consensus among the key parties
affected...By contra.st what we can observe happening with increasing
frequency in contemporary organizations is markedly different. .. In
advocating rapid coercive restructuring, they often express impatience and
contempt for 0.0. approaches, which they regard as trivial and time
consuming. [Dunphy & Stace, 1988]
The collaborative approach is argued by numerous researchers and consultants to be
superior because it ensures that organizational resistance is properly dealt with and that
the employees internalize the nevI processes such that there will not be a relapse or
sabotage. It is argued as the best way to establish shared vision and values in the
majority of the organizational change literature. It "increases confidence anlongst
employees, reducing organizational dependence on outsiders" [Dunphy & Stace, 1988]
In Chapters 1.0 and 2.0 several other arguments were put forth for why a collaborative
approach is valuable. It has also been argued that \vhile collaborative approaches work
well when change is not thrust upon the organization rapidly, there are many situations in
which greater speed is necessary. This would be the case if the need for change was not
realized until it was very late, such that little time is available to react. In fact a primary
conclusion of organizational change theory is that change will not occur until pain and
discomfort is significant, and this is usually the case when there is little tinlC left to
change. Some, such as Handy, have illustrated this using the sigmoid curve, which is
representative of many life cycles, including organizational life cycles. In Figure 8.4,
point A represents when the organization should react, and point B represents \vhen the
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organization typically reacts. At point A, all the signals are that all is well and there is no
pain to trigger the change. At point B the need is understood, but the organization may
not have what it takes to rebuild the necessary momentum. A coercive or dictatorial
approach may also be required if key stakeholders' interests are not compatible and can
only be resolved by an authoritative: directive, or by coercive influence of a stronger
party. [Dunphy, Stace, 1988]
FIGURE 8.4 - SIGMOID CURVE (FROM HANDY)
Dunphy and Stace concluded that each approach has its place, and provided a
typology of change strategies and suggestions for wilen to utilize them. Their work
responds to the fact that "we need a theory of organizational adaptation that incorporates
all types of interventions, applying them to the management of the numerous crises all
organizations face." [Beer, Walton 1987] Several researchers have adopted and expanded
upon their typology. Those who wish to implement an improved design improvement
process must first assess the current state of the organization. That, coupled with their
autllority and influence, will detennine the appropriate strategy. Table 8.1 illustrates
their typology of strategies (from lick's adaptation of Dunphy and Stace).
Transformative Stratel:iesIncremental StrateKies
Panicipalive Evolulion: Charismatic Transformation:
Use when the organization is in good Use \..'hen Ihe organization is not in
condition but needs minor adjustment. good condilion and though there is
or is not in good condition but time little time for extensive panicipalion
is available and inlerest groups favor there is support for radical change
change. within the orsanization,
Dictalorial Transfonnalion:
For~ed Evolulion:
Usc when the organization is not in
Usc when Ihe organization is in good good condition, there is no time for
condition but :l~eas minor adjustment. cxtcnsi,'c participation and no support
or when it is nol in good condition and within the organizalion for radical
key interesl groups oppose change, but change. but radical change is vital
lime is available. to ort;anizational s~r\'i\'al alld
fulfillment of its basic mission.
Collaborative
Mode
Coercive
Mode
TABLE 8.1 - IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY - COLLABORATIVE VS. COERCIVE MODES
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If the shipyard already has a production engineering function in place, does not
believe it has a dire need to "cost-down" its existing or anticipated designs, and the
relationships between stakeholders are strong, it is likely that a participative evolution
will allow many of the elements of the proposed process to be put in place.
Implementing Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy devellJpment, and standardization
will be significantly easier in this environment, but will require considerable care and
feeding on the part of management. If the Build Strategy process establishes goals and
objectives as recommended in Chapter 3.0, implementing the change management
framework and evaluation process is likely to repI~sent an evolution of existing activity.
On the other hand, if the shipyard has not embrac~~ J""roduction engineering and
the other elenlents of design for competitiveness, and relationships between stakeholders
are strained, it is likely that a coercive nlode change will be required, at least to "kick off'
the process. This would especially be the case if the shipyard faced a dire need to reduce
costs and cycle time and had waited too long to take action. Evidence for this was seen in
the shipyard feedback presented in Chapter 4.0. A dictatorial transformation was often
required to est~blish the expectation that there will be a new order of things, that this
would include production engineering and design improvement, and that engineerillg had
no choice but to improve their design for competitiveness capability despite the need to
reduce their own design cycles. The approach is not without its costs, and while it
establishes the expectation and results in design improvements, it demoralizes the targets
of the change. Such a transfonnation nlust be quickly followed by efforts to stabilize the
targets and shift to a participative environment.
8.2.2 Implementation of Improvement Proposals
Implementation of proposals begins with an understanding that an improvement is
a change if it is contrary to any stakeho!der's expectations. Change can therefore occur at
the start of the concept design stage as discussed in Chapter 3.0. Change management
principles must be addressed throughout all the design phases regardless of the
management approach taken.
The AHP model ranks and prioritizes proposals, suggesting the order in which
they should be implemented. The next concern is the best strategy for implementing each
selected proposal. The output of the AHP decision model provides information which
can assist in developing implementation strategies for individual proposals.
Implementation planning is concerned with establishing the project management
strategy, defining activities, schedules and costs, allocating resources, and establishing
performance measures and a reward system. The focus of this research \vas 011 how the
output of the decision model can be used to indicate project implementation strategy.
Implementation can be considered to be broken into three sub-elements. These include
the initiation phase, an interim monitoring phase, and a transfer phase. A fourth elenlcnt
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follows which is ident:fied as a separate stage of the design change framey/ork,
measuring and feedback. This is a final monitoring phase. During initiation, the
implementation plan is established and the implementation begins. During the interim
monitoring phase, feedback regarding progress is used to make necessary "course
corrections." The focus during initiation and the interim monitoring phases is action and
accomplishment of goals. During the transfer phase, action is taken to establish new
processes and standards to insure that lessons learned are made permanent, and that these
gains will be shared on future programs. During the final monitoring phase, additional
feedback is gathered regarding both the proposal and the implementation process to
insure that lessons learned are used to improve future similar proposals and the change
management process itself.
The attributes of the implementation strategy are trade-offs between short tenn
efficiency and long tenn organizational learning. The fastest implementation approach is
not often the one which will result in a lasting change, but rather a local change to a
particular contract. This trade-off might also be expressed as that between effective
proposal implementation and effective ongoing work in the line organization, direction
vs. r~irticipation and flexibility vs. controL The characteristics of the change will suggest
the best implementation strategy.
Wheelwright and Clark established a typology of implementation strategies for
new product development in manufacturing finns. These relate to alternative fonns of
projecI management and are also applicable to design illlprovement proposals. The
shipyard feedback obtained during the surveys demonstrated that the full range of these
approaches are used in practice. The implementation strategies which they identify
include functional or line, lightweight, heavyweight, and autonomous (described below).
These strategies can be linked to proposals through the AHP output and the change
characteristics identified in Chapter 1.0. These change characteristics include:
• Extent and Breadth
• Timing
• FDeus and Interdependency
• Cost, Benefit and Risk (AHP output)
Functional or line refers to implementation through the existing configuration
control process. This strategy relies on the line organization with little or no external
monitoring. It is well suited to projects with minimal risk~ cost, breadth/extent and low
time sensitivity, moderate benefits. These proposals would require no significant changes
to design or production processes, and minimal follow on effort. The change is
"finished" in a short and definable period.
Lightweight project management strategies rely on the line organization and a
modified configuration control process to accomplish the change, but assign a project
manager who schedules, encourages and track's performance. This approach provides
c~ordination between departments and enhances communication. It provides
coordination with subcontracts as required. The project manager does not have direct
control of resources, and the assignment may often be used to "grow" management skills
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in a less experienced project manager. The project manager reports to a steering
committee of sponsors. This is often the case in shipyards with a production engineering
organization. In these cases a production engineer is often assigned to this role. The
workload of the project manager is generally spread over multiple projects. Liaison is
with members of the line organization who report to their own supervisors. This is suited
to well defined projects with minimal to moderate risk and cost, of moderate breadth and
extent, moderate time sensitivity, moderate risk, and moderate to significant benefit. The
projects involve moderate process changes and will generally require some follow on
effort. The projects are of longer duration than those implemented directly through the
line organization, and involve multiple departments. They often require some testing and
analysis or phased implementation with a customer or regulatory approval stage.
Heavyweight project management is a related strategy which involves the
assignment of a senior project manager who brings expertise and "clout." The project
manager generally reports to a steering committee. The project manager is responsible
for the total project effort and its success. The project manager is given influence on
resources within constraints set out by the project charter. Members of the line
organization are dedicated to the project with conditions set out in the project charter.
The project manager is given influence regarding memLers' evaluations and rewards.
This approach is suited to proposals which require ongoing definition and refinement,
with significant risk, cost and benefit, moderate to significant time sensitivity and
moderate to significant breadth and extent. These proposals will require significant
process changes and follow on effort. They will be of longer duration and involve
multiple departments, testing, analysis and/or approval.
An autonomous strategy employs a heavyweight project manager with teanl
members pulled from their functional organizations and collocated. These are often
referred to as "change tiger teams." The project manager is given [onnal authority, rather
than influence, over project resources and members' compensation, evaluation and
rewards. These proposals generally have significant time sensitivity and strategic
benefits justifying the disruption of ongoing work in the line organization to facilitate
implementing them. These proposals have increased complexity and represent serious
departures from traditional processes. Ultimately, additional effort will be required to
integrate the lessons learned and process with the fonnal organization.
As the shipyard feedback demonstrated, different structures might be used for
different phases in the case of phased projects. The initiation phase may require a highly
projectized approach which eventually gives way to an approach more congruous with
the line organization during the transfer phase. Hybrids can also be utilized. An
approach which was shown to be effective at several of the shipyards is job rotation. 'fhe
project manager from the initiation phase can be transferred to the line organization to
supervise implementation during the transfer/install phase with appropriate reorganization
to suit. This is essentially a conversion to a heavyweight model within the line
organization itself. It was found to be very effective for a nUI11f-)er of design
improvements at several of the shipyards. For example, several of the case studies used
in the previous Chapter were implemented with a lightweight project nlanager in
production engineering during the initiation phase followed by a transfer to the line
engineering organization during implenlentation. It is likely that this is one of the reasons
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why performance was better than might have been predicted for several of the proposals.
Table 8.2 summarizes the range of implementation strategies that might be used.
The position of proposals in "benefit-cast-risk space" suggests alternative
implementat~on strategies together with an assessment of issues associated with timing,
phasing and complexity. The output of the AHP model suggests the relative degree of
control that may be required for each of the proposals in the portfolio that had been
evaluated. Figures 8.5 and 8.6 provide examples of how plotting the model output
visually suggests which proposals require relatively more or less projectized approaches.
Table 8.2 provides a summary of implementation strategies.
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Those projects which are indicated to require additional control relative to others
in the portfolio require additional monitoring. When targets and goals are set, a schedule
for in process measurements to track progress should be established. This monitoring
,viii guide implementation and facilitate corrective action. It will also build positive
momentum by recognizing success. In addition, reflection on performance and lessons
learned should be encouraged. rrhe organization must reflect on lessons learned to
improve. This is true both for the change management process itself as well as future
similar proposals. The results of these measurements should be shared with the steering
committe of management to serve as feedback to the strategic planning process. The
sponsors and management must "spread the news" to build monlentum based on success.
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Implementation Management Strategies
Mi~imal complexity,
lower risk, less breadth,
more easily integrated into
ongoing work.
Increasing speed,
coordination.. risk,
cost, benefit
complexity, innovation
as \vell as disruption of
ongoing \\'ork.
Organization Design Types (adapted from Whech\'righl & Clark)
Functional or Line
Implemenlalion tlnollgh existing conficuralion l;ontrol process
Reliance on line 01 ganil.&1tion with lillie or no external monitoring
Well defined projects with minimal risk, cost or breadth and low time scnsitiv1y, moderale benefits.
No significant changes required to design or prodllction processes and no follow on elTon
Change is "finished" in a shon and definable period
Lightweight
Reliance on line organization & modified configuration control process
Project manager assigned who schedules, encourages and tracks performance
Providcs coordination between depanments, enhances communicalion
Provides coordination with subcontractors as required
Does not have direct ~ontrol af resourcts
Assignment is an opponunil)' to "~row" project manager
Repons to a sleering commiu.:e of sponsors, generally led by productiCln en~inecring
Workload of project manager spread among numerous projects
Liaison is with members of line organization who repor1 to their supen.'isors
Suiled ro well defined projects with miflimal to modcrate risk and cost, of mod~r.ttc hrcddlh, moderalC time sensitivity and
moder2te to significant benefit.
Projects involve modernle proccss changes as well as follow on en"ort.
Projects of longer dUrlltion involving l,lUltiple depanmeilts and possibly H:Sllng, outside analysis or approval.
Heavywei};ht
Assignmenr of senior projecr manae;er who brings expenise and "clour"
Rcports to steering committee
Project manager has res~nsibilily for rotal projcct efTon and its success
Projc!:t mflnager given influence on resources within constraints set 01lt by projeci charter
Mcmbers of line organization are dedicated ro rhe project per condilions sci 0'11 ill project charter
Project manager has influence on members' compensation & rC\l.-ard. as wdl as evaluation
Sui[ed to projecrs which requirc ongo~ng definition and refinement. wirh si~nificant risk. cost and benefit. moderate to
significanr lime sensitiviry, nloderate to significant breadlh
Projects may require significant process changes and follow on effon.
Projecrs of longcr duration involving multiple depanmenls ilnd some tcsting. ":'utside analysis or approval.
Auronomous
Hei1\')'wci~ht re;lms where members ;'Irc pulled from line organi7..:Jtion and collocated
Projecl m:mager has fonnal au[horily ovcr project resources and members' compensationfevaluJtion
Significanl time s;::nsilivity and risk, increased projcct complexity , "breakthrough" lI~e{ le:un project
Projcct represents a serious depanure from traditional proccsses
Ullima[cly addilional eITon \,,'ill be rcquired ro inlcgralc lessons learned \\llh Ihe line nr~:lnil..atipn
TABLE 8.2 - IMPLEMENTATION STRi\TEGY - PROJECT ORGANIZATION DESIGN
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•Fe\'..'er controls required to assure success.
The relative strength of the benefits warrant
Benefit - Risk strong leadership and panicipation from
\ /
management A moderatel~' strong project
manager is required.
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potential benefit. Efforts should be made to implementation process to assure success. A
improve these projects. Serious consideration strong project munager will be required with
should be given before undertaking these strong panicipation from management and
projects. If they are undertaken, strong project from stakeholders. A phased implementation
management, controls and monitoring with strategy \\'hich emphasizes monitoring and
full management panicipation is required. feedback is indicated.
Risks arc relalivcly low and the benefits of the
projects are relatively less. Efforts should be made
to improve the anticipated performance of the projects
These projects require the least control.
Figure 8.6 - "Benefit - Risk Space"
8.3 SYNOPSIS
In this Chapter, it was demonstrated that the AHP model output can be used to
facilitate quality decisionmaking, planning and implementation. The decision model can
be used to perfonn "what if' scenario sensitivity analysis to explore the value of
obtaining additional irlfonnation regarding proposals. It also serves to visually illustrate
the level of consensus that exisis. This can be used to improve stakeholder relationships
and the proposals themselves. The output also suggests which proposals are candidates
for further consideration regarding how they might be improved relative to particular
criteria for which they have been ranked low.
The ratio scale model output can be used directly in the objective functions of
mathematical programming approaches to resource allocation. The prioritization reflects
the order in which proposals should be invested in. Implementation strategies are
suggested for the proposals by examining the model output regarding relative benefits,
costs and risks. These priorities suggest the relative level of control required for each
proposal. In the next Chapter, an overview of the key research results is presented along
with lessons learned and recommendations.
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9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This research developed theory and process for managing design improvenlent in
shipbuilding through the integrated study of management, organizational theory)
decision theory, and engineering. In this Chapter the results associated with the primary
research questions are reviewed. The research questions which were this study's focus
included:
• Is Change Management a strategically important capability relative to other
competitive capabilities?
• How strong is industry's understanding and skill with respect to Change Management
relative to other capabilities?
• What facets of the Change Management process are most critical for success?
• What facets of the Change Management process require the most improvement?
• Can a decision analysis model be developed to significantly improve the process?
It was shown, both through an extensive literature review and data from an
industry survey, that the capability to manage design change is of strategic importance. It
was also shown through the industry survey that shipbuilders lack adequate strength in
this area. In fact, the ratio of strength to importance for capabilities associated with
managing design improvement are among the lowest of all the capabilities studied,
validating the importance of this research. Figure 9.1 illustrates this result from the
industry survey data.
Important facets of a successful process were shown to include methods for
identifying, evaluating, prioritizing, planning, and implementing proposals. The need to
link proposals to a high level business strategy and prioritize them based upon explicit
goals was shown to be critical. An understanding that resistance to change is associated
with variance from expectations is necessary to fully appreciate the contribution that
Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy development, Production Engineering and
Standardization can make to the process. These elements of "Design for
Competitiveness" were found to be foundations for a succesful Design Change
Management process. The lack of a means to prioritize and select proposals was
suggested to be a key contributor to failure. The industry survey results strongly suggest
that a decision analysis model is desirable.
Numerous alternative methods for evaluating and prioritizing proposals \vere
revie\ved for applicability to this problem. The Analytic Hierarchy Process \vas chosen
as the decision theory best suited to this application. AHP utilizes hierarchical
composition. and is therefor consistent with the strategic planning processes described in
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this research. The A.HP structures a problem in a manner that is inuitively appealing and
is cunducive to "what-if' type sensitivity analysis. A feature of the AHP is its ability to
admit group judgements, which is significant because consensus is an important part of
managing change. The AHP provides a mecllanism for measuring inconsistency of
judgements and can also model dependencies between criteria and alternatives. The
Analytic Hierarchy Process utilizes pair-wise comparisons to establish intensity of
preference. These have been found to be more easily understood than questions
associated with probabilities of events such as in Utility Theory. AHP generates ratio
scale data which is inherently more meaningful, and can be operated upon
mathematically in more ways, than interval scale data of other methods.
A decision analysis model was developed using the Analytic Hierarchy Proc.ess,
and it was found to be consistent with the objectives of prioritizing proposals based upon
a business strategy linked to the competitive environment. The results of the model
correlated well with participants' expectations, and it was found to be useful for
implementation planning in addition to prioritizing and selecting proposals. Design
Change Management is a critical capability for shipbuilders today, and it was
demonstrated that a decision analysis model can be developed using AHP to significantly
improve the process.
9.1 DISCUSSION
Shipbuilders must think in terms of strategic objectives and how they are
supported by capabilities and competencies. The design inlprovement process and
decision analysis models must address the means by which competitive advantage, and
therefore capahilities, will be supported by proposed design improvenlents. This is a
strategic concern which will require analysis that goes beyond traditional engineering
economic cost/benefit considerations.
Product and process are linked, and therefore process change generally requires
product change to support it. A shipyard which emphasize5 continuous or breakthrough
improvement of production processes must be equally concerned with engineering
support. A mechanism for introducing design improvements must be put in place. Doing
so will require shipbuilders to balance flexibility and control. A mechani.sm for
alternating between disorder/informality/innovation and stability/conservatism IS
required.
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Shipbuilding appears to be clos~ly aligned with a mass customization model of
production. Making standardization a distinctive competency will provide the shipyard
with a greater capacity to balance flexibility and control, and enhance its ability to
manage design imprllvement. Concurrent Engineering, Standardization/Mass
Customization, Build Strategy development, and the Production Engineering function
address this issue, in part by managing expectations. These facets of design for
competitiveness serve as foundations for successful Design Change Management by
providing a focus for change and a means of communicating change. They both reduce
the "assimilation drain" on engineering organizations as well as expand the "assimilation
budget" which the organization has.
Significant productivit}, advances are achieved through a combination of both
incremental and major innovations. "All the evidence points to the need to innovate both
with breakthrough products and processes and with regular incremental improvements.
Any finn that plans to win the race to commercial success by being either a steady
plodding tortoise or a swift-footed hare will find itself outpaced by finns that have
developed the virtues of both." [Utterback, 1994, p.135] This implies a systematic
approach to Design Change Management.
The history of the quality movement demonstrates that a chain of events has
resulted in industry realizing the need for effective Change Management. 'fhe
introduction of TQM led to greater rates of change, \vhich ultimately was perceived as
having many disruptive effects as well as successes. This triggered the latest wave of the
quality movement whi~h emphasizes strategic planning (Hoshin) and Change
Management.
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FIGURE 9.2 - CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO CHANGE MANAGEMENT
The total quality movement was a response to the competitive environnlent and
increased the pace of change. The engineering organization '.vas unable to cope as \vell as
it Inight have with the increased pressure, in part due to a lack of an overarching strategy
which clearly associated change proposals with strategic objectives and in part due to the
lack of a Change Management process. Shipyards must address this issue by adopting a
strategic planning process which links nleans \vith objectives, \vhich in turn arc linked to
responses to changes in the competitive environment. They must also adopt a procedural
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context for change that facilitates linking design improvement proposals with strategic
responses, and prioritizes proposals to reflect an understanding that organizations have
limits to the amount of change they can assimilate. Change implementation procedures
must address both procedural arid psychological roadblocks.
The changes in the ship design and production cycle, increases in automation, and
development of standardized interim parts and work processes signaled a move away
from craft production and the increasing irrelevance of the traditional learning curve
model p:.nd notion of learning. While traditional thinking suggests that changes always
disrupt the learning curve, it has been shown in this study that more learning is associated
with deliberate rather than unconscious activity.
Product mix defines the competitive environment
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FIGURE 9.3 - MANAGED IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
A key element of success is the development of a procedural context for
managing change. This research has yielded the following stage model, which has been
verified as workable tlu·ough discussions and testing with shipyard personnel. This stage
model begins with a motivating force \vhich leads to identification of a change proposal.
This is followed by periods of evaluation, prioritization, decisionmaking, planning,
implementing and measuring. A key element of this stage model is the evaluation phase.
This research reviewed a variety of evaluation techniques and developed an evaluation
model that is consistent with the strategic planning techniques described earlier.
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A survey of industry played a key role in this research. Among some of the most
significant conclusions to be drawn from the industry survey are:
• Change Management and design improvement capabilities are considered to be
strategically important, but industry strength in this area is low.
• The industry is actively seeking to improve its capnbilities in the area of Design
Change Management.
• U.S. shipyards exhibit a broad imbalance bet\\'een the importance of capabilities and
their strength relative to those capabilities. A Japanese shipyard representative of best
in class exhibits a significantly greater balance (S/I = 1.0).
• U.S. shipyards exhibit a nlore diverse improvement program while the Japanese yard
exhibited more focused improvement efforts.
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• The existence of a visible corporate strategy which identifies performance gaps to be
addressed with goals and objectives appears to be important to success.
• Activities associated with maintaining stability, prioritizing, planning, and
decisionmaking are considered to be most critical to successful Change Managelnent.
• A mechanism for quickly and effectively evaluating and prioritizing proposals and
linking them to business strategy is essential. Decision criteria must be explicit.
• All of the Charlge Management goals introduced in Chapter 1.0 are considered to be
equally important. These include extending the timeframe of effectivity, allowing
changes to be made faster, minimizing the number of design changes, selecting
potential design changes, evaluating potential design changes, prioritizing potential
changes, allowing decisions to be made faster, insuring changes are effective,
maximizing benefit potential, minimizing delays and disruption due to changes and
id~ntifying potential changes to reduce costs.
• Most organizations believe their procedures are effective for dealing with mandatory
changes, but weak with respect to elective changes.
• Different shipyards have varying perspectives regarding decision criteria and the
'relative importance of maxirnizing benefits, minimizing costs, and minimizing risks
associated with change proposals. A shipyard policy and strategy must make the
position and guidelines clear.
• ~'\n active Production Engineering group appears to be present in those yards which
reflect a preference for maximizing benefits over minimizing costs and risks.
• Close relationships and collocation of Production Engineering with Engineering and
Planning appear important to success.
• The most significant roadblock 10 implementing elective change is manpower rather
than budget. Change should be anticipated Y'hen allocating time and resources to a
program.
• Participation and consensus are commonly used and appear correlated to success.
• Conclusions regarding the importance of Concurrent Engineering, Build Strategy
Development, and standardization to Change Management success are reinforced by
industry experience.
The identification procedure described in this study has been developed based
upon lessons learned from the industry surv"ey and the literature. In chapter 2.0 the
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history of the quality movement \vas reviewed and it was demonstrated that recent
attention has been focused on mechanisms to align improvement activities with strategic
objectives. The industry survey presented in chapter 4.0 supported that conclusion. The
proposed identification approach addresses this issue.
The input to the identification stage is competitive pressure manifested as
perceived or actual performance gaps. The output is a set of design improvement
proposals focused upon strategic responses to the competitive pressures. The
identification stage of the design change framework consists of a number of sub-elements
aimed at tirst making the competitive environment explicit, followed by establishing
objectives and goals, followed by identifying alternative proposals that support those
goals. The theory and practice of value focused thinking and other methods aimed at
eliminating or reducing cognitive biases are used to insure that a broad range of proposals
is considered and to improve their perfonnance relative to the identified goals. A
hierarchical structure is used to facilitate this process. The approach recommended is
consistent with structured decision analysis, and the hierarchy used in the identification
stage serves as the benefits branch of the hierarchy structured for use with the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a decision analysis tool for evaluation and prioritization of
proposals.
A decision analysis model was developed and tested as a key contribution of this
research. It was demonstrated that the Analytic Hierarchy Process can be used for this
purpose, and proved capable of prioritizing proposals with respect to their contribution to
strategic objectives. The model provides a meaningful way to examine alternatives under
conditions of uncertainty using all the available information. Pairwise comparisons and
ratio scale prioritization appear to successfully assess the relative benefits, costs and risks
associated with proposals. The AHP permits prioritization of criteria, and adjustment of
criteria to reflect changing objectives. The model results appear to reflect quality
decisionmaking based upon a test application at a shipyard. Participants expressed
interest in the process, and found it to be an appealing tool. While dependency between
parameters did not appear significant to this problem, dependencies between alternatives
had a significant impact. Both types of dependency can he considered using the AHP
model. Assumptions regarding the detenninistic synthesis of group judgments should be
tested by examining the discrepancy between these judgments. It was shown that
establishing consensus is important, and that the AHP model facilitates this. Model
perfonnance might be improved if greater consensus can be reached. The inconsistency
ratio output of the Analytic Hierarchy Process was very useful. It identified wheel
additional thought or data might be required. This unique feature of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process serves to further facilitate consensus building.
Every effort must be made to minimize the number of parameters in the model
and focus on key criteria. If several of the parameters are prioritized low, they can be
eliminated without a significant impact on the results. This would have reduced the
number of pair-wise comparisons required and subsequently reduced the anlount of time
required to complete the evaluation. Some parameters might be combined using
constructed or proxy attributes, for example. It should be remembered that dominance of
criteria diminish as one moves further down the hierarchy. A simple approach to
screening should be used to eliminate inferior proposals. Such a screening method may
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utilize constructed attributes as discussed in chapter 6.0. This is necessary to place the
evaluation in context. It also acts to reduce the amount of time the AHP evaluation will
take.
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It was demonstrated that the AHP model output can be used to facilitate quality
decisionmaking, planning and implementation. The decision model can be used to
perform "what if' scenario sensitivity analysis to explore the value of obtaining
additional infonnation regarding proposals. It also serves to visually illustrate the level
of consensus tllat exists. This can be used to improve stakeholder relationships and the
proposals themselves. The output also suggests which proposals are candidates for
further consideration regarding how they might be improved relative to particular criteria
for which they have been ranked low.
The ratio scale model output can be used directly in the objective functions of
mathematical programming approaches to resource allocation. The prioritizat!on reflects
the order in which proposals should be invested in. Implementation strategies are
suggested for the proposals, ranging from implementation through the line organization
with no monitoring to highly projectized approaches, by examining the model output
regarding relative benefits, costs, and risks. These priorities suggest the relative level of
control required for each proposal.
•
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FIGURE 9.7 - MODEL OUTPUT SUGGESTING 11\1PIJ.:f'.1l:NTATION STRATEGY
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9.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
While all of the shjpyards recognized the impol1ance of this competitive
capability, none of the U.S. shipyards considered its strength in this area to be high. This
lack of strength is manifested in two ways. Many yards exhibit risk adversity to the point
that they will not take action to improve the design throughout the design cycle. Other
shipyards exhibit opportunity- seeking tendencies and introduce so m,any changes and
"improvements" that "assimilation drain" js suffered and delay and disruption results.
The industry survey results validated conclusions drawn from the literature and
experience, the most important of these being that proposals must not be introduced ad
hoc, but must be prioritized and managed. This research yielded a Design Change
Management framework and a decision analysis model 'which address this issue directly.
Tile model and methods developed facilitate strategic planning and prioritization of
proposals with respect to the strategic plan. The evaluation process and output serve to
build consensus within the shipyard and focus attention upon shipyard strategy and
policy. When the recommendations of this investigation are applied, it is anticipated that
shipbuilders will significantly improve their ability to manage design impro,,-ement
throughout the design cycle.
While the decision analysis model was developed to facilitate managing design
improvement proposals, there is no reason to believe that the recommended approach is
not general ell0ugh to be applied to other improvement activities. An example would be
facility upgrades. Virtually any activity which must support strategic objectives could be
evaluated using an approach similar to that recommended here. Further exploration and
validation of the application of decision modeling with respect to strategic planning could
be done with respect to other improvement activities.
Finally, the industry' swve} data suggests other avenues of related research.
Design Change Management capabilities were not the only ones for which strategic
importance is high but capability is low. While this study addressed all the stages of the
Design Change Management framework, it was predominantly concerned with the
evaluation and prioritization stages and how the output of the decision model can be used
in the remaining stages. Additional research could be devoted to the implementation
stage. Many design improvement proposals are implemented through the line
organization's configuration management process. As was illustrated in the industry
survey data, and Figure 9.1, shipyards need to reduce engineering rework. This rework is
manifested as engineering change orders. The volume of mandatory changes directly
impacts upon the "assimilation budget" which remains for elective changes. While
industry survey data shows shipyards believe their processes associated with mandatory
changes to be relatively strong, the conclusion that the S/I index for engineering rework
reduction is low appears contradictory. Further exploration of the causes of engineering
rework, and the processes shipyards use for dealing with it, will not only address an
additional area of importance but will also directly contribute to introducing design
improvements by reducing the "assimilation drain."
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APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
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DESIGN CHANGE MANAGEMENT BENCHMARKING QUESTIONNAIRE
Rev C
SECTION A - OVERVIEW AND INSTRUCTIONS
The purpo~:e of this questionnaire is to assist in gathering infonnation about your shipyard's design
processes and procedures, leading to an analysis of design change management methodology.
Please try to answer all questions. While it woufd be preferable if all s~ctions could be completed by a
range of people from designers through upper rnanagement, some segments can be targeted to
individuals with specific roles or knowledge of the organization. Each section indicates who the
questions are targeted to. If you do not believe that you are best suited to answer questions in a
particuJar segment, please encourage someone to participate and ansv"er those questions. If you feei
that a question is not applicable to your organization, or that the information requested is proprietary,
please indicate this in the space provided.
If you feel that your response might be misinterpreted, or you have an example which could illustrate a
point, you are encouraged to provide additional infonnation.
Should you have any questions or need interpretation, please contact
Please send final responses to the address above.
All data will be treated as confidential. No reports \vill be published which make specific reference to
any particular organization by name \vithout \vritten approval to do so. This research is being
conducted by Matthew Tedesco in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Ph.D. in the Ocean
Systems Management program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Matthe\\l Tedesco \\lorks
at the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company. All participants are \velcome to a final report
regarding the research results.
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SECTION B - PARTICIPANT IDENTIFICATION
This section gathers infonnation describing participants, and is to be completed by all participants.
I) Your name, address and phone number where you can be reached?
2) What is the name of your company?
3) What is your title at your company?
4) In your own words, please provide a short job description:
This survey will ask you questions about your "business unit". This may be your entire company \vhen no
such distinctions are made.
5) Indicate the business unit for \"hieh you are responding and describe its function and products:
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6) Ho\v many people are employed by your division, department, and workgroup or section?
Division:
Department:
Workgroup:
7) What are the primary functions of your division, department, and workgroup or section?
Division:
Department:
Workgroup:
8) Please check the item below that best describes who understands the goals, strategies and overali
business plans in the business unit. Please provide your mission, values and guiding principles
statements if they exist.
[ ] Top Management Only
[ ] Top and saine middle management
[ ] l'op and most middle management
[ ] Every manager and supervisor
[ ] Every manager, supervisor and employee
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SECTION C - STRENGTHS AND IMPORTANCE OF ABILITIES
This section should be completed by management. On the left hand side of the page, please rate the degree of
importance \\'hich you judge the competitive ability to have to\vards overall success in your busine~s. On the right
hand side of the page, please judge your business unit's strength \\'ith regard to the competitive ability relative to your
best competition. Assume that t\VO years ago represents 100% • Where do you stand today and \\'here do you expect to
be in 1\\'0 more years, Please add any competitive abilities \\'hich you judge to be important \vhich have not been
identified. Please provide additional infonnation on separate sheets explaining \"'hat conditior.s exist \\'hich result in
lo\v scores for cOlnpetitive strength in those cases \\'here the ability \vas judged important.
DEGREE OF COMPETITIVE DEGREE OF +
IMPORTANCE ABILITY STRENGTH NOW 2yrs
Unimportant. ........ Imponant Very Weak .....Very Strong
123 4 567 8 9 10 Ability to compete on price 234 5 6 789 10 ~/o
--
~~
234 567 8 9 10 Ability to profit in your market 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0/0 0/0
--
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to meet cost expectations 2 3 4 567 8 9 10 0/0 0/0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to offer consistent high quality 2 3 4 567 8 9 10 °10 %
--
in the eyes of the end customer
I 234 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability of engineering to be secn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0/0 0/0
--
as offering consistent high quality
in the eyes of production
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to provide reliable products 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 °iG 0/0
2 3 4 56789 10 Ability to meet delivery promises 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 % 0./(0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to exceed delivery promises 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~-o 0110
234 5 6 789 10 Ability to customize products and 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 % 0//0
meet customer requests
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to minimize number of 2 3 ..t 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 o·10 10
design changes
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to develop manufacturable I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~~ 0,0
designs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to id~ntify and incorporate I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~,~
--
~'o
lessons learned during design
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to identify and incorporate I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ~/o ~'o
--
lessons learned during production
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to identify and incorporate 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 % 0;10
cost/cycle tinlC saving design changes
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Ability to increase production 2 3 .t 5 6 7 H 9 10 01 0'/0 ,0
\vhcn n~~dcd
2 3 4 5 (5 789 10 Ability to cornplctc dt:sign to schedule 2 3 -t 567 R 9 10 01 0 0,0
2 3 4 5 6 7 R 9 10 Ability to complete design ahead 2 3 -t 5 6 789 '0 o· 00 ,0
of schedule
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DEGREE OF
IMPORTANCE
Unimportan~ lmportant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~ 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Q 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COMPETITIVE
ABILITY
Ability to complete design at budget
Ability to complete design under
budget
Ability to minimize engineering
re\vork
Ability to complete production
to schedule
Ability to complete production
ahead of schedule
Ability to complete production
at budget
Ability to complete production
under budget
Ability to minimize production
re\\'ork
Ability to produce accurate dra\\'ings
or production information
Ability to produce dra\\'ings or
production information to schedule
Ability to minimize the amount of
information contained in engineering
products
.A.bility to maximize the amount of
information contained in engineering
products
Ability to capture market share
Ability to minimize material costs
Ability to maximize direct labor
productivity
DEGREE OF
STRENGTH
Very Weak.....Very Strong
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 to
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
+
NO'" 2 yrs
010 __0/0
0;0 __%
0/0
OJ
10
0/
/0
0/0
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maximize engineering
productivity
Ability to maintain high production
~mployec morale
r\hillty to maintain high engineering
employee nlorale
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
01
/0 O'/0
0'
,0
DEGREE OF
IltfPORTANCE
Unimportant Important
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COJrIPETITIVE
ABILITY
Ability to minimize inventories
Ability to standardize materials
DEGREE OF
STRENGTH
Very Wcak .....Vcry Strong
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
+
NOW 2J'TS
0/0 0/0
% __%
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to standardize parts I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maintain design simplicity 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maintain clear I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
communication bet\\'een eng. and prod.
0/0 0/0
0/0 0/0
% __°/0
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maintain clear
cammunication bct\veen eng. depts.
Ability to maintain clear
corr.mun ication \vith customer
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
o~ __~/o
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maintain clear I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
communication \\'ith regulatory bodies
Ability to maintain stable and I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
predictable processes
Ability to implement a simple 2 3 4- 5 6 7 8 9 10
and common product modeling system
Ability to implement concurrent 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
engineering
Ability to develop and implement I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
a design/build strategy
OT~IER: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OTHER: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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SECTION 0 - CRITICAL NEEDS
This section should be completed by management and supervision. Please indicate the degree to \\'hich you believe the
items listed below contribute to successes or failures you have experienced \\'hile implementing design changes. A
score of I indicates the item is a lo\v contributor, a high score indicates an item is a high contributor. Please consider
providing additional information regarding examples, additional reasons for success or failure, or the processes and
procedures in place at your company \\'hich mitigate these problems.
UNIMPORTANT IMPORTANT
Ability to properly implement concurrent engineering I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to identify critical needs early in design cycle 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to develop a robust desig....Jbuild strategy 2 3 4 5 6 7 g 9 10
Ability to identify critical actions reqUired to implement the change 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability of engineering to react to ne\\' production processes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to identify high payoff changes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 J0
Ability to demonstrate a compelling need for the change 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to avoid delays in decisionmaking, possibly from too many participants 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to avoid poor decisionmaking, possibly from too fe\\' participants I .2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to obtain sufficient interest from leadership 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Abi Iity to provide proof of progress to key people 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Suitable analytical tools to quantify cost or benefit 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to assess the technical risks 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to assess the financial risks 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to assess of the organizational risks 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to maintain stable and predictable engineering processes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 q 10
Ability to standardize 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to identify rel~ted auxiliary changes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
AbiHty to coordinate changes \\'ithin the context of a strategy 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to provide budget for the change effort 2 3 4 5 6 '7 8 9 10
Ability to man the change effort 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to identify \\'hen the change is complete and irrcvcrsible 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to fully utilize product modeling (CAD/E/M) 2 3 .t 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to avoid too many changes at once 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to prioritize proposals 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ability to avoid implementing unsound proposals 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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SECTION E - CHANGE MANAGEMENT GOALS
The following section should be completed by management and upper management. Which of the
following do you consider to be the most important goals of a design change management process or
program. Please rate each on a scale of I to 10, and provide further explanation below.
Unimportant Important
Minimize number of design changes
Minimize delays and disruption due to changes
Extend the timeframe within which change is effective
Allow decisions to be made faster
AIIJ\V changes to be made faster
Insure changes are effective
Maximize benefit potential
Identify potential changes to reduce production costs
Evaluate potential changes
Prioritize potential changes
Select potential changes
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I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 ~ 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 ) 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SECTION F - AVAILABLE PROCEDURES
This section should be completed by supervision and designers. Please indicate which of the following
motivations for design change your business unit has procedures in place for dealing with. Also rate, on a
scale of 1 to 10, the effectiveness of your procedures.
MOTIVA TION: PROCEDURE WEAK STRONG
Errors and Omissions y N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Customer Requests Y N I 234 5 6 7 8 9 10
Regulatory Requirements '{ N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time/Cost saving technologies & Solutions y N 2 3 4 567 8 9 10
Lessuns learned during production Y N 2 3 4 567 8 9 10
l.essons learned during design y N 2 3 4 567 8 9 10
OTHER: Y N I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OTHER: y N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
OTHER: y N I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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SECTION G - DESIGN CHANGE MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
The following framework describes a typical process of managing design change. The questions that
follow penain to the different stages illustrated by the framework. These questions s~ould be answered by
management and supervision.
MOTIVATION
Lessons Learned
During Construction
~
•t-l~ ~
."U 0
~ ..,...
...
,.
!; n0
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~ tit
n
...
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~
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I) For each of the following motivations, please indicate which individual!; or group (by
function) have primary responsibility for identifying potential design changes.
Errors and Omissions
Customer Requests
Regulatory Requirements
Time/Cost saving technologies & Solutions
Lessons learned during production
Lessons learned during design
2) What tools or "enabltrs" does your organization use to facilitate design change? These
may include analytical tools, special meetings or forums, feedback systems, papenvork
or data management systems. Please refer to the process stage for which the tool is
intended (identification, evaluation, prioritization, decisionmaking, planning,
implement~ng or measuring)
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3) Is there an individual or group responsible for each stag~ of your process? Who performs these functions?
Please identify for each stage (identification, evaluation, prioritization, decisionmaking, planning,
implementing, and measuring).
4) What arc the means of documenting and communicating change proposals and progress?
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5) What alternative approaches to each stage of the design change process does your organization employ, and
v.'hat detennines the approach used? Do the characteristics of the change alter the approach used? Some
characteristics [0 discuss include source of the change, timing of the change, necessity, potential benefit and
risk.
6) What roadblocks exist \\'hich hamper the success of each stage of the process?
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7) When and ho\v are decisions made regarding design changes?
8) Are proposals captured for later usc if the decision \\'as made not to implenlcnt at this tim~?
9) Please identify all the considerations given \\'her. deciding to implement proposals. Please rat~ the
importance of each consideration on a scale of I (unimportant) to 10 (very important),
Cost to implement
Time required to implement
Number of individuals/groups involved
Schedule risk
Regulatory risk
Current design stage
Current backlog of deSign changes
Other Considerations:
[ J
[ ]
l ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
Potential benefit in $$$
Potential hcnelit in cycle tinlC
Technical risk
Finuncial risk
Number of impacted documents
Available r~sourccs
Organization's "Readiness" for change
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10) Please discuss the role of the considerations id~ntitied in question (9) in the decisionmaking process.
II) Ho\v are issues n:lated to budget and resources handled. What is the source of budget and resources for
design changes aimed at ieducing production costs and cycle time?
12) To \\'hat extent does management and upper management participate in the process of
design change?
13) What incentives ex ist for design supervision to incorporate design changes?
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SECTION H - CASE STUDIES
This section should be completed by supervision. The purpose of this section is to identify examples of
design changes which have been successful, as well as those that have not.
I) Please identify and describe one or more successful design changes which you have been
involved with which were identified and implemented for the purpose of reducing
production costs. Please describe the process used to identify and implement the change,
and the timing of this implementation in the design cy~le. What significantly
contributed to success? How do you define success?
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2) Please identify and describe one or more unsuccessful design changes which you have
been involved with which were identified and implemented for the purpose of reducing
production costs. Please describe the process used to identify and implement the change,
and the timing of this implelnentation in the design cycle. What significantly
contributed to failure? How do you define failure?
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SECTION 1- CHARACTERIZATION OF THE COMPANY
This section gathers data related to the company and business unit which you represent.
I) Please identify your business unit's primary product(s). Identify product lines if
they exist.
2) If the company has several similar or related business units, please identify them, along \vith
their primary products or product lines.
3) Please indicate which best describes your business unit:
[ ] A seller of capacity which markets their expertise, services and facilities to
provide a customer with a tailor made end product ·"vhich has been specifically
contracted for.
[ ] A seller of products that develops products \\lhich serve a Inarket, and markets those
products to potential customers, \\lith some customization \vithin predetenllined lill1its.
4) Ho\v many people are employed by your business unit?
Production:
Engineering:
Planning:
TOTAL:
Administrative:
Industrial Eng.:
Other Support:
5) Please provide organization charts for your business unit.
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6) What is the mix of commercial to military work at your company?
7) Is commercial work separated into its o\\'n division or business unit?
8) What types of products has your business unit built in the last 5 years?
9) Describe how the markets your business unit targets has changed in the last five
years, and your plans for the future.
10) Please characterize your products in relationship to other company's products by size and
capacity. If your business is shipbuilding, please use length, Learn and deadv/eight tonnage.
II) Ho\v many units do you cOITIplete each year?
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12) What is the average development duration, measured in months, for typical products? Please
indicate with regard to conceptual through contract design and detail or production design.
Please indicate any significant differences that may exist for different products.
Concept through Contract
Detail design
13) What is the average number of development man-hours expended for typical products? Please
indicate any significant differences for different products.
Concept through Contract
Detail design
14) What is the average production duration, measured in months, from start of fabrication to
delivery for typical products?
15) Ho\v has the experience level, composition, or number of engineering/design personnel changed
in the last 5 years?
16) How has the experience level, composition, or number of production personnel changed in the
last 5 years?
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17) Did your business unit make a profit last year? Has it been profitable over the last five years?
18) What has been your average annual profit over the last two years:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
Less than 3 M
3 to 5 M
6 to 10 M
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
II to 15 M
16t020M
21 M or greater
19) What is your business unit's market share of its primary products?
20) Please describe key areas in which your company has invested towards training in the last two
years. What results have you seen?
21) What is the typical unit price for your typical products?
271
(This page intentionally left blank.)
272
APPENDIX B: DECISION MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND TEST
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DESIGN IMPROVEMENT PROPOSAL PRIORITIZATION MODEL
CRITERIA WEIGHTS QUESTIONNAIRE
October 1997
Rev 'A'
Please Return to:
Your name and how you
can be reached...
Matthew Tedesco
The following questionnaire seeks feedback from you regarding the degree to which
different parameters contribute to a design improvement proposal's capacity to enhance
shipyard competitiveness. The results of this questionnaire will be used to develop the
weights assigned to parameters in a decisionmaking model for use in evaluating, ranking,
and weighting design improvement proposals. This is accomplished through a system of
pair-wise comparisons known as the Analytic Hierarchy Process. This ranking and
weighting can subsequently be used as a basis for decisions regarding \vhich proposals to
implement and how to allocate resources to a portfolio of proposals.
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The decisionmaking model being proposed operates within the general framework illustrated
below. This questionnaire is concerned with the evaluation, prioritization and decisionmaking
phases of the framework, particularly as it relates to elective (productivity motivated) changes.
These changes are associated with the first row of motivations in the illustration below.
MOTIVATION
!
EOENTIFICATlON )~
r..t.1 !
t-4 I J~ fa~ EVALUATION ~~u ! 0; ~....
1-4 ( PRIORITIZATION )~ ..=; n0
w ! I~JI.1~
(OECISIONMAKING I~0 ,..... I!j
w ! !i~
#Q I J~ •~ PLANNING '='w la~ !..... tI1n
....
( IMPLEMENTING ] ~ c;
=!
MEASURING +--
The structured decision system proposed begins \vith a screening process \vhich quickly
evaluates the feasibility and merit of a proposal against a set of key criteria \vhich represent
thresholds belo'" \vhich porposals \vill not be pursued. Those that are not rejected as a result are
examined through an evaluation rnodel \vhich ranks and \veights the portfolio of feasible
proposals to assist in ilTIplementation and resource allocation decisions.
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.Iabilahilily
and Sl'fel\'
The hierarchy belo,;v illustrates the proposed prioritization model. In examining the model, recall that proposals which are to be
evaluated by this model have been previously screened to demonstrate that they are feasible and have merit. The goal is to select "the
best" design improvement proposals which have the greatest potential to enhance shipyard competitiveness. This goal is support,~d by
lower level objectives, or criteria, which serve as model parameters. These are sllbsequently supported by additional sub-criteria. The
criteria and sub-criteria reflect shipyard strategic objectives, and their weighting reflects the relative importance of objectives. Ilt the
lowest level of the hierarchy are alternative proposals. The most complete description and accounting for each proposal should be
made with respect to each parameter in the time available, but need not be overly detailed. Proposals will be pair-wise compared to
elicit judgments regarding intensity of preference for one over the other with respect to each parameter. This intensity of preference
can be based upon both quantitative and qualitative data. Through the Analytic Hierarchy Process, these pairwise comparisonls are
synthesized into a ranking and weighting of the alternatives. The AHP has advantages over other decisionmaking &pproaches in that it
allows both quantitative and qualitative data to be used, it structures the problem in a natural way, it admits and measures
inconsistency (useful in gauging the quality of a decision), and can be used to synthesize the judgments of multiple decisionmakers.
Selecl and prioritize lhe besl desi~n
impro\-ement proposals which will enhance
shipyard compeliliveness
or
Payload
[apaCil)'
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DEFINITIONS
The model parameters are defined as follows.
Benefits, Costs and Risks
The high level criteria in the hierarchy are benefits, costs and risks. N~t Benefits of
proposals represent the contribution the proposal makes to furthering shipyard strategic
objectives, as reflected in the sub-criteria to benefits. Costs refer to the negative impacts
which ilnplementing a proposal may have on the organization and the design. Risks are
associated with uncertainty. They represent an a~sessment of both the magnitude of the
uncertainty and the likelihood or probability associated with the uncertainty. These high
level parameters synthesize the results of their sub-criteria and reflect the intensity \vith
which one proposal contributes to benefits, costs, or risks with respect to another.
BENEFITS:
Cycle Time/Duration:
l'his parameter is associated with the value which reducing the construction cycle has to
the shipyard. It represents the intensity of preference for one p~oposal over another with
respect to their contribution to the strategic objective of reducing cycle time. Reduction
of cycle time is a strategic objective which has value independent of cost or quality. It is
associated with labor hours, material handling time and any waiting or lost tilne
associated with tasks. Cycle time ultimately impacts market share and ilnptl.cts on the
amount and type of work the shipyard C3n bid on. Reduced cycle time is generally
believed to lead to lower costs, but also has value independent of costs. For exanlple
·while reducing labor content, and therefore man-hours, will always result in reduced cost
it does not necessarily result in reduced cycle time. Tht reduction of cycle time is
dependent on whether the tasks being made easier are actually on the cri tical path. If they
are, a reduction in cycle time will occur in addition to a reduction in costs. A shipyard
may choose a strategy which focuses heavily on reducing cycle time without enlphasizing
dollar savings. Cycle time is being considered here as an independent paranleter and
reflects the value of reducing the construction cycle even if the dollar costs associated
with the labor content remained the same.
Ship production can be described as taking place in a variety of stages. These form sub-
criteria to reduced cycle time, as a shipyard 111ay deternline that reductions in a particular
stage are of greater strategic importance due to facility constraints and the \vork content
of a particular contract.
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The sub-criteria to cyc!e time reduction are defined as follows:
• Engineering
• SOC 1 - Fabrication
• SOC 2 - Sub Assembly
• SOC 3 - Asselnbly
• SOC 4 - On - Unit Outfitting
• SOC 5 - On - Block Outfitting
• SOC 6 - On - 8vard
• SOC 7 - Test and Trials
Dollar Savings:
This parameter represents the dollars associated \vith labor or material content \vhich the
proposal will save. It is the intensity of preference for one proposal over another \vith
respect to the total dollar value of man-hour reduction, substitution or reduction of
material, and other proposal characteristics. It is independent of dollars \vhich are not due
to labor or material content. Those that are associated with reduced cycle time (such as
incentives for meeting or beating schedule or costs associated vv'ith time in the yard that
are not directly linked to labor content or design features) are considered \vhen evaluating
alternatives with respect to cycle time and the weight allocated to that paranleter. In this
way, dollar savings is being defined as a parameter independent of cycle time.
Perfonnance or Quality Improvement:
This parameter is associated with a number of sub-criteria which reflect performance or
quality features of importance to the owner. The weights of these sub-criteria should
reflect the "voice of the customer" as it relates to their desires. The \veight of
perfonnance improvement in comparison to cycle tinle reduction or dollar savings is a
function of shipyard strategy and objectives. The parameter reflects the intensity of
preference for one proposal over another with respect to improving performance.
COSTS:
Dollars Invested:
This parameter represents the intensity of the decisionmakers aversion to the total cost, in
dollars, that is estiinated to be required to implement one proposal relative to another.
This should include consideration of non-recurring and recurring costs, labor, and
nlateria!.
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Schedule Delay:
This parameter represents the in~ensity with which one alternative negatively impacts
schedule with respect to other alternatives. The dollar value of schedule delay is
generally very difficult if not impossible to predict. The interest here is the intensity of
the aversion to projects which impact schedule regardless of the estimated dollar
investment in the project. This parameter has also been associated with sub-criteria to
allow the strategic importance of certain stages to be accounted for.
Additional Manning Required:
The requirement for additional manpo\ver by those involved in the implementation effol1
represents a cost which is distinct from budget and schedule. Manpower is a resource
\vhich contributes to dollar costs, but is also an independent consideration of in1portance
to decisionmakers. Forcing an overtime situation, or addition of people to the team,
represents a destabilizing force which management \\'ould prefer to avoid but is difficult
to evaluate strictly in tenns of dollars or schedule. The commitment of manpo\ver nleans
that this resource is now unavailable to handle cun'ent \vorkload or unforeseen
requirements. The weight associated with thjs parameter represents an aversion to
increased manpower requirements.
Additional Infonnation Systems Resources Required:
The requirement for additional COOlputer equipnlent or software represents a cost which
has significance independent of dollars invested. As was the case with nlanpower, this
requirement contributes to dollars invested~ but is generally considered as an additional
parameter by Inanagement. The paranleter represents the intensity with which one
proposal ties up (or requires acquisition of additional) infornlation system resources as
compared to another resource.
Product Performance or Quality:
This parameter represents the intensity with which one proposal negatively inlpacts
product perfonnance or quality as compared to another proposal. As \vas the case in the
discussion of benefits, it is a function of sub-criteria \vhich are of in1portance to the
customer.
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RISKS
Cost Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity with which the costs estimated for a proposal may
have been underestimated. It is a measure of cost uncertainty with respect to the
combined impact of magnitude and likelihood. It is a representation of the intensity of
preference for one proposal over another with respect to their cost uncertainty.
Benefit Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity with which the benefits estimated for a proposal
may have been underestimated. It is a measure of benefit uncertainty \vith respect to the
combined impact of magnitude and likelihood. It is a representation of the intensity of
preference for one proposal over another wi th respect to their benefit uncertainty.
Technical Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity with which one proposal is preferable over
another \vith respect to the likelihood that the proposal may fail for technical reasons.
Organizational Support Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity of preference for one proposal over another with
respect to the likelihood that one I ilay fail due to a lack of organizational support, despite
all other measures of merit being promising. This parameter is a function of a nUl11ber of
sub-criteria as follows.
The "Cultural" parameter represents the intensity with which one proposal requires
changes in peoples attitudes or daily work-habits as compared to another proposal. It
represents the impact that the change will have on people personally in the way they
conduct their daily work.
The "VisibJe Rapid Benefits" parameter represents the intensity with which a proposal is
believed to have highly visible short-terrTI benefits as cOPlpared to another proposal.
The ~·Resource Availability" paran'lcter represents the intensity of the uncertainty
associated \\'ith the availability of resources to inlplenlent one proposal as c0l11parcd to
another.
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'''Breadth of Rework Required" represents the intensity of preference for one proposai
over another with respect to the number of docum~nts and product models \vhich will
require rework to implement the proposal.
"Breadth of Cooperation Required" represents the intensity of preference for one prcposal
over another with respect to the degree of cooperation required by numerous people or
groups. It is a measure of the risks associated with the degree of communication and
cooperation which is required for a proposal to be successful.
"Visible Support" represents the intensity of preference for one proposal over another
\vith respect to the amount and quality of visible management support for the proposal.
The ~·Urgency, Strategy, Need" paranlcter measures the intensity of preference for
proposals which clearly are aligned with a COll1111Unicated and understood strategy or
shipyard objective which the people or organizations tasked with implen1cntation support.
'~Complexity & Capability'~ refers to the intensity of preference for proposals \vhich do
not require knowledge or workforce capabilities which are scarce or missing, and for
\vhich the means and requirements for implementation are readily understood and
achievable.
"Stability" refers to tIle intensity of preference for proposals \vhich require action related
to processes or interim products which are standardized and understood, and by people or
groups which are not presently stressed by a high degree of change.
Regulatory Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity of preference for proposals \vhich are less likely to
be delayed or rejected by regulatory bodies (or tr'e customer).
Schedule Risk:
This parameter represents the intensity of preference for proposals which exhibit less
uncertainty with respect the both the magnitude and likelihood of schedule delays beyond
those estimated in the consideration of costs.
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'fhresholds and Goals
When considering the benefits, costs or risks of proposals, please describe the threshold
level for each sub-criteria. These threshold levels represent the minimum level of
achievenlent you would accept to consider implementing a proposal. Please also describe
the goal level. This represents your Hstretch goal" or the best you would expect to see a
proposal achieve. These thresholds and goals will be useful in setting the context for the
subsequent pair-wise comparisons. They will also aid in the development of the pre-
prioritization screening model.
If a criteria is particularly insignificant to you, you may enter a zero for both the threshold
and the goal. If you believe that a proposal is worth looking at so long as a particular
parameter is positive, you can simply indicate "positive". The purpose of these questions
is to gain an understanding of how you would quickly determine if a proposal is \vorth
evaluating further, and to place conlparisons of parameters in the context of a scenario
which is "reasonable" to you. if the questions below do not reflect the way you think
about these issues, please provide a short description of how you consider thresholds and
goals for proposals.
Maximizing Benefits:
Cycle Time Reduction:
In establishing the thresholds and goals, assume that the only cycle time reduction a
proposal results in is for that particular stage. In setting the threshold and goal for ~~all
stages" consider the reduction you would expect to see for any given proposal \vith
respect to TOTAL construction cycle. Please express these as % improvement over
current performance.
STAGE THRESHOLD GOAL STAGE Tl-IRESHOLD GOAL
Engineering: 0/0 % SOC4: % 0/0
--
SOC 1: 0/0 0/0 SOC 5: % 0/0
SOC2: % o~ SOC 6: 0/0 0/0
---- ---
SOC 3: °/0 0/0 SOC?: ~/o 0/0
---
Ali Stages: % °/0
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Dollar Savings:
Please indicate the threshold dollar value you would consider as worth pursuing, and the
"'stretch goal" which represents the most you would expect the "best" proposal to save.
You can also indicate a benefit/cost ratio or return if that is an important consideration to
you.
Threshold $
-------
Goal $
--------
Product Perfonnance or Quality Improvement:
The model being developed is focused upon proposals \\'hich enhance competitiveness
through productivity improvement. This parameter and its sub-criteria is therefore of
secondary importance in evaluating benefits within the context of the purpose of this
model. It is included to reflect the fact that given two proposals which provide equal
benefits with respect to productivity, one which improves quality would be favored.
There is no need to identify threshold values or goals.
Minimizing Implementation Costs:
Dollars Invested:
Please indicate the highest threshold dollar value you would consider as worth pursuing.
The '''stretch goal" is assumed to be a zero cost change. You can also indicate a
benefit/cost ratio or return if that is an important consideration to you.
Threshold $
--------
Goal 0 $
--_..........-_---
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Schedule Delays:
Please indicate the most schedule delay you would accept. The goal is assumed to be
zero delay.
STAGE THRESHOLD GOAL STAGE THRESHOLD GOAL
Engineering: 0/0 0 % SOC 4: 0/0 0 0/0
SOC I: % 0 % SOC 5: 0/0 0 0/0
SOC 2: 0/0 0 % SOC 6: % 0 %
SOC 3: 0/0 0 0/0 SOC?: % 0 ~'O
---
Ali Slages: 0/0 0 0/0
Additional Manning Required:
Please indicate the threshold highest increase in equivalent men you \vould accept as
being required above the baseline workload during the implementation period.
Thresh'lld equlv. men Goal 0,--- equlv. men
Additional Infonnation Systems Required:
Please indicate the threshold highest increase in number of con1putcr tcrnlinals or
soft\vare licenses you would accept as being required above the baseline \vorkload during
the implem~ntation period.
Threshold tenninals/licenses Goal 0 tcrlninals/liccnscs
---- --------
Product Performance or Quality Impact:
It is assurned that for fhe purposes of this nlodel, the threshold pcrfornlance level is not
explicit, but is some measure that is related to the ship specification, applicable
regulations and shipyLrd standards. It is understood that S0l11C negotiation is possible
with regard to specifi cations and standards, but that there is generally an understood
threshold pcrfonnance level for each characteristic. The threshold \vill be assunlcd to be
understood, and the goal is no negative inlpact.
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Minimizing Risks:
Cost Risk:
Please indicate the threshold uncertainty which you would accept with respect to
implementation costs. This can be expressed as a probability distribution. The
distribution will be described subjectively here using several points. rfhe interest is only
in costs higher than the estimate. The goal is assumed to be zero risk of implementation
costs higher than those estimated.
Probability that implementation cost is as estimated:
Probability that implementation cost is 10% higher:
Max % increase over estimate you would accept:
Probability that implementation cost is that nluch higher:
Benefit Risk:
%
------
%
------
0/0
------
0/0
------
Please indicate the threshold uncertainty which you \vould accept with respect to
implementation benefits. This can be expressed as a probability distribution. The
distribution will be described subjectively here using several points. The interest is only
in benefits lower than the estimate. The goal is assumed to be zero risk of
implementation benefits lower than those estimated.
Probability that implementation benefit is as estimated:
Probability that implementation benefit is 100/0 lower:
Max % decrease below estimate you would accept:
Probability that implementation benefit is that much lower:
Technical Risk:
0/0
-------
0/0
------
o~
----
%
-----
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal \vould be proven to be
technically unworkable? The goal is assun1ed to be zero risk.
010
---
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Organizational Risk:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because of insufficient organizational support? The goal is assulned to be
zero risk.
0/0
-----
Please consider each of the sub-criteria to organizational risk...
Cul.tural:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal \vould fail to be
inlplemented because of insufficient organizational support due to the intensity with
\vhich the proposal requires those tasked with implementation to change their attitudes or
daily work habits? The goal is assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
Visible Rapid Benefit:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because of insufficient organizational support due to the intensity with
which the proposal lacks clearly visible, short tenn, benefits? The goal is assumed to be
zero risk.
0/0
-----
Resource P.vailability:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because at some point during implementation it is found that there are
insufficient resources? The goal is assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
Breadth of rework required:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because those tasked with implementation could not accept the level of
rework involved? The goal is assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
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Breadth of cooperation required:
What threshold ~1> chance would you accept that the proposal \vould fail to be
implemented because at some point during implementation it is found that
communication !ines have broken down and that the necessary level of cooperation was
not being achieved among those tasked with implementation? The goal is assumed to be
zero risk.
0/0
-----
Visible Support:
What threshold % chance \vould you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because of insufficient clearly visible management support? The goal is
assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
Urgency, Strategy, Need:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because it is not clear that there is a strategy associated with it, or that it fits
into an existing strategy? The goal is assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
-----
Complexity and Capability:
What threshold % chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
implemented because of its task complexity and/or a lack of the necessary \vorkforce
skills? The goal is assumed to be zero risk.
0/0
-----
Stability:
What threshold Ofr, chance would you accept that the proposal would fail to be
inlplemented because it is associated \vith issues for \vhich there is a lack of clearly
understood standard processes and products, and those tasked with inlplenlcntation are
already undergoing significant change efforts? The goal is assuI11cd to be zero risk.
0/0
-----
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RET ~TIONSHIP MATRICES
Please identify in the matrices below the degree to which one parameter (on the left)
impacts another parameter's (top of matrix) contribution to the goal. Use the follo\ving
intensity scale. Positive values indicate a parameter assists another in its contribution to
the goaL Negative values indicate a parameter hinders another in its contribution to the
goaL Please review the parameter definitions when detennining relationships. If you
believe that there is no dependency, then enter a zero.
INTENSITY DEF~,ITION EXPLANATION
Experience and judgment indicate a strong influence
There is no dependency relationship
Tv/o parameters are identical
One parameter weakly influences the other
One parameter moderately influences the other
None
Equal
Weak
Moderate
Moderate Plus
Strong
Strong Plus
Very Strong
Very, Very Strong
Extreme Importance
o
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 The evidence of the impact of one activity over another is
of the highest po~sible order of affirmation
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Minimize Implementation Costs
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Minimizing Risks
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PAIR-WISE QUESTIONNAIRE
The following questions will relate to pair\vise conlparisons between model parameters. You will be asked
to identify which parameter more intensely supports a~ objective, and by ho\v much, as compared to
another parameter. In answering these questions, the following interpretation should be used for numerical
representations of intensity judgments.
INTENSITY
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Example
DEFINITION
Equal Importance
Weak
Moderate
Moderate Plus
Strong
Strong Plus
Very Strong
Very, Very Strong
Extreme Importance
EXPLANATION
T\'JO activities contribute equally to the objective
Experience and judgment slightly favor one
Experience and judgment strongly favor one
An activity is favored very strongly over another
The evidence favoring one activity over another is
of the highest possible order of affinnation
Which of the two parameters below has the greatest influence on the value of a proposal's benefits to the
shipyard, and with what intensity?
Cycle Time Reduction $$$ Savings
9.....8...(2)...6.....5.....4.....3.....2 ..... 1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....8.....9
In the example above, cycle time reduction is considered to be very strongly favored over dollar savings
with respect to the value of a proposal' 5 benefits to the sh ipyard.
Please consider the following:
• The alternatives being evaluated by the model described have already been screened to determ ine that
they meet minimum feasibility criteria and are believed to have merit (net positive benefit). Proposals
being evaluated will have been estimated to meet threshold requirements.
• The cdteria weights reflect shipyard strategy, and are a function of the conditions at the shipyard and
even a particular contract. In answering these questions, please consider the conditions that existed at
the start of the Sealift New Construction contract. The alternatives being evaluated have generally
been motivated by lessons learned on Sealift Conversion 1 and identification of technology \\'hich has
not yet been taken advantage of. Please assume that this prioritization addresses the decision to
implement on SLNC or not, and that Functional and l~ransition design are essentially complete. Detail
Structural design is \vell undenvay and outfitting detail design has begun.
• In answering the pair-\vise comparisons on the follo\\'ing pages, please indicate \vhich paranlctcr
contributes more intensely to the goal of selecting and prioritizing design inlprOVeJnent proposals to
enhance 3hipyard competitiveness. Assume that the cOIl'!parison is bet\\'een achieving the threshold in
the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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HIGH LEVEL CRITERIA
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following page more intensely
contributes to the goal of selecting and prioritizing design improvement proposals to
enhance shipyard competitiveness. Assume that the comparison is between achieving the
threshold in the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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BENEFITS
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following page more intensely
contributes to the goal of maximizing the benefit of design improvement proposals.
Assume that the comparison is between achieving the threshold in the lesser vs. the goal
in the greater as defined earlier.
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BENEFITS - Cycle Time Reduction
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following pages more intensely
contributes io the goal of maximizing the benefit of design improvement proposals by
reducing cycle time. Assume that the comparison is between achieving the threshold in
the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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BENEFITS - Perfonnance Improvement
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following pages more intensely
contributes to the goal of maximizing the benefit of design improvement proposals by
improving product perfonnance or quality. Assume that the comparison is between
achieving the threshold in the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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COSTS
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following page more intensely
contributes to the goal of minimizing the cost of implementation of design improvement
proposals. Assume that the comparison is between achieving the threshold in the lesser
vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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COSTS - Schedule Delay
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following pages more intensely
contributes to tile goal of minimizing the cost of implementation of design improvement
proposals by minimizing schedule delays. Assume that the comparison is between
achieving the threshold in the iesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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COSTS - Product Perfonnance
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following pages more intensely
contributes to the goal of minimizing the cost of implementation of design improvement
proposals by minimizing negative impacts upon product perfonnance or quality. Assume
that the comparison is between achieving the threshold in the lesser vs. the goal in the
greater as defined earlier.
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RISKS
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following page more intensely
contributes to the goal of minimizing the risks of implementation failure of design
improvement proposals. Assume that the comparison is between achieving the threshold
in the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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RISKS - Organizational
Please identify which of the parameters in the pairs on the following pages more intensely
contributes to the goal of minimizing the risks of implementation failure due to a lack of
organizational support for design improvement proposals. Assume that the comparison is
between achieving the threshold in the lesser vs. the goal in the greater as defined earlier.
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TEST OF THE MODEL
REV '-' Alternatives Evaluation
Your name:
Case studies are being used to "test" the model wtlich has been developed based upon the
feedback you previously provided. A short description of the case projects is provided
with some of the "backup" material which had been generated at the time the project was
being considered. This material is provided after the pair-wise comparison questions.
Please review it to refresh your mernory reg~rding the case studies as necessary. The
intent is to evaluate the projects as though you were looking at them for the first time,
based upon the knowledge that was available to you at the time the projects were initially
being proposed.
In answering the questions, please consider the conditions that existed at the 5t811 of the
SLNC. The alternatives being evaluated have generally been motivated by lessons
learned on the SLCI. Functional and Transitio!1 design for the SLNC are essentially
complete, detail design in Structural is well underway and Outfitting detail design has
begun.
These projects will be pair-wise compared against the model criteria to result in a ranking
and weighting of the projects based on the information that was available at the time (in
the past). These cases have been selected becCluse I believe tha~ they will be familiar to
you, and because we have knowledge today regarding ho\v successful they were. In
addition to pair-wise comparing the alternatives with respect to the criteria to evaluate
them via the model, I am also asking you to pair-wise compare them DIRECTLY as to
the intensity with which you believe they were successful in enhancing the shipyard's
productivity. This should be based on everything you know today.
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CASE STUDY SUMMARIES
Eight case studies were selected 10 test the decision model developed in this
research. Summaries of the cases were developed, complete with supporting
documentation, to refresh the memory of those participating in the research. They were
asked to pairwise compare the cases reiative to the model criteria based upon the
information that was available at the time the case was originally being considered. Later
the participants were asked to pairwise compare the cases with respect to the contribution
they were thought to have actually made to improved competitiveness. The following
summaries are provided to give additional background to the reader, but do not include
the quantitative data which is considered to be business sensitive.
CASE 1 - Deck Socket Cups
It has been proposed by production to reduce the thickness of deck socket cups for
lashing tie-downs from 1/2" to 114" for an existing and upcoming sealift contract.
Implementing the change would mean modifying an existing standard to include the new
cups and to change any existing bills of material and find numbers on drawings as
required for follow on work for contracts in progress. It is proposed to use the thinner
cups everywhere except the weather deck and in way of tanks. The ships under
consideration are estimated to have 14,000 to 22,000 per vessel that would be candidates
for the change.
This design change would:
• Modestly reduce the weight of a ship
• Result in savings in material dollars
e Result in labor savings
• Result in facilities savings by cutting use of weld robots in half, subsequently
extending availability.
• Layout and welding of the cups is on the critical path for the assembly Stage of
Construction, but durations and impact upon durations are not known
• Result in improved quality of the weld connection of the cup to the deck (100% \vcld
vs. partial) which has ABS and MSC support
• Reduce the corrosion resistance of the cup itself, but this is not anticipated to be a
problem so long as the proposal is limited to decks other than the weather and tanks.
In this case the cup thickness meets ASS corrosion allowance.
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Initial review of the proposal has shown it to be reasonably feasible, but that ASS and
customer approval are subject to a series of physical tests. Hull systems experts believe
that the proposal would be acceptable structurally, but ASS and the customer would like
to see a demonstration that the thinner cups would not adversely effect the performance
of the tie down. The requested test is similar to one performed previously. The test
would involve pulling the sockets to the breaking strengt~Jproofload of the tie dOWll to
demonstrate that no significant deformation occurs. The physical tests would require the
design and construction of a 20 foot by 9 foot steel replication of a deck with cloverleaf
l:uts and three deep beanls and four longitudinal stiffe;ters. Both thick and thin cups
wOllld need to be made for use on this test fixture. Additional test equipment for use in
this test is pre-existing from the earlier, similar, test that \\'as performed. The general test
methods are understood because of earlier experience in getting approval for the current
configuration.
An additional savings which may result is during the test and trials period. If the test is
successful, ABS has suggested that they would reduce or eliminate the existing
requirement to production test 2% of the on-board cup installations. On-board testing
involves a l. -' w of two test engineers moving a test apparatlls from tie-down to tie-down
throughout the ship to pull test them. Furthennore, paperwork must be maintained and
submitted regarding the tests.
Cost data for this proposal is incomplete. The costs in engineering include updating the
standard, anticipated to require the addition of details and part numbers to an existing
standard. The cost for constructing the test deck section is not clear, but feedback from
production is that they have remnant material available which can be used and that it
would require about two weeks to build (duration) not man-hours). It is possible that
construction might involve the weld school. Perfonning the tests is anticipated to require
one week in duration with three people (a production engineer, and t\VO test engineers)
required full time during the test. Furthennore, the test must be developed and approved
by ABS. This will require a production engineer full time and a test engineer part time
for approx. three weeks. The cost to incorporate the change will depend on ho\v quickly
approval can be obtained. In addition to the engineering effort, some re-planning may be
required to support the change.
The decision point is whether or not to proceed with the tests, and to develop the new
standard in pr~paration for the change. In addition, in order to meet schedules, it would
be prudent to perform prelin1inary engineering work to identify the changes and
Engineering Change Notices in advance of approval to be ready to issue itnnlediatcly
upon approval. Production fully supports the move. Engineering had initially given
production's request a lukewarm reception, but has recently shown support for lhe idea as
visibility and upper management support have strengthened. Additionally, there are
presently concerns regarding ship weight and any effort which reduces \veight is
appreciated by Systems Engineering.
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CASE 2 - VanStone Flanges
An analysis of the critical path for On Block Outfitting has demonstrated that pipe
installation is a key driver. FurtheIinore, make-up of pipe at block breaks after erection is
also a key driver On Board. It has been suggested by Pipe Shop Management that
Manufacturing Engineering examine the use of mechanical fittings versus welded fittings.
Welded joints require the use of skilled labor which is a scarce commodity which could
be put to better use. Cost returns suggest that pipe fabrication and installation is the
second largest cost driver for the Sealift Ships next to steel.
In response to Production's request, Manufacturipg Engineering has benchmarked other
leaders in the shipbuilding industry such as a Japanese yald as well as the civil
engineering and petrochem industries. This lesearch has detnonstrated that a number of
alternative mechanical joints exist. One !iliriguing example is the VanStone Flange.
Traditional flanging is already an option for the yard, but requires flanges to be welded in
place and also requires alignment from one flange to the next at installation. The
proposed approach utilizes a VanStone flared expansion of the pipe, with a slip on flange
that is held on the pipe by the expanded end. Two flanges can be rotated about the pipe
to be aligned to one another at installation and t~te bolted connection holds the flared ends
of the pipe tightly in place. Pressurization of the pipe actually increases the tightness of
the joint. This approach has been used successfully in civil engineering with no reports
of undue leakage. Shipboard applications have been reported, but these have been
limited and have had mixed results. Some owners have reported that the connections leak
in service. Due to the anticipated savirlgs potential, Manufacturing Engineering
perfonned a study to detennine the relative savings in hours and dollars per joint for a
variety of alternative schemes. This has demonstrated that the VanStone Flange
represents an order of magnitude savings over the current approach of welded sleeves or
welded flanges.
To implement this proposal, the acquisition of a VanStone machine will be required. In
addition, pipe-fitting standards will require revision. Additional benchmarking and
research is required to develop demonstrable technical confidence in the approach.
Testing has been performed to date that indicates that the proposal is sound, but the
Customer is still wary and requires additional testing. Furthermore, Systems Engineering
has expressed similar concerns. It is not yet clear under what conditions the proposal
would be approved and what the guarantee terms would be. It is anticipated that an
additional combination of physical testing and engineering analysis will be required to
demonstrate that the joints will not leak in a dynamic shipboard environnlent over tilne.
The cost to implement the change on the first ship will be a function of ho\v quickly
approval can be obtained. It is estimated that a significant engineering effort \vould be
required to modify the bills of material and pipe spool sheets, as well as to issue ECN's.
This approach is being considered for piping sizes from 2 1/2" to 16" IPS. Since these
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flanges are larger than existing joints, penetrations through beams and bulkheads must be
increased to accommodate them. This represents an additional cost in penetration
control, ECN's, and requires a significant amount of cooperation between the Deck OfF
department and the Structural Department. Furthennore, use of this approach on larger
piping is predicated on some additional work being none to get approval for penetrations
through beams which are larger than those our current standard would allow. Even if this
were not done, Production is convinced that the savings, if approved for the piping that
can currently be accommodated, is overwhelming. It is proposed to have this joint be the
preferred shop joint to replace socket and butt weld joints to the greates~ extent possible.
It is also proposed that this joint be the standard for field joints for applicable size ranges.
A restriction would be that mechanical joints would only be used in tanks when similar
fluids are in the pipe and tank. Thus this is anticipated to be the joint of choice for most
systems such as the Fire Main, Foam Main, Bilge and Oily Waste, Sea Water Cooling,
Ballast, Lube Oil, 1'ank Vents and Sounding Tubes, and Vehicle Washdown.
The current decision point is whether to continue research on this proposal and to perform
the required testing and analysis, and to develop the proposed standard in preparation for
approval. Actual changes would not conlmence until after approval, at which point a
decision would be made regarding hull applicability.
CASE:; - FoundationIMethod Mount Standard
Experience on the Sealift Conversion contract demonstrated that the identification,
design, procurement and installation of equipment foundations was very costly and
caused extensive rework. Confusion and lateness of VFI resulted in late identification of
the need for a foundation, and therefore the design and procurement processes did not
support Assenlbly and Outfitting Stages of Construction. This lead to extensive rework
on board. A lack of resources resulted in subcontract of foundation designs resulting in
additional management costs and subsequent rework due to miscommunication.
Production has suggested that the foundations appear to follow no consistent design
practice and are not utilizing the most producible details. Foundation fabrication is
subcontracted, and the lack of standardization of materials and construction practices has
increased costs and resuited in poor accuracy control.
This resulted in the formation of a PAT team with upper management support to
investigate the root causes of the problems and suggest process and organizational
improvements. The PAT team focused on the identification, nlanagement and
procurement processes. It was suggested that Manufacturing Engineering work with
Engineering to focus on the design process and inlprove the product itself to reduce costs
and cycle time.
It is proposed to reduce the costs and cycle time associated with design, fabrication, and
installation of foundations by:
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• Developing standards eliminating the need to design, draw, fabricate and ship a
foundation
• Increase foundation availability by utilizing standard parts
• Iilstall in On Block and Assembly vs. On Board Stages of Construction due to
increased availability
• Develop design guidance for typical but non-standard foundations and train designers
to reduce fab and installation costs
The pioposed standard would provide guidance and part numbers for "method mounts" to
cover a wide range of circumstances. These would take advantage of stud tecrulology and
mechanical fastening to the greatest extent possible. Additional standards would be
developed such as "pedestal" type foundations and standard angle bar grillages for use on
decks and bulkheads. Design guidance for minimizing costly backup structure would be
provided.
To implement the proposal requires significant development effort. Engineering analysis
must be perfomled for the method mounts to det~rmine their range of applicability. In
addition a number of physical tests would be perfonned to demonstrate the feasibility of
different options. MSC has shown great interest in foundations and has reservations
about reducing backup structure and shows a preference for uniquely designed
foundations due to concerns regarding vibration and corrosion. To obtain savings on the
first New Construction ship, the project must be funded and started quickly. 'rhe cost
savings projected are a result of
• Reduced design time in engineering due to callout of standards rather than unique
design
• Reduced cycle time in purchasing due to reduced number of uniquely fabricated
foundations
• Reduced cycle time in production control due to fe\ver foundations to be received and
checked
• Reduced material/fab costs
• Reduced installation cycle time and costs
The costs associated with implementation include engineering analysis. It is anticipated
that this cost will be at least partially recouped by using the analysis for a subsequent
NSRP deliverable if we are awarded that project. In addition, some physical
"prototyping" will be required. These costs have not been estimated. Engilleering will
need to perfonn significant revision to an existing standard, essentially a rewrite. This is
expected to be a major undertaking which will tie up one person in standards at close to
full time for one and a half months after the analysis is complete and require their part
time participation prior to that. The analysis is expected to require three months. During
this time a i'Aanufacturing Engineer will be assigned to the project full tinle. Once the
standard is developed, its success will require significant training in Engineering
regarding the availability and selection of standards. Outfitting design engineers are
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currently working in a mode where the foundation is "Structural's problem" and will
resist this change. The PAT team has suggested moving the foundation design group to
Deck Outfitting which would reduce this risk, but that suggestion has not been approved
yet.
The decision point is whether to begin development of the standard and to start the
analysis. Training would be begun regarding foundation producibility concurrently with
the analysis.
CASE 4 - Round Spiral Duct
Next to piping, ventilation represents the next cycle time driver for On Block Outfitti~g.
Pipe is currently the cycle time driver, but if pipe installation time is reduced, ventilation
will become part of the critical path. Ventilation also represents a significant fabricat;on
and installation cost.
The Sheetmetal department suggested that Manufacturing Engineeri!1g examine potential
savings for ventilation fabrication and installation. M.E. perfonned a study and
determined that the current approach which utilizes rectangular duct passed through
beams using heavy spool pieces is very costly by comparison to alternatives. The least
costly approach is to use round spiral duct passed through beams with no spool pieces
and attached with studs.
Use of Round Spiral Duct on sealift will require larger penetrations than can presently be
cut in the beams per existing standards if it is to be used in all applications. Preliminary
investigation indicates that it is possible to get approval for larger openings if additional
engineering effort is undertaken. Absent of this, round spiral would be used where
possible with flat oval spiral duct (fabricated from round spiral) used in other cases.
The decision being considered is whether to modify the ventilation standards in
preparation for the New Construction contracf, and to backfix part of the lower deck
composite drawings which had already been started to reflect round spiral duct. In
addition, it is desired to rework parts of the Conversion contract.
CASE 5 - Penetration Standard
Traditional standards fOf allowable penetration sizes and conlpensation resulted In
significant costs on the Sealift Conversion contract associated with:
• Greater numbers of distributive system runs required due to smaller allo\vable
penetrations
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• Many unique penetration sIzes resulting in a penetration control nightmare and
rework in the field
• Use of expensive steel compensating rings and doublers throughout the ship
It is estimated that there will be 4,000 penetrations in the cargo hold beams of the New
Construction contract and that half of these require compensation. Penetrations are
currently burned manually at Assembly or On Block.
An initial engineering analysis demonstrated that in many cases tile penetration
standards were conservative, but was not at a detailed enough level or thought through
well enough to get ABS approval. The indication is that half the compensation can be
eliminated. On Block management suggested installation of compensation is on the
critical path, and that elimination could represent a cycle time reduction per block. By
undertaking additional analysis, seeking A.BS approval and issuing a Contract Particular
Standard, reinforcement could be reduced. In addition, the standardization on the larger
openings would improve design stability. This in tum would facilitate NC burning of
penetrations in the early Steel Fabrication Stage of Construction and installation of
compensating parts in Sub-Assembly and Assembly representing an elimination of this
work content entirely from the later On Block stage. Larger openings would also
facilitate proposals associated with mechanical pipe fittings and round spiral duct.
The engineering analysis is anticipated to take two months, with program management
required from the ME department. The cost is uncertain because the workscope will be
defined as we go based upon what we learn and what ASS requires as proof of concept.
MSC is wary of the approach but will accept whatever ASS approves. Development of
the CPS standard is expected to require significant effort. It will require one Standards
Engineer full time for two months, and additional assistance as required. The standard
represents a significant departure from the way that engineering does business and will
require a great deal of training for it to be successful, as the acceptable sizes of
penetrations ,is anticipated to be a function of location in the ship. The standard will
therefore be more complex than that which is currently in use. Training in production
will also be required, as they have learned to compensate openings even in situations
where engineering mistakenly (or not) neglected to add parts to the drawings. Production
will be required to "trust" the drawing because their instincts will not reflect the standard.
To maximize the benefits attributable to this initiative, it is proposed to concurrently
develop a more streamlined penetration control process leading to NC cutting of
penetrations in early Stages of Construction. Cooperation will be required between Deck
OIF and Structural Engineering to maximize the benefits of the proposal. The current
decision point is whether to continue research on this proposal and to perform the
required analysis, and to develop the proposed standard in preparation for approval ..
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CASE 6 - Loro
This proposal is similar to the VanStone Flange proposal. Research has identified a pipe
fitting which requires no hot work or mechanical fastening for non-pressurized systems.
It is a simple system consisting of a flared and unflared end. The unflared end is pushed
into the flared end and a gasket seals the joint.
The customer is wary of the joint due to potential leakage problems, but is willing to
consider limited lise as a pilot project. The dollar savings from using Loro-X and Loro-
Vac is similar to that for use of VanStone Flanges, but the installation cycle time is
significantly lower. In addition, this approach requires a smaller opening through
structure and can be used on smaller pipe.
Some physical testing will be required to get approval for the pilot use on deck drains
(the application that negotiations to date with MSC has suggested). It is hoped that
additional demonstration and negotiation may yield additional application approval.
Once the testing is complete, and approval is obtained, pipe standards will require
revision. It is anticipated that this process will take some time and that rework to
engineering drawings will be required to take advantage of this application on the first
Sealift New Construction hull. It is believed that the upper decks \vill not require rework,
but that lower decks may_
CASE 7 - Shifting Work from On Block OfF to Steel Assembl'y' Stages of Construction
It is appreciated that both cost and cycle time can be reduced if work can be perfonned in
the earliest appropriate stage of construction. It has been suggested that installation of
pipe, hangers and other metal outfit that requires hot work be performed in steel Stages of
Construction rather than On Block OfF. Recent improvements in steel production have
resulted in reduced cycle times in early steel Stages of Construction but cycle time
reduction in SOC 5 has not been as dramatic. Steel productioll supports the effort,
believing that with recent improvements in their processes they can achieve the new
workscope without impacting their cycle time dramatically_ T'hey do require a significant
replaruling effort to be accomplished along -"vith production infonnation to be added to
steel drawings rather than outfit drawings.
A fonnal benefit analysis has not been perfomled, but there is high level visibility and
support for this project. It is believed by iTIOst experts that it will result in a dramatic
decrease in cycle time and overall costs. There is risk. If the required infoffilation is not
provided, is incomplete, or is wrong, then the result could be confusion and rework in
both steel and outfit stages.
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Proper itnplementation will require significant effort with regard to changes to planning
processes, as well as training and changes to engineering processes in Outfitting and
Structural. Since steel stages of construction are earlier, and many Structural Engineering
products have already been issued for the first hull, significant replarming and rework will
be required. In addition, the OfF design is not stable at the time of issue of Structural
products. For this reason, it has been proposed that OIF continue tc issue their drawings
as they are and that planning perfonn work to annotate the Structural products. This
represents a continuing function, and therefore additional workscope for the planning
function. The trade-off is between cycle time reduction and cost reduction in production
at the expense of ongoing additional worksco.pe in engineering and planning. No formal
cost/benefit analysis has been done, but it is generally agreed that the savings are
significant provided schedules are not missed.
CASE 8 - Stud Mounted Padeyes
Throughout the ship, padeyes are welded in place to provide lifting points for equipment
maintenance. ABS requires testing of these padeyes, and each must be labeled to indicate
its allowable load. Metal OfF Production suggested that Manufacturing Engineering
develop and perform tests on a stud mounted padeye to see if it could be used as an
alternative. The use of studs has been very successful for hangers and other outfit. The
hope is to reduce material costs by not providing as many padeyes and to reduce m/h' s
associated with installation and testing of padeyes.
The installation and testing of padeyes is not believed to be on the critical path, but was a
highly "annoying" process for production on the previous contract which resulted in
significant m/h's expended on rework. This was the result of two problems. The first is
that testing often required mounting additional padeyes for the sole purpose of facilitating
testing. The second was that identification of the need for padeyes was too late to
support the first of the class in a timely manner, as the drawing was ship-wide rather than
by block.
The proposal is to utilize stud mounted padeyes and to seek approval to eliminate
production on-board testing by getting approval that the stud welding process is "in
control". ASS and MSC has suggested that they would accept this. Furthennore
Engineering is to identify padeyes to the appropriate block to facilitate installation.
Engineering has agreed to do this regardless of the type of p~deye. Shifting the \vork to
the earlier stage of construction will reduce the labor cost associated with the traditional
padeye.
It has been proposed by production personnel there is a savings in mill in using the stud
mounted padeye, but insufficient data is available to confirm the extent of the savings.
While it is generally agreed that some savings may result in installation m/h's, it is not
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believed to be significant based on a follow-on study. The material costs of the stud
mounted padeye are higher than those for the standard padeye, but this would be offset by
reducing the number provided.
Engineering supports the change if it results in elimination of the need to provide a
padeye for every locatiun. The proposal is to provide a box of padeyes, and merely shoot
the studs in the overhead as required. In addition, Engineering would only support the
change if it eliminated the need for labelplates in the vicinity of the padeye locations.
Absent these savings~ program management does not believe the proposal is justified.
Other improvements to the process which are already in place will result in savings over
past practices even with traditional padeyes.
A test program has been suggested by Manufacturing Engineering which would require
approximately one month to complete and a Manufacturing Engineer \vorking full time
on the project. In addition, the proposal would require a change to an existing standard.
MSC has suggested that they like the approach because they believe it will provide them
with some operational benefits. They have not approved the idea of not providing a
single padeye for each location or the idea of eliminating the need to label the padeyes. It
is not clear that they can be convinced on these points.
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